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ABSTRACT 
 
Law and science are fundamental to the operation of racism in the United States.  
Law provides structure to maintain and enforce social hierarchies, while science ensures 
that these hierarchies are given the guise of truth.  Biologists and geneticists have used 
race in physical sciences to justify social differences, while criminologists, sociologists, 
and other social scientists use race, and Blackness in particular, as an explain-all for 
criminality, poverty, or other conditions affecting racialized peoples.  Social and physical 
sciences profoundly impact conceptualizations and constructions of race in society, while 
juridical bodies give racial science the force of law—placing legal benefits and criminal 
punishments into play.  Yet, no formal rules govern the use of empirical data in opinions 
of the Supreme Court.  My dissertation therefore studies the Court’s use of social 
scientific evidence in two key cases involving race and discrimination to identify what, if 
any, social scientific standards the Court has developed for its own analysis of scientific 
evidence.  In so doing, I draw on Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Institutional 
Ethnography (IE) to develop a methodological framework for the study and use of social 
sciences in the law.  Critical Race scholars generally argue that race is a social and legal 
construct and racism is endemic, and permanent, while Institutional Ethnography 
provides a social scientific method for rigorous study of the law by mapping and 
illuminating relationships of power manifested in social institutions that construct 
consciousness and place for marginalized groups in society.  Combining methods of IE 
with epistemologies of CRT, I propose Critical Race Methodologies in the study of 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.  These two cases from 
ii 
recent terms of the Supreme Court involve heavy use of social sciences in briefing and at 
oral argument, and both cases set standards for racial inclusiveness in Texas.  Throughout 
this dissertation, I look at how law and social sciences co-construct racial meanings and 
racial power, and how law and social science understand and misunderstand one another 
in attempting to scientifically understand the role of race in the United States. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?  
(Who watches the watchmen?) 
-Juvenal, Satire VI, 347-8 
 
Law and science are fundamental to the construction of race and racism in the 
United States.  Law provides structure to maintain and enforce social hierarchies, like Jim 
Crow segregation or mass incarceration, while science ensures that these hierarchies are 
given the guise of truth.  Biologists and geneticists use race in physical sciences to justify 
social differences,1 while criminologists, sociologists, and other social scientists use race, 
and Blackness in particular, as an explain-all for criminality, poverty, or other conditions 
effecting racialized peoples.2  Social and physical sciences influence the way that race is 
conceptualized and constructed in society; enabling, enacting, and perpetuating white 
supremacy by giving racism an air of science or objectivity.  Courts and legislation also 
give racial science the force of law—adding legal benefits or criminal punishments.   
Scientific evidence can also undermine legal regimes of racial power.  In Brown 
v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Earl Warren cited to psychological and sociological 
                                                 
1 See Troy Duster, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (2nd ed. 2003) (describing the ways genetic sciences have 
revived eugenics movements by biologizing social constructs, like race); Dorothy Roberts, FATAL 
INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (2011) (discussing how racial categorization is reinscribed in new technologies and laws, like 
supposed DNA tests for ancestry which use statistical correlations between genetic markers to guess about 
ancestries and geographies as a substitute for racial categorization), and Kim TallBear, NATIVE AMERICAN 
DNA: TRIBAL BELONGING AND THE FALSE PROMISE OF GENETIC SCIENCE (2013) (examining how genetics 
companies are selling unproven, and inaccurate DNA testing to Tribal Nations as a means of determining 
citizenship). 
2 See Tukufu Zuberi, THICKER THAN BLOOD: HOW RACIAL STATISTICS LIE (2001) (describing how 
statistics have used race as a proxy or decontextualized identity to legitimize stratification and disparities in 
healthcare, sentencing, income, etc.); Khalil Gibran Muhammad, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: 
RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010) (describing how social science was 
used to both vindicate and undermine associations of Blackness with criminality based on studies of crime). 
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studies as evidence of segregation’s negative impacts on Black youth.3  These “modern 
authorities” indicating the ongoing harms of segregation provided sufficient weight to 
overturn long established legal precedent.4 Particularly in understanding or explaining the 
effects of social constructs like race or gender, scientific evidence often takes center stage 
in legislation and legal proceedings. 
For example, at oral argument for Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin—the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent decision on affirmative action—the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia sought scientific standards for the University of Texas’ use of race in its 
admissions policies.  First, Justice Scalia questioned whether there were “scientific 
studies” for critical mass, defining precisely what would be sufficient enrollment of non-
white, non-male applicants to achieve diversity.5  Later in oral argument, Justice Scalia 
stated that “most of the black scientists in this country don’t come from schools like the 
University of Texas. . . They come from lesser schools where they do not feel that they’re 
being pushed ahead in – in classes that are too – too fast for them,”6 paraphrasing 
research from on the so-called “mismatch theory” to imply that Black scientists are less 
                                                 
3 387 U.S. 483, 494 Fn.11 (1954). 
4 Id. 
5 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).  In the Supreme Court, the term harkens back to the Court’s decision in Grutter 
v. Bollinger, where the Court found critical mass to be necessary to further Michigan Law School’s 
“compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”  539 U.S. 306, 333 
(2003).  In searching for an exact, scientific number, Justice Scalia is likely trying to analogize the critical 
mass standard to a quota or racial balancing, which is unconstitutional.  See Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding affirmative action constitutional insofar as it does not 
depend on a quota system). 
6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 67-68, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(No. 14-981). 
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capable of performing at elite institutions, and this apparently inherent inferiority would 
be best accommodated by removing affirmative action policies.   
Justice Scalia’s use of social science at oral argument is ironic, considering his 
staunch originalism—believing the Constitution should be interpreted by deciphering the 
original, intended meaning7—would usually shun extrinsic evidence, particularly modern 
social science data.  For Justice Scalia to search beyond the text itself for a legal test of 
significance seems like a departure from his thirty years of decisions as a Supreme Court 
Justice.  But, Justice Scalia was not searching for a constitutional standard.  The Court 
had long before decided that to be constitutional under the equal protection clause, an 
affirmative action program must be necessary to further a compelling state interest and be 
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.8  The scientific evidence Justice Scalia mentions is 
legally dubious and scientifically flawed; it overstates the findings of the research9 and 
                                                 
7 See Antonin Scalia. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (1998) 
(describing Justice Scalia’s originalist philosophy as a means of avoiding creating novel constitutional 
rights, that he would not read into the Constitution based on his understanding of history). 
8 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court outright states that diversity, or a diverse 
student body, “furthers a compelling state interest [but] encompasses a broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.”  See Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 315.  The Bakke Court found that racial quotas were not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling 
interest of diversity, instead advocating for the racial “plus” plan proposed by Harvard and other elite 
institutions which consider race but do not reserve seats based on race.  Id. 438 U.S. at 317. 
9 Yanan Wang, Where Justice Scalia got the idea that African Americans might be better off at ‘slower-
track’ universities, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015).  The mismatch theory comes from a Law Professor’s 
analysis of admissions standards and law student performance, see Richard Sander, “A Systematic Analysis 
of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004) (calling for reconsideration 
of affirmative action policies, modifying to prevent mismatch of students with low scores to institutions 
with high academic standards).  This theory was thoroughly refuted by another article the same issue of the 
Stanford Law review, and submitted as an opposing brief submitted in Fisher, see Ian Ayers and Richard 
R.W. Brooks, “Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?,” 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 
(2004) (arguing that removing affirmative action policies would significantly decrease the number of 
diverse, and particularly Black, attorneys in the United States).  See also infra Chapter 5 (discussing both 
Sander’s mismatch theory and the opposing briefs). 
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revives arguments against affirmative action with pseudo-rigorous science that imply 
racial inferiority.  Justice Scalia’s search for scientific evidence in Fisher is part of a long 
history of the Court searching for external validation for the meaning of race in society—
using science to evaluate, reaffirm, or decry social applications of constitutional schemes, 
but with little deference to social scientific standards that create and regulate that 
evidence.10 
For social scientists and others generating research to combat the social and legal 
oppressions of racial, class, gender, or other intersecting inequities, misuse or ignorance 
of scientific evidence is incredibly frustrating.  Social scientists hold themselves to 
methodological standards for rigor in their given field, why can’t the Court do the same 
when evidence comes before it?  Similarly, Social scientific evidence may seem dubious 
to those unfamiliar with methodological standards or procedures, or even worse, studies 
and findings may reach courts without meeting levels of rigor, validity, or reliability that 
are commonly accepted in the social sciences.   
For lower courts, the Supreme Court has offered opinions, guidance, and 
handbooks on how to think about social scientific evidence presented before it.  In a 
series of opinions stemming from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,11 the 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 3 infra.  Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (finding that because the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected against racially discriminatory effects of employment practices, a 
showing of disparate impact was sufficient to show a statutory violation) with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistically significant racial disparities in death penalty sentencing were not 
enough to find an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose or cruel and unusual punishment). 
11 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (finding Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 superseded the Frye v. United States test, which asked only whether a scientific technique is generally 
accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community, 54 App., D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)); 
General Electric co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 579 (1997) (finding that a judge’s decisions to admit or exclude 
evidence under Daubert is reviewed for abuse of discretion); and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
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Supreme Court established judges as gatekeepers with guiding principles for the 
introduction of scientific evidence through experts at trial.12  Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, judges have a “gatekeeping responsibility” to take “a preliminary 
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying testimony is 
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology can be properly applied 
to the facts in issue.” 13  Judges are the initial filter to determine the validity, relevance, 
and admissibility of scientific evidence, in order to ensure expert testimony and evidence 
“employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the 
practice of an expert in the relevant field.”14  Daubert triggered a new way of thinking 
about the introduction of extrinsic, empirical data through expert testimony, due to a 
“heightened need for judicial awareness of scientific methods and reasoning,” spawning a 
series of federal reference manuals on scientific evidence from the Federal Judicial 
Center,15 hundreds of treatises, thousands of law review articles, and countless textbooks 
and course offerings at law schools across the United States.16   
                                                 
137 (1999)(extending Daubert’s line of analysis to apply to all expert testimony, not just scientific 
testimony). 
12 Justice Breyer summarized the general factors of Daubert in Kumho Tire: “testing, peer review, error 
rates, and “acceptability” in the relevant scientific community, some or all of which might prove helpful in 
determining the particular scientific ‘theory or technique.’” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141, (quoting Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 593-594. 
13 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7, 592-93. 
14 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. 
15 See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Center, 2nd ed. 2000); REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2011). 
16 The ABA does not require evidence courses under its rules of accreditation, see American Bar 
Association, Standard 303. Curriculum, ABA Standards, and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law 
Schools (2016-2017) (available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications 
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Yet for all the rules and guidance to come out of Daubert, none of the factors or 
standards apply to the Supreme Court directly since the Supreme Court does not hear 
expert witnesses, except in the rarest of circumstances.  Evidence comes before the Court 
primarily through written briefs with pages of footnotes citing to evidence that the Court 
is not required to interrogate or screen before it is considered.  At trial, there are 
procedures to follow for making decisions on evidence, both of which are reviewable by 
courts of appeals or the Supreme Court.  But there are no appeals from the Supreme 
Court.  The Court reviews and considers rules of procedure and evidence, but since the 
Supreme Court does not hold a trial with witnesses, they are not applicable.  The 
Supreme Court has its own set of rules which take Federal Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence only “as guides” in very limited circumstances.17  
With no rules for the use of empirical data in opinions of the Supreme Court, this 
dissertation examines the Court’s use of social scientific evidence in recent cases 
involving race and discrimination.  To identify what standards, if any, the Court develops 
through its opinions, I ask the following guiding questions:  How does the Supreme Court 
use, misuse, and/or analyze, empirical data in cases dealing with race?  What research has 
the Court deemed significant?  For that matter, how does the Court operationalize and 
conceptualize race?  How can social science researchers present empirical data to better 
                                                 
/misc/legal_education/Standards/2016_2017_standards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf); but based on a very 
non-scientific google search of the curricula of most major law schools, some form of evidence course is 
offered, with some presenting scientific evidence, or advanced evidence seminars are typically optional.  At 
Arizona State University, for example, evidence and scientific evidence are both offered, though neither is 
required for J.D. graduation, they are required for practice in one of the clinical legal programs.  See Ariz. 
R. of the Sup. Ct. 38 (d) (requiring students practicing in law school clinics to have taken or be currently 
enrolled in civil procedure, criminal law, evidence, and professional responsibility).  
17 Sup. Ct. R. 17.2.  Even this rule for the Supreme Court applies in the very limited sets of cases that 
invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
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persuade the Court, if at all?  Does the Court have implicit or unspoken methodological 
or theoretical standards, or is scientific evidence taken at face value?  How does 
empirical data come before the Court—briefing, amici, or from the Court’s independent 
research?  And ultimately, how does this effect the social construction of race in the law 
and thereby the lived experiences of racialized peoples in the United States? 
To begin answering these questions, I draw on Critical Race Theory (CRT) and 
Institutional Ethnography in order to develop a methodological framework for the study 
and use of social sciences in the law.  Critical Race Theory provides a theoretical and 
activist base from which engaged legal scholarship on race occurs, providing a wealth of 
knowledge predominantly generated by legal scholars of Color, questioning race and 
racism as ideology, institutional/systemic power, and the tension between group and 
individual rights.  Institutional Ethnography provides a social scientific perspective for 
rigorous study of the law, drawing from the epistemologies of Critical Race Theory to 
form a methodology.   
1.1 From the Root: Critical Race Theory 
Analyzing race and science at the Supreme Court necessarily begins with Critical 
Race Theory—a movement of critical legal scholars and others who “not merely [work] 
to understand the vexed bond between law and racial power, but to change it.”18  Critical 
Race Theory’s engaged scholarship is rooted in the tradition of W.E.B. Du Bois,19 and 
                                                 
18 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). 
19 See Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (foundational piece of Critical Race scholarship which draws on Du 
Bois’ scholarship to strategize tactics for lawyers working for school desegregation). 
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social scientists like Oliver Cox, Joyce Ladner, Robert Guthrie, and contemporaries like 
Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, who recognize the hegemonic and systematic 
effects of race in society.20  While there is no “canonical set of doctrines” to Critical Race 
Theory,21 over time CRT has developed some points of consensus.22  Critical Race 
scholars generally argue that race is a social and legal construct, not an inherent 
biological trait, but comes with real life significance.  Although race is in many ways 
made up, the categorization and valuation of people based on skin color, tone, and/or 
national origin has consequences, and produces racial hierarchies like white supremacy.  
Put simply, race is a social construct, but is also very real because of its impact on the 
lived experiences of people through racism and white supremacy. 
                                                 
20 See, Crenshaw, Kimberlé, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 
CONN. L.REV 1253, 1257 (2011). 
21 Crenshaw, supra note 18, at xiii. 
22 Devon Carbado and Daria Roithmayr summarize  
ten empirical arguments that represent CRT commitments . . . on which there is general 
consensus among practitioners in the United States. 
1. Racial inequality is hardwired into the fabric of our social and economic landscape. 
2. Because racism exists at both the subconscious and conscious levels, the elimination of 
intentional racism would not eliminate racial inequality. 
3. Racism intersects with other forms of inequality, such as classism, sexism, and 
homophobia. 
4. Our racial past exerts contemporary effects. 
5. Racial change occurs when the interests of white elites converge with the interests of the 
racially disempowered. 
6. Race is a social construction whose meanings and effects are contingent and change over 
time. 
7. The concept of color blindness in law and social policy and the argument ostensibly 
race-neutral practices often serve to undermine the interest of people of color. 
8. Immigration laws that restrict Asian and Mexican entry into the United States regulate 
the racial makeup of the nation and perpetuate the view that people of Asian and Latino 
descent are foreigners.  
9. Racial stereotypes are ubiquitous in society and limit the opportunities of people of color. 
10. The success of various policy initiatives often depends on whether the perceived 
beneficiaries are people of color. 
Devon Carbado and Daria Roithmayr. Critical race theory meets social science. 10 ANN. REV L. & SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 149, 151 (2014). 
 9 
Furthermore, racism is endemic, and permanent,23 which necessitates analyzing 
“the ongoing dynamics of racialized power, and its embeddedness in practices and values 
which have been shorn of any explicit, formal manifestation of racism.”24  Analyzing the 
dimensions of the Supreme Court’s definitions of race and racism highlights the 
structural power of the Court as well as the social and ideological effects of race on 
society.  The United States built by enslaving Africans, taking the lands (by treaty or 
force) from hundreds of Indigenous Nations, and creating social strata obfuscated by a 
myth of meritocracy—all legal under the Constitution and laws of the United States.  
Critical Race Theory highlights how racialization and white supremacy are central to 
relations of power the United States, past and present.  Despite textual commitments to 
justice, due process, and equal protection, the Court’s application and understanding of 
these principles perpetuate relationships and systems of power that insulate white 
supremacy and racism. 
Critical Race Theory focuses on law and courts, both because of its roots in the 
the work of law students and professors, and because law is an area where “the 
relationship between losing a legal battle and suffering a particular material loss [is] 
readily visible.”25  As Crenshaw notes, critiques of law and racial power are “perhaps 
more explosive because of law’s putatively apolitical status and the corresponding claims 
                                                 
23 Derrick Bell, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 92 (1992) (arguing 
that recognizing racism as a permanent, integral part of United States society that “cannot be vanquished by 
enactment and vigorous enforcement of strong civil rights laws,” but in recognizing permanence “enable[s] 
us to recognize the potential for effecting reform in even what appear to be setbacks.”) 
24 Crenshaw, supra note 18, at xxix. 
25 Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 1307. 
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that reason more generally could distinguish truth from ideology.”26  Critical Race 
Theory recognizes the power of law to create and destroy entire populations, by defining 
the legal standards for categorization—what it means to be white, Black, brown, Latina/o, 
under the law is defined by the entitlements and interests that go along with it.27      
Foundational works of Critical Race Theory illuminate how even laws that speak 
to equality in the text, function to reinforce imbalances in power.  For example, Derrick 
Bell’s principle of interest convergence identifies how landmark decisions like Brown v. 
Board of Education are diluted by ideological powers underlying existing practices.  
Although Brown declares educational segregation unconstitutional and incompatible with 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection,28 making segregation illegal 
does not upend the underlying system of white supremacy that fostered the 
unconstitutional inequality in the first place.  Moreover, white supremacist ideologies and 
structures extend like a web throughout United States law and society, cutting one thread 
does not automatically eliminate the network of interlocking systems.  Bell’s principle of 
interest convergence reminds us that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality 
will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”29  In other 
words, racial justice does not happen because of some inherent, normative belief in racial 
                                                 
26 Id. at 1309. 
27 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as property, 106 HARV. L. REV 1707 (1992)(summarizing how systems 
of property and race were legally sanctioned to create differential status privileges); Ian Haney López, 
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE, (1997) (historicizing legal status of whiteness in the 
context of immigrants and others who were racialized through naturalization legislation). 
28 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
29 Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW 518, 523 (1980). 
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equality, but because the dominant class benefits more than it loses.30  Although Brown 
eliminates educational segregation, the Court does not interrogate the underlying 
ideologies of white supremacy in society, leaving racism to continue to fester and grow. 
Critical Race Theory provide core concepts like interest convergence, whiteness 
as property, intersectionality, and critiques of colorblindness that are crucial to 
understanding the relationship between race and the law, particularly in decisions of the 
Supreme Court.  In Chapter 2, I spend more time closely reading these concepts against 
the legal and historical background of the Supreme Court.  While CRT’s focus on law 
provides a crucial lens of analysis, the activist scholarship of CRT has grown beyond 
legal academia and spread into other fields like education, cultural studies, political 
science, philosophy, psychology, and sociology that CRT draws so heavily from.31 
Recent CRT scholarship argues for adding empirical analysis to legal curriculum 
and CRT itself.  Gregory S. Parks and others call to merge the “New Legal Realism 
Project” into CRT, in order to “facilitate some translation between law and social 
science—bridge the gap between epistemologies, methods, operating assumptions and 
                                                 
30 In Brown, particularly, Bell argues that Brown emerges in a historical moment when the United States 
needed to maintain governmental legitimacy in three main ways:  
First the decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with 
Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples. . . . 
Second, Brown offered much needed reassurance to American blacks that the precepts of 
equality and freedom so heralded during World War II might yet be given meaning at 
home. . . . [Third,] segregation was viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the 
South.   
Id. at 525. 
31 See generally Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 1256-1257 (extensively describing and citing to other fields 
where CRT has taken root, while also paying deference to influential sociologists). 
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overall goals.”32  These Critical Race Realists are optimistic that integrating empirical 
social sciences—primarily quantitative research and psychology—into the law should 
“expose racism where it may be found, identify its effects on individuals and institutions 
and put forth a concerted attack against it, in part, via public policy” in the tradition of 
Charles Hamilton Houston’s use of social sciences in defeating educational segregation 
in Brown.33   
Other Critical Race Theorists are more cautious, arguing that social sciences, 
particularly quantitative analyses, are potentially “antithetical to the core commitments 
that characterize CRT,” like the critique of neutrality and the structural dimension of 
race.34  The primary concern here comes from social scientists who want to individualize 
structural oppressions, or social sciences that uncritically engage race without 
acknowledging the role of sciences, particularly social sciences, in perpetuating racial 
stratification and hierarchy.35  Tukufu Zuberi’s insightful work on race and statistics 
theorizes anti-racist social sciences, that also apply to integrating CRT and science:   
theorize more precisely the structural nature of inequality [by drawing on 
the] descriptive method—a mode of knowledge production—that helps to 
theorize the connection among racial inequality, individual agency, and 
collective action, to uncover the way in which processes that appear to be 
race neutral in fact reproduce racial subordination.36   
 
                                                 
32 Gregory S. Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, in CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF 
PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW 3 (Gregory S. Parks, Shayne Jones, and W. Jonathan Cardi eds., 2008). 
33 Id. at 7. 
34 Carbado and Roithmayr, supra note 22, at 150. 
35 For a brilliant and detailed discussion of the role of social sciences and sociology in perpetuating racial 
stratification, see Zuberi, supra note 2. 
36 Id. at 163. 
 13 
While CRT has been taken up in a variety of disciplines, founders like Kimberlé 
Crenshaw call for CRT to develop a broadened, intersectional interdisciplinary approach 
“to remap the racial contours of the way that people see the world that we live in.”37  
CRT thus not only serves as a theoretical lens for analyzing race, courts, and the law, but 
the precursor to one of the primary goals of this dissertation: identifying and creating 
methodological approaches to studying the law. 
1.2 Mapping the Ruling Relations 
Social science evidence and Supreme Court opinions are discourses of power 
emanating from social institutions.  Though researchers and Supreme Court justices 
occupy different social positions, both effect the everyday lives of marginalized peoples 
by establishing, reifying, or even countering, social constructions of race.  The Supreme 
Court, through its decisions interpreting the Constitution, function as a social institution 
which reflects and reinforces narratives of personhood, rights, and governmental 
responsibility—deeming whose lives and privileges are protected, or even need 
protecting, under the United States legal system.  In a society built on white supremacy, 
this means that even those systems and institutions which proclaim justice and equality 
are still built upon constructs of race and embedded with racism; providing for the 
insulation, reification, and furthering of white supremacy, even as forms of racism like 
segregation are dismantled. 38  Racial identity is “merged with stratified social and legal 
                                                 
37 Crenshaw, supra note 20, at 1352. 
38 See Bell, supra note 23, (racism is both endemic to society and perpetuated through legal decisions, even 
those that may appear to grant rights like in Brown v. Board); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform and 
Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 
(1988) (the boom of antidiscrimination law floundered in the midst of white supremacist retrenchment 
tactics that curtailed remedial legislation); Harris, supra note 27 (summarizing how systems of property and 
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status” in the United States; from pre-Constitutional definitions of white as free, Black as 
property, and Red as assailable/exterminable to modern stratified definitions that 
continue to limit the rights and social status of non-whites.39   
Similarly, social sciences have legitimized oppression and marginalization under 
the guise of scientific fact—normalizing white supremacy by making social constructions 
of race to appear natural, justifiable, and immutable.40  Statistical analyses have been 
particularly harmful, as racial disparities in incarceration, education, or even 
demographics have been used as legitimating tools for white supremacy.41  As Khalil 
Gibran Muhammad brilliantly summarizes: 
`For good or bad, the numbers do not speak for themselves. They never 
have. They have always been interpreted, and made meaningful, in a 
broader political, economic, and social context in which race mattered….  
The invisible layers of racial ideology packed into the statistics, sociological 
theories, and the everyday stories we continue to tell about crime in modern 
urban America are a legacy of the past.  The choice about which narratives 
we attach to the data in the future, however, is ours to make.42  
 
                                                 
race were legally sanctioned to create differential status privileges); Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,109 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987)(identifying how 
racism permeates decisionmaking in the United States legal system, so much so that overt racism is no 
longer necessary to reinforcing white supremacy); Haney López, supra note 27 (historicizing legal status of 
whiteness in the context of immigrants and others who were racialized through naturalization legislation). 
39 Harris, supra note 27, at 1718. 
40 Duster, supra note 1 (describing the modern genetics movement and how it builds on racist 
pseudoscience of the past); Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla Silva, WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: 
RACISM AND METHODOLOGY (2008) (collecting essays examining the ways in which social sciences reify 
and influence social constructions of race); Zuberi, supra note 2. 
41 Muhammad, supra note 2; Zuberi, supra note 2 (describing the ways in which statistical analyses are 
used to reinforce racial domination). 
42 Muhammad, supra note 2, at 277. 
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In the Supreme Court or in social sciences, the narratives created from, around, or with 
data are a means of affirming or negating the existing hierarchies of power, but the 
weight of the evidence is constantly in flux, depending on how and where they are used.  
Social sciences at the Supreme Court become part of legal storytelling, which 
Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun describe as “more like gathering of material for an 
index than the telling of a classic narrative.  Facts are assembled to tell a story whose 
conclusions are determined by others.”43  The way the story is told depends on the way 
facts are incorporated and how those facts are made relevant.  In social sciences there are 
large debates over how facts are gathered and what methods are used in the academic 
production and gathering of knowledges.  For the most part, when race is involved, 
methodologies and research reproduce knowledge only for the benefit of white people 
and to reinforce social hierarchy.44  Sciences have used “white methods. . . to 
manufacture empirical data and analysis to support the racial stratification in society.”45   
Critical sociologists have turned the gaze inward to create race-conscious methodologies 
that are critical of established methods, reflective, and focused on the histories, growth, 
and changes in social relations and realities involving race.46   
                                                 
43 Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee 
Indian Case. DUKE L.J. 625, 627 (1990). 
44 Tukufu Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, Telling the Real Tale of the Hunt: Toward a Race Conscious 
Sociology of Racial Stratification, in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 332 
(Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008). 
45 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & Tukufu Zuberi. Toward a Definition of White Logic and White Methods, in 
WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 18 (Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva 
eds., 2008). 
46 Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, supra note 44, at 336-338. 
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Translating critical methodologies into the law, however, is difficult since there is 
no legal methodology to begin with.  Law certainly has procedural safeguards and 
guidelines to manage the flow of evidence, but there is no standard for the evaluation of 
research—particularly before appellate courts which review briefs and hear oral 
arguments rather than hold a full trial.  Legal academia has drawn on the style and 
production of empirical research in history, statistics, and other fields, but reviews of 
legal literature reveals “little awareness of, much less compliance with, the rules of 
inference that guide empirical research in the social and natural sciences,” leading to 
exaggerated conclusions and less rigorous scholarship.47  Lee Epstein and Gary King 
conclude the key problem “is the unmet need for a subfield of the law devoted to 
empirical methods, and the concomitant total absence of articles devoted exclusively to 
solving methodological problems unique to legal scholarship.”48  Empirical legal scholars 
do exist and do produce quality research, however conversations on methodologies 
specific to the law are notably absent, especially when looking at the Supreme Court.49  
                                                 
47 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002). 
48 Id. at 6 fn. 19. 
49 For the most part, these studies focus on quantitative models of the Supreme Court, looking at political 
ideologies of the judges (see e.g. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, & Sara C. Benesh, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2005); Harold J. Spaeth & Michael F. Altfield, 
Influence Relationships within the Supreme Court: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, 38 
WESTERN POL. Q. 70 (1985)), predictive forecasting of voting patterns of individual justices (see e.g. 
Theodore Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin, & Kevin M. Quinn. The Supreme Court Forecasting 
Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision making, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004); Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY 
L. J. 909 (2013)) and amicus modeling to try and measure the quantitative influence of briefs (see e.g. Paul 
M. Collins, Jr., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 
(2008); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill. The Influence of Amicus Briefs on the Supreme Court, 
148 U. PENN L. REV. 743 (2000). 
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Discourse50 and institutional power are therefore central to the operation of the 
Court and social sciences separately, making it vital to interrogate when they intersect.  
Institutional ethnography provides a key analytical tool for understanding the overt and 
covert meanings created when the Court uses, misuses, or fails to use social science 
evidence in cases dealing with race.  Institutional ethnography provides a unique means 
of understanding how institutions construct meaning and how these meanings factor in to 
what Dorothy Smith terms “ruling relations [which are] forms of consciousness and 
organization that are objectified in the sense that they are constituted externally to 
particular people and places.”51  Though terms like stare decisis have specific 
institutional meaning in the Court—beyond being a fancy way of saying that prior 
decisions must be applied in future cases—institutional ethnography provides a rigorous, 
and emancipatory, method of unlocking the implications of legal meanings by examining 
the Court’s ontological or epistemological understandings of social science.  
1.2.1 Defining Institutional Ethnography 
Institutional ethnography (IE) is more than a methodology for understanding the 
power relationships of institutions; it is, as founder Dorothy Smith proposes, an 
“alternative sociology” to understand the subjectivities of marginalized peoples in midst 
                                                 
50 Here I use discourse to evoke law’s ethical, social, and political formations used in perpetuating power.  
Discourse in this sense refers not only to the ways in which law controls speakers and forms of knowledges 
determined to be valid, see e.g. Michel Foucault, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1972; 2012), and 
the relationship between society, ethics and law, see .e.g. Jürgen Habermas, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996). 
51 Dorothy Smith, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE 13 (2005). 
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of the complexities of multilayered social relations.52  Smith developed IE from her own 
experience as a feminist sociologist, understanding that “women’s experience has special 
authority” to claim alternative subject position to coordinate struggle against oppression 
from the margins.53  While standpoint theory originates primarily in white feminisms, it 
has been expanded to understand the intersecting layers of identity and refers more to the 
creation of “a subject position for IE as a method of inquiry, a site for the knower that is 
open to anyone.”54  The aim is therefore to acknowledge and integrate the positionality of 
the researcher, the research subject (an individual being interviewed or text used in the 
process), and the institution as the object.  Smith explains that “it is the aspects of the 
institutions relevant to the people’s experience, not the people themselves, that constitute 
the object of inquiry.”55  This positioning of researcher, subject, and object creates a 
multilayered perspective in understanding the function of institutions through the 
experiences of both the observer and the observed. 
Analysis of social life through institutional ethnography begins with the 
“ethnographic problematic.”  Rooted in the works of Marx and Althusser, IE uses the 
problematic to identify “the discursive organization of a field that is larger than a specific 
                                                 
52 Id. at 1. 
53 Id. at 8-9.  Importantly, Smith notes that standpoint theory, and indeed the dynamics of the women’s 
movement in the United States were largely centralized on experiences of white middle-class heterosexual 
women.  These centers shifted with activism of working-class women, lesbians, women of color and others, 
making “issues of older feminists either alien or irrelevant.”  Id. 
54 Id. at 10. 
55 Id. at 38. 
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question or problem.”56  Identifying a problematic is not the same as speaking on 
problems people experience in everyday life.  Instead a problematic identifies the social 
relations that construct, coordinate, or otherwise correlate to everyday problems.  
Institutional ethnography may begin with the specifics of lived experience, but the 
ultimate focus is on “how peoples’ activities and practices are coordinated.”57  As 
Marjorie L. DeVault and Lisa McCoy summarize, “the aim of the institutional 
ethnographer is to explore particular corners or strands within a specific institutional 
complex, in ways that make visible their points of connection with other sites and courses 
of action.”58  Moving between localized problems and larger systemic issues therefore 
reveals the connections between oppressions that people face and the structural forces 
that contribute to oppression.   
Links and relationships are critical to social inquiry under institutional 
ethnography—identifying the ways in which people relate to institutions and how 
structural forces are linked to form ruling relations.  The researcher approaches the 
problematic, with a “general orientation,” but then engages how social life is coordinated 
through two overall aims: 
One is to produce for people what might be called “maps” of the ruling 
relations and specifically the institutional complexes in which they 
participate in whatever fashion. . . .  The second aim is to build knowledge 
and methods of discovering the institutions, and more generally, the ruling 
relations of contemporary Western society.59  
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 59. 
58 Marjorie L. DeVault & Liza McCoy, Institutional Ethnography:  Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling 
Relations, in INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY AS PRACTICE 17 (Dorothy Smith, ed., 2006). 
59 Smith, supra note 51, at 51. 
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Mapping and discovering ruling relations thus identifies the complexities embedded in 
institutional discourse and provide a way for researches, activists, and participants to 
conscientiously navigate social life.   Conceptual mapping of institutions creates a way of 
identifying where social processes operate and how, creating “an account of an aspect of 
an institutional regime that a reader can refer to with her or his own work knowledge of 
the same regime or can incorporate into one’s work knowledge.”60  This simultaneously 
indicates how people are positioned in structures of institutional power, while identifying 
obstacles, barriers, and paths for the researcher and others to navigate.   
Map making, practically and theoretically, begins with products of institutional 
discourse: language and texts.  Texts are more than words on a page, particularly in an 
institutional setting.  Texts coordinate sequences of institutional action, which then 
generate more institutional texts.  In the Supreme Court, for example, cases are heard 
based on a petition for a writ of certiorari—a text asking the Court to review the case.  If 
the Court accepts certiorari, then parties and amicus curiae submit written briefs to the 
Court suggesting arguments on an interpretation of the law, the Court holds oral 
argument and issues an opinion, which is published as text.  The relationship between 
text and action is crucial, as texts are part of social processes; texts are “activated” by the 
circumstances in which they are produced and interpreted.61  Susan Marie Turner 
emphasizes that with institutional ethnography “the analytic goal is to situate the text 
                                                 
60 Id. at 161. 
61 Smith, supra note 51, at 169. 
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back into the action in which it is produced, circulated, and read, and where it has 
consequences in time and space.”62  Institutional discourse is manifested through text 
which “installs its own temporality” and creates categories which “locate the subjects of 
institutional courses of action, not as to particular individuals, but as a class of persons.”63  
Institutional ethnographic analyses of “text-based work sequences” broaden the view of 
particular cases or sites to understand and “map the institution’s work practices.”64  
Mapping institutional texts therefore reveals the mechanisms by which institutions 
operate, how people and actions are conceptualized and operationalized through the 
institutional process, and how people, institutional actors, function within the system.   
In some ways, institutional mapping resembles the process-tracing methods in 
case study methodology.  Alexander George and Andrew Bennet explain that process-
tracing identifies “mechanisms or micro foundations behind observed phenomena” by 
analyzing empirical connections between variables in social processes, to hypothesize 
and theorize explanations for events.65  Process-tracing looks to historical pathways to 
generalize instances based on theoretical interpretations of events, crafting categories that 
can be used to model historical outcomes.  These models are used to identify “causal 
processes embedded in the phenomenon being investigated” through detailed narratives, 
                                                 
62 Susan Marie Turner, Mapping Institutions as Work and Texts in INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY AS 
PRACTICE 140 (Dorothy Smith ed., 2006). 
63 Smith, supra note 51, at 116-117. 
64 Turner, supra note 62, at 149. 
65 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 147 (2005). 
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hypothesis testing, and analytic theorizing.66  Case studies, process-tracing, and 
institutional ethnography share methodological orientations in connecting events in 
historical or social contexts in which they arise.  However, process-tracing’s interest in 
causal mechanisms is motivated by prediction, while institutional ethnography 
emphasizes the descriptive.  Rather than test a specific theoretical model, institutional 
ethnography emphasizes the dialogic nature of texts and institutional processes in 
coordinating social actions.  Prediction is replaced with “anticipation” and the 
development of “intervention strategies”67 that may resist oppressive institutional forces 
in peoples’ lived experiences, rather than a grand historical or political narrative.   
Texts in institutional ethnography are meant to illuminate social processes that 
may be obscured through institutional discourse.  This means attempting to understand 
how texts coordinate social processes, particularly in how texts and language create 
institutional hierarchies.  The social coordination of institutions through texts creates “a 
distinctive vulnerability” through discourse which is “highly effective and largely 
invisible” in the regulation of everyday life.68  Mapping institutional discourse therefore 
reveals how institutional processes are coordinated and affect peoples’ lives in and 
outside institutions.  Understanding the procedural and practical implications of 
institutional action reveals how institutions coordinate social life, but also begins 
considerations of why and to what end.   
                                                 
66 Id. at 210-212. 
67 Turner, supra note 62, at 159. 
68 Smith, supra note 51, at 219. 
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The same question can be turned back on institutional ethnography; what purpose 
does revealing the coordination of social activities serve?  Smith emphasizes that 
institutional ethnography must be “accessible,” not just restricted to academic 
publishing—though Smith argues this is important in challenging how other sociologists 
and students internalize work processes and research.69  Institutional ethnography 
attempts to turn criticism of “the incompetence of individuals to the work process and its 
intertextuality,” highlighting the systems of power in everyday life that radically effect 
individuals, but no one person may be responsible.  In this process, institutional 
ethnographers are concerned with the standpoints and perspectives of marginalized 
people, and with the underlying question of justice for those who may be adversely 
affected by institutional action.  Mapping the social not only identifies how the power 
structures effect marginalized people, but also potential avenues for change and 
resistance—and maybe even the ultimate brokenness of a system that cannot be 
reformed, repaired, or rescued. 
1.2.2 Institutional Ethnography and the Supreme Court 
Legal inquiries in the United States are like research in the social sciences.  
Courts are qualitative, taking in testimonies, expert opinions, and prior analyses of 
similar instances to decide the outcome of a given case based on general principles.  In 
the law there are strict rules for data collection, particularly in trial courts, as rules of 
evidence, procedure, and professional conduct govern the introduction and discussion of 
evidence.  Information in trial courts comes through expert testimony and exhibits, over 
                                                 
69 Id. at 220. 
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an extended trial with many decisions on the application of legal standards and an 
eventual conclusion on a factual matter (guilty or not guilty, whether someone is at fault, 
etc).  This is all incorporated into the official record, which is sent on to appellate courts 
with oral arguments, which is again put into the official court record, which eventually 
can become incorporated to a writ of certiorari for the Supreme Court.  Figure 1.1 
(below) offers a brief sketch of the different paths a case may take to reach the Supreme 
Court.  All paths lead to a writ of certiorari—a brief submitted to the Court arguing there 
are pressing constitutional or statutory legal issues that need to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court (usually involving disagreement on standards or outcomes between 
different state supreme courts or federal appellate courts).  The Court does not review the 
minutiae of the case, but focuses on questions of law central to the case; ostensibly 
grounding its opinion in constitutional analysis of the key questions.  Parties will submit 
briefs and argue the case before the Court.  Third parties may submit briefs as amici 
curiae, arguing for some interpretation of the case with additional information that is not 
part of the official record.  However, the Court is not required to accept the interpretation 
of any party (petitioner, respondent, or amici).  Rather, the Court is tasked with 
interpreting and affirming the underlying constitutional principles that it deems necessary 
to the case.  Theoretical interpretations of the Court are always traced back to 
constitutional interpretation, giving some formal meaning to the provisions of the 
constitution at issue by exercising the “judicial power of the United States.”70   
                                                 
70 U.S. Const., Art. III. 
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Figure 1: Path from Trial Court to the Supreme Court 
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Mapping institutional discourse of the Supreme Court is centered on the text-act-
text relationship that is thoroughly embedded in the law.  Any case seeking a hearing 
before the Supreme Court begins with a petition for writ of certiorari.  The justices 
review the petition and four must decide to grant cert for “compelling reasons”—usually 
based on opinions by a state supreme court or a United States Courts of Appeals which 
decide an “important federal question” that conflicts with either Supreme Court precedent 
or opinions of other state supreme courts or courts of appeals.71  A grant of certiorari 
leads to more briefs, from all parties involved in the case and amicus curiae, leading to 
oral argument at the Supreme Court, typically involving an advocate from the petitioner, 
the respondent, and occasionally an intervention by the solicitor general of the United 
States.  The Court then issues its written opinion, and reads an abbreviated version of the 
majority opinion from the bench—though at times a justice may decide to orally dissent 
in addition to a written dissent in the opinion.  The decision of the Court may affirm the 
decision of a lower court, reverse the decision of a lower court, and/or remand the case 
for proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the Court.  The Supreme Court may 
also dismiss the case outright.   
The legal system in the United States produces and creates a multitude of texts.  
The legal system and the Supreme Court are defined by the text of the Constitution.  The 
Supreme Court’s constitutional role is the interpretation and application of cases “arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
                                                 
71 Supreme Court Rule 10 
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be made under their Authority.”72  Text is the impetus for legal action at the Supreme 
Court, first defining the metes and bounds of judicial authority, and secondarily in 
particular actions as each case comes before the court on a writ of certiorari, which leads 
to extended written briefs—from parties and amicus curiae.  Acts of the Court, the 
decisions made by the justices, are then reproduced in text as written opinions.   
This process is a prime example of the type of text-act-text relationship that 
institutional ethnography seeks to map:  the petition for certiorari is the initial text, 
leading to the Court’s action or inaction, which creates more text through briefing, an act 
of oral argument, followed by more text in a written opinion, and acts by other courts.  
The multitude of texts produced in this process can be mapped to reveal potential 
influence on Supreme Court decisions, as the arguments, theories, and most importantly 
facts, that emerge from briefing—both by the parties and by amicus curiae—appear in the 
final decision of the court. 
Final decisions do not have a strict procedure or methodology for arriving at an 
ultimate conclusion of law; controlled only the longstanding tradition of applying of 
judicial precedent in analogizing or distinguishing prior decisions of the court.  Precedent 
is not simply an outcome but is formed “when deciding individual cases, judges create 
general rules, or perhaps governing standards, to be applied when similar factual 
circumstances arise in future actions.”73  Precedent is not intended to be applied 
mechanically or create a rigid uniformity, but aims to ensure the “stability, certainty, and 
                                                 
72 U.S. Const., Art. III, §2. 
73 Frank B. Cross, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 204 (2007). 
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predictability of the law” by presuming the court has correctly decided an issue 
previously.74  Under this ideology, previous decisions are not easily questioned and are 
theoretically followed “unless flatly absurd[,] unjust” or inapplicable.75  But, as Robert A. 
Williams, Jr. notes, “a judge who feels bound to enforce prior precedents because of this 
doctrine of stare decisis can perpetuate, in the most subtle of fashions, a system of racial 
inequality.”76  Precedent alone does not decide cases, as no two cases before the Supreme 
Court are identical and Justices often distinguish previous cases based on factual 
differences.  The key connection is in the constitutional text, and how the principles of 
the court are received. 
Like institutional ethnographers, the Court takes texts and maps their relationship 
to the institutional structure in deciding how precedent applies; beginning with the lived 
experience that initiated a legal dispute, mediated through textual commitments of the 
Constitution, to institutional principles that function beyond the particularities of a given 
case through general principles of law.  Unlike institutional ethnography, there is no 
necessary reflexivity.  The justices of the Court rarely involve their personal standpoints 
in the text of their opinions, outside collegial qualifiers (“In my view…,” “in my 
colleagues’ view,” etc.).  The institutional power of the Court imbues the opinions of the 
Justices with institutional power, making binding constitutional doctrine from one 
                                                 
74 Brian Z. Tamanaha, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDING 38 
(2010). 
75 Id. at 39 (quoting William Blackstone).  
76 Robert Williams, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL 
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 23 (2005). 
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person’s perspective.77  There are theories of constitutional application and principle, but 
the methodology in reaching this point is largely obscured, explained only through the 
discussion of a written opinion.  Which facts became relevant are only those which 
appear in the opinion—why those facts in the opinion were considered above others is 
left to guesswork by observers, scholars, and others.  While the Court may be concerned 
with social life in the United States, it is bound to some meaning derived from the 
constitution to define it. 
The Court reinforces systems of power, actively defining how governmental 
powers operate under constitutional standards.  Social science, on the other hand, 
perceives the world as it is, or predicts how it could be.  The fundamental conflict then 
arises in which perception and description is deemed valid by the Court, scientists and 
social perception; and whether the three overlap.  The constitution validates specific 
regimes and organizations of power, as enumerated by the constitution.  Procedure in the 
                                                 
77 Of course, this one perspective is put to a vote, usually requiring a majority of the Justices.  The Court 
usually speaks with one voice—between 2009 and 2015 nearly half of the cases before the Supreme Court 
were decided 9-0.  There are some 8-1 and 7-2 opinions, but the Court becomes more closely split in the 6-
3 and 5-4 cases, which are usually the more politically and socially controversial opinions.  Currently, as of 
March 2017, there are only eight justices on the Supreme Court, which means there are potential for 4-4 
splits, in which case the opinion of the lower court would remain undisturbed, though justices will still 
write opinions.  Kedar Bhatia, Final October Term 2015 Stat Pack, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 2016, 11:25 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/final-october-term-2015-stat-pack/.  However even when the 
Court has all nine justices, there are rare cases where the Court is split 4-4, and one justice votes with the 
result of the majority, but does not agree with the opinion, or sections of the opinion, of the plurality of the 
justices and so writes separately.  See e.g  Parents Involved in Community Schools, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(Justice Kennedy joined only with Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, which 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined in full).  There are still other circumstances with a glut of 
opinions, that it can become confusing which opinion represents the Constitutional doctrine or opinion of 
the Court. See e.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579 (1952)(during the Korean War President 
Truman attempted to seize control of the nation’s steel mills, 6 of the Justices found that action 
unconstitutional, Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, but Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, 
Burton and Clark all wrote separate concurrences to explain their own view and reasoning as to why, with 
Chief Justice Vinson writing for all three dissenting justices; Justice Jackson’s concurrence is the most 
often cited of the seven opinions issued in the case).   
 30 
Court defines the methods of inquiry as facts are obtained from sources—including the 
factual record created by the lower courts, briefs submitted to the court and external 
sources that a justice may insert on their own78—and cited in the opinions of the Justices.  
While the means of obtaining information is fairly clear, mapping through institutional 
ethnography helps to reveal the methodological, ontological, axiological, and 
epistemological assumptions of the justices.  Using institutional ethnography to map the 
way information is presented to the Court, and how it emerges in the analyses of the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions creates a clearer picture of how and why 
the justices use facts—and permits inferences as to why.  Better understanding how and 
why the Court interprets facts presented before it would help social scientists to shape the 
presentation of data and extend the practical influence of the social sciences in legal 
structures.  Similarly, institutional maps of the justice’s reasoning can aid attorneys in 
looking for what type of evidence and arguments to make before the court.  Above all, 
institutional ethnography can map how the Court uses, misuses, and fails to use social 
science in understanding the cases that appear before it.  
1.3 Vexed Bonds: From Brown to Fisher II. 
  The “vexed bond” between law and racial power is not a dichotomy,79 but 
includes influence from a multitude of disciplines.  Race, law, and social science are at 
the center of the problematic that begins my institutional ethnographic research design.  
Regimes of power manifest in law to coordinate the activities and lived experiences of 
                                                 
78 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012). 
79 Crenshaw, supra note 18, at xiii. 
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people; defining personhood and identity through race, which is interpreted by social 
science.  This ethnographic problematic highlights the fluidity of race, law and social 
science; there are any number of variations in the relationship, but none are entirely 
linear.  Taken together, race, law and social science construct and coordinate everyday 
experiences, and the Supreme Court is at the center.  The Supreme Court’s understanding 
of the Constitution ultimately decides questions of rights and privileges—attacking or 
reaffirming the legitimacy of social attitudes embodied by the law.   
Social sciences may expose racism, but they are also used to legitimate and 
perpetuate racial ideologies under the same veils of neutrality that CRT critiques.  Using 
an institutional ethnography to map the uses and misuses of social sciences in Supreme 
Court opinions will reveal and inform a legal methodology guided by CRT, uniting 
critiques of neutrality with standards of inquiry to contemplate how courts understand 
social scientific evidence.  The remainder of this dissertation will therefore focus on the 
relationship between social sciences, race, and the law to outline the metes and bounds of 
what I call Critical Race Methodology (CRM), a way of producing interdisciplinary legal 
knowledge that is legally accurate, methodologically rigorous, reflexive, and transparent.  
This dissertation is not a discussion of the relationship between race and science, 
focusing on the flawed conceptualization and operationalization of race throughout the 
scientific method.  This has been done quite brilliantly by established sociologists, 
psychologists, historians, and others who inspire me to rethink my own methodological 
approaches to science and many of whom are cited in this dissertation.80  This also isn’t 
                                                 
80 See Muhammad, supra note 2; Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, supra note 40; Zuberi, supra note 2; Duster, 
supra note 1; Tallbear, supra note 1. 
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strictly a discussion of race and the Supreme Court—another essential element of my 
dissertation which has been thoroughly discussed by scholars more brilliant than I could 
hope to be.81  What I want to focus on is the intersection of these two eminent fields of 
scholarship from an interdisciplinary, methodological perspective—drawing out central 
arguments from both social sciences and legal studies and looking at how they overlap 
and interact.  Focusing on the methodological question is rarely done in legal studies, but 
adds a necessary, and largely missing, element of legal discussions on race. 
My goal is to use CRM to bridge gaps and translation errors that I have seen over 
the course of my study as a J.D./Ph.D. student.  The mismatch I saw was not the white 
supremacist mismatch theory that would eliminate affirmative action, identified by 
Justice Scalia at oral argument in Fisher II,82 but rather a mismatch between law and the 
sciences that used to bolster legislation or opinions of the courts.  Lawyers and social 
scientists often have common concerns, particularly those concerned with peoples placed 
at the margins of society by racialization, white supremacy, poverty, patriarchy, 
homophobia, ableism, and other oppressive social hierarchies.  What is missing is a 
common vocabulary, a means of ensuring that legal significance and scientific 
significance overlap.  This dissertation therefore tires to bridge that gap, by identifying 
the function of the Supreme Court, the types of evidence and facts presented before it, 
and two case-studies to examine how race, science, and law intersect in practice. 
                                                 
81 See Lani Guinier, Demosprudence through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008); Crenshaw, supra note 
18; Bell, supra note 29; Derrick Bell, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2005); Harris, supra note 27; and so many other Critical Race 
Scholars. 
82 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, No. 14-981 (2015). 
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Chapter two begins this effort by identifying the functions of the Supreme Court.  
Constitutionally, the Court is committed to hearing cases and controversies based on 
federal law, with many distinctions and legally relevant minutiae defining what types of 
issues make it before the Supreme Court.  However, opinions of the Court have broader 
impact than the Constitution describes.  Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Constitution, case law, and facts influence ideologies, social institutions, and individual 
rights at all levels in the United States.  Chapter 2 identifies these as “the I’s of the 
Court,” examining the influence of the Supreme Court and what social pressures may 
influence decisions of the Court.  I argue the Supreme Court acts as a pressure valve for 
social issues, a way of diffusing the force of social movements or oppressive social forces 
that would give rise to revolutionary attitudes that could disturb the Constitutional 
structure.  For the most part, the Supreme Court has been incredibly effective at 
moderating social change by utilizing, obscuring, or reworking the I’s of the Court. 
Social science often plays a role in the Court’s opinions on social issues, and 
chapter three examines the extent of the influence of social science by looking to the 
literature and case law behind presenting social science evidence to the Supreme Court in 
cases dealing with race.  Beginning with the Brandies brief and moving through Brown 
into modern uses of social science and conflicting philosophies of law and science, this 
genealogy of law and social science begins to develop patterns of analysis of social 
facts—received through social science or hegemonic commonsense—in the Supreme 
Court.  This foundational process of the institutional ethnography draws on different 
taxonomies of fact established by legal scholars to begin mapping the functional aspects 
of Supreme Court interpretations of data.  Meanings of the law are just as open to 
 34 
interpretation by the justices as are the facts in a given case; there is not necessarily a 
correct decision of the court, but only one that matches the ideology of a justice or the 
precedent of the court (which is really just the ideology of previous justices).  Rather than 
simply create a system of classification, an institutional ethnography attempts to create a 
guide for navigating institutional processes.  Ultimately my hope is to provide insight into 
how justices consider arguments and ideas before the Court by analyzing how these are 
incorporated into the opinions, tracing how laws, doctrine, and facts are transformed 
through the process of a single case. 
Law students are taught to write and construct arguments that follow general 
patterns of discussion and analysis, taught in law schools as some variation of 
Conclusion, Rule, Explanation, Analysis, Conclusion, or CREAC—but research designs 
and analyses are not typically pushed towards questioning methods or methodologies of 
the law itself.  I argue that institutional ethnography and CRT provide an alternative to 
traditional studies of law by presenting a scientifically grounded, legal research and 
analysis methodology, explored fully in the final three chapters of this dissertation.  
Chapters four and five look at two recent cases coming out of Texas: Fisher v. University 
of Texas at Austin83 and Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.84  Both cases arise from controversies in Texas 
involving racial discrimination—Fisher is contesting remedies like affirmative action, 
while Inclusive Communities looks at the applicability of the federal Fair Housing Act in 
                                                 
83 Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).  
84 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2504 (2015). 
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cases involving housing discrimination.  Both cases were decided within the past 5 years 
by close margins, 5-4 and 4-3 respectively, with Justice Anthony Kennedy writing both 
opinions.  Justice Kennedy’s authorship is significant since he has been opposed to most 
racial remedies during his tenure on the Court; writing conservative majorities in cases 
like Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, where the Court affirmed a 
state’s power to ban affirmative action and other racial remedies under the guise of 
colorblindness.85 These two cases will highlight how the Court uses social scientific, and 
other, evidence in two major cases involving race decided very recently and explores the 
connections between the science and reasoning involved in the two. 
Analyzing a case is not just a good way to play on the typical social science 
process of the “case study,” but also serves as the site for mapping institutional power.  
Though many institutional ethnographic accounts focus on interviews to map relations of 
ruling, I focus exclusively on texts and audio recordings of oral arguments.  In part this is 
an issue of access—interviewing Supreme Court justices on a pending or past case is 
usually work reserved for biographers, ghostwriters of memoirs, or the occasional well-
connected journalist.  Rather, focusing on a case presents a manageable way for tracking 
what elements are given relevance and are supplied to the Court.  The litany of amicus 
curiae that add on to the original briefing helps to show how arguments are developed 
and come before the Court, while arguments and facts that appear in the final opinion that 
do not come from any of the briefs show the ideas a justice develops on its own.  Looking 
at a particular case also highlights how the power of the Court is applied; using a 
                                                 
85 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for 
Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014) 
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particular set of factual circumstances to stand in for larger principles of law.  If the Court 
is to set standards for all lower courts to follow under the Constitution, the interpretation 
of broad principles in any given case are incredibly meaningful. 
Analyzing Fisher II and Texas Department of Housing, I will map and analyze 
how scientific evidence is considered in each case, what standards (if any) are given for 
social science—either in the particulars of the case or as a general standard—and where 
the data or scientific evidence comes from.  I plan on reading and coding the information 
in reverse-chronological order, beginning with the actual opinion of the Court and any 
concurrences or dissents, working backwards through oral argument, amicus briefs, and 
merits briefs in each case.  Starting from the beginning of the case makes narrative sense, 
but in my case, in order to map how the Court uses information, it is best to begin with 
what the Court deems relevant, since there is considerably more information presented 
before the Court than it actually uses.  In this way I can map where citations and 
assertions of the Court recur within the texts presented before the court, visualizing how 
information is received by the Court and where it comes from within the case record.  
Although I will be focusing on the presentation and use of social scientific data, I intend 
to also map the use of case law and the factual record of the case, to compare how 
different types of information recur in case law.  From this I can analyze the outcome of 
the case, looking at how the Court’s conclusions are supported by evidence, the record, 
and data, and what conclusions of law, fact, or a mixture of the two, emerge. 
Ultimately, my dissertation argues for the importance of exchange and translation 
between legal and social scientific studies of the Supreme Court, and the law generally.  
Social sciences can alter or legitimize understandings of power, hierarchy, or even 
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everyday life in the United States through stories, surveys, and analysis.  These analyses 
are important and influential, but I hope to understand how influential they can be when 
put before a Court, and more importantly, what Courts need to properly analyze the data 
presented and weigh competing studies.  Law has the power to define lived realities, 
while social sciences describe and help understand those lived realities, putting the two in 
conversation has tremendous potential for change—either to aid those at the margins or 
to legitimize established state structures.
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2 The I's of the Court 
I seen people abuse power, use power, misuse and then lose power 
Power to the people at last, it’s a new hour 
-Kanye West, “Power” 
 
No one corrects the Supreme Court, and we rarely correct ourselves. 
- Justice Sonya Sotomayor 
 
First Lady Michelle Obama’s powerful statement “I wake up every morning in a 
house that was built by slaves” at the 2016 Democratic National Convention highlights 
the continuing salience of race and slavery in the United States.1  As the wife of the 
President whose election flooded media with talk of a mythical “postracial” America, 
Michelle Obama’s statement recentralizes race by emphasizing how structures of power 
are built on Black labor and Black lives.  Black and brown labor was, and still is, used to 
build the physical representations of social power on land taken from indigenous peoples.  
Michelle Obama invokes the imagery and history of slave labor to argue for the greatness 
of the United States—a Black family now lives in the White House as the first family of 
the same nation that used enslaved Black people to build the White House.  Slave labor 
built the White House and Congress, but they did not build the power structure that 
racialized, enslaved, and continues to oppress people of color in the United States.  These 
oppressive forces are not contrary to the founding principles of the United States, but 
instead are deeply rooted in the Constitution and laws of the United States—texts brought 
                                                 
1 Importantly, this sentiment was couched in language bolstering the importance of the United States and 
support of Hillary Clinton:That is the story of this country, the story that has brought me to this stage 
tonight, the story of generations of people who felt the lash of bondage, the shame of servitude, the sting of 
segregation, but who kept on striving and hoping and doing what needed to be done so that today I wake up 
every morning in a house that was built by slaves. Democratic National Convention, First Lady Michelle 
Obama at DNC 2016, YouTube (July 26, 2016), https://youtu.be/cBxTwFiF9QI. 
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to life by state actors like the Presidency or maintained and protected by the Supreme 
Court.  Just as the White House was built by slaves, the Supreme Court and the laws of 
the United States construct race. 
The Supreme Court sits at the crux of this relationship of race, law, and power in 
the United States.  If the Constitution is a blueprint for law and order, the Supreme Court 
ensures that those plans are followed and maintained so the structure stands in perpetuity.  
The Court maintains the legitimacy of the state by defining the terms of justice under the 
Constitution.2  The Constitution does not mention race directly, but relies on implication.  
The Census Clause, for example, defined state representatives based on “adding the 
whole number of free Persons. . . and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons”—counting only white landowning men had the power to vote, reducing 
enslaved Blacks to a fraction, and excluding Indigenous peoples of the United States.3  
The Census Clause thus constitutionalized the racial hierarchy that would dominate the 
early United States, conceptualizing Whites as whole persons under the law, Natives as 
assimilable outsiders, and Blacks as fractional property of the region they were held to.  
Even the language of “free Persons” is misleading as voting rights applied only White 
men, according to the Supreme Court, until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.4  
                                                 
2 Article III of the Constitution vests “the judicial Power of the United States” in one Supreme Court, 
giving the court final say on all cases “arising under” the Constitution.  U.S. Const. Art. III. Judicial review 
originates with the text, but mostly comes from common law precedent—the Court’s understanding of its 
own role.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (defining the terms of the Court’s original and 
appellate jurisdiction, rejecting the case for lack of jurisdiction since the Judiciary Act of 1801 would 
contradict the Constitution). 
3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (known as the “Three-Fifths Clause” or the “Census Clause”). 
4 Prior to the 19th Amendment, the Supreme Court decided in Minor v. Happersett, that women are not 
entitled to a right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to vote is not guaranteed to 
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The Supreme Court interprets, maintains and perpetuates the Constitution above all—
typically reinforcing white supremacist patriarchal hierarchies.    
If and when the Constitution implies or explicates guidelines for racial power, 
how does the Court give the text relevant social meaning?  What contexts, injuries, or 
advantages are taken into account?  What remedies, if any, are available for the social 
injuries created by racial oppression?  Is the Supreme Court an active or passive 
participant in the legitimation of white supremacy?  Put simply, what is the role of the 
Supreme Court in the construction of race and racism in the United States?  This essay 
attempts to see how competing ideologies of race are balanced in the institutional scheme 
created by the Constitution, and what implications this has for people in society.   
Race does not originate in the Supreme Court, but the Court’s constitutional and 
social authority shapes the function of race in society.  The Supreme Court 
operationalizes race—managing and enacting racial meaning in the law.  Andrea Smith 
theorizes three pillars of White Supremacy to highlight the “separate and distinct, but still 
interrelated, logics” of Slavery/Capitalism, Genocide/Capitalism, and Orientalism/War.5  
In this view White Supremacy relies on Black Labor, Native Land, and the vacillating 
                                                 
citizens under the Constitution.  88 U.S. 162 (1873) (holding “if it had been intended to make all citizens of 
the United States voters, the framers of the Constitution would not have left it to implication.  So important 
a change in the condition of citizenship as it actually existed, if intended, would have been expressly 
declared.”).  Even the Fifteenth Amendment contains no explicit guarantee of the right to vote, only a 
prohibition on states from restricting the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. U.S. Const. amend. XV. 
5 Andrea Smith, Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy, in COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE 
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, ed. INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 67 (2016). 
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in/exclusion of those deemed outsiders, predominantly Asian and Latina/o peoples.6  
Each of these are distinct and important issues, but in looking at the three pillars we see 
the greater structural relationship between them and how they bolster white supremacy.   
Similarly, I would argue that at the Supreme Court, there are three pillars of racial 
power, what I call the “I’s of the Court:” Ideology, institutional power, and individual 
rights.  Ideology is the manifestation of implicit social rules and hierarchies—these are 
both created and reinforced by the Supreme Court.  Institutional power refers to the 
coordination of social institutions at all levels under the Constitutional power of the court.  
Disputes involving schools, prisons, and everything between often come before the 
Supreme Court for a determination on constitutional authority of power.  Can school 
district policy compel students to attend specific high schools to achieve racial diversity?7  
Can a prison prevent an inmate from growing a beard?8  The Supreme Court determines 
the meaning of institutional power under the Constitution, especially in lower federal and 
state courts, since opinions of the Supreme Court must be followed, and thus 
reinterpreted, by lower courts.  The third I, Individual rights, refers to the rights of people 
under the law and how the Court conceptualizes the rights of individuals under the 
Constitution—as distinct from groups which the Court is loath to recognize outside a 
formal class action. 
                                                 
6 Id. at 67-69.  Each of the three pillars of white supremacy as constructed by smith is connected, but 
distinct, reliant upon a common theme of white supremacy but with distinct strategies and tactics. 
7 No, at least according to Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.  See 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 US 701 (2007). 
8 No, according to a unanimous court in Holt v. Hobbs, 574 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
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In the following sections I identify the role and power of the Court in four 
primary areas, first the textual power of the Court as defined by the constitution and court 
opinion that has flowed from it.  Next I begin tackling the I’s of the court with the 
ideological power of the law and the Supreme Court.  It is the Court’s ideological role 
that does the most balancing by attempting to insulate the Constitution, and thus white 
supremacy, from all challenges—even challenges for racial justice.  Finally, I address the 
Institutional and Individual I’s of the court in the final section, since the two are usually 
placed in opposition before the Supreme Court—individual rights placed in opposition to 
an institution’s authority.  Institution in this sense is not about a group or collective, but 
the doctrinal power of a social body.  Similarly, individual rights also include 
corporations or collections of individuals, but not social identities or group rights because 
rights under the Constitution are vested in individuals, not groups.9 
The Court’s power to define race shapes legal realities for the United States and 
the lived experiences of people within it, even if that legal reality does not always 
resemble the lived realties of people of color.  The supposed neutrality of law and its 
relationship to truth and justice mask the Court’s role in shaping mindset, as the legal 
realties provide a justification for changing, denying, or ignoring lived realities of people 
of color.  Because the Supreme Court has the final say on law, it is crucial to look at 
                                                 
9 See infra §III; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1761 (1993). The Court 
has strict rules about what groups it will and will not recognize, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 23 which 
designates class certification, proscribing formal rules and standards for recognizing the group.  However 
even class certification is only about coordinating individual lawsuits against common parties to better 
allow for spreading the burden of litigation and legal fees among parties.  The benefits and rights involved 
still are individually derived for each member of the class certified by a court. 
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whose voices are amplified or even heard, how it effects social conditions, and if it is 
even possible for the Court to work as an agent of social change to benefit people of color 
when the Constitution was not designed to grant people of color, the “other persons,”10 
rights or privileges.  Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the Supreme Court has failed in its 
most important role: “to enforce the Constitution against the will of the majority,” 
thereby protecting rights of socially marginalized people.11  However, particularly when 
it comes to race, the Court’s role is not to protect the rights of the marginalized, but to 
protect the Constitution above all—regardless of whether the will of the majority or 
rights of the marginalized are aligned with the Court’s interpretation. 
2.1 The Blueprint – Constitutional Powers of the Supreme Court 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule. 
- Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
Decisions of the Supreme Court establish constitutional bases for social, civil, and 
political rights in the United States.  Even though a decision may not radically alter social 
perceptions, status, or standing, the Court’s opinion provides legal authority to social 
power.  Before analyzing the social power of the Court’s decisions, it is important to 
understand what powers the Court has according to the Constitution.  Article III vests 
“the judicial Power of the United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
                                                 
10 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
11 Erwin Chemerinsky, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 200 (2014). 
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Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”12  However the 
Supreme Court does not hear trials, and is hardly ever the first court to rule on an issue.  
Instead, the Supreme Court primarily hears oral arguments based on appeals from lower 
Federal courts or State supreme courts.13  Any issue goes through years of litigation 
before reaching the Supreme Court, and even then the questions before the Court are 
matters of federal law—determinations of administrative or legal authority, or broader 
notions of Constitutionality.  Since the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land under 
Article VI14 the Supreme Court’s judicial powers extend to all cases and controversies 
“arising under” federal law—so long as the interpretation of federal law is essential to the 
claim.15  Even when the Court hears a case it does not usually determine the outcome, but 
instead rules on the pertinent legal issue appealed to the Court.  A criminal conviction for 
kidnapping and rape would not reach the Supreme Court—unless it involved 
constitutional or federal issues like in the infamous Miranda v. Arizona where the 
                                                 
12 U.S. Const. Art. III, §1. 
13 Article III §2 limits the Court’s original jurisdiction (or power to hear cases without any other court’s 
prior ruling) is limited to “cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in 
which a state shall be a party.”  U.S. Const. Art. III, §2. Appellate jurisdiction is more expansive, and 
defined through various acts of Congress.  See e.g. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332 (defining subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction, respectively). 
14 U.S. Const. Art. VI. 
15 U.S. Const, Art. III, §2; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (interpreting arising under jurisdiction to 
include cases where it is necessary to interpret the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States), but 
see Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp, 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (finding that a theory under 
federal law is not sufficient to invoke arising under jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331), and Grable & 
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (finding that 
arising under jurisdiction requires a substantial federal issue, necessary to the claim, which is actually 
disputed, and will not disturb congressionally approved balance of state and federal interests). 
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conviction resulted from a coerced confession, meaning the defendant was under duress 
and did not understand his constitutional protection against self-incrimination.16  
No matter the scale or perception of injustice, the Court is not required to hear a 
case.  Wrongful convictions or inaccurate court decisions happen and are never reviewed 
by the Supreme Court.  Instead, the Supreme Court accepts nearly all of its cases through 
a writ of certiorari, giving the Court almost complete discretion on what cases to 
review.17  How, where, and when the Supreme Court intervenes in social issues is further 
restricted by doctrines of justiciability—implied limits on judicial authority outlined by 
the Supreme Court.  Determining whether a case is justiciable may be grounded in the 
Constitution, but requires no explicit restriction or allowance to hear a case.  Instead the 
Court limits its own authority to hear cases based on the Court’s understanding of the 
Constitution, statutes, and theories of its own power.  Even when a case presents an issue 
that is socially relevant, the Court may dismiss it as non-justiciable if a party lacks 
                                                 
16 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
17 There is an extremely limited set of cases for mandatory review, the Court’s jurisdiction is codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§1251-1259, illustrating the requirements for original jurisdiction, direct appeals, and appeals from 
state courts.  The language of the statute primarily uses the language that decisions “may” be repealed or 
the Supreme Court “may” review appeals from federal or state courts. The remaining cases in which the 
court “shall” have jurisdiction are only those cases described for the Court’s original jurisdiction under 
Article III. 
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standing,18 if the issue is not ripe for review19 or has become moot,20 if it is an advisory 
opinion,21 or if it involves a “political question.”22 Each of these doctrines set judicially-
                                                 
18 Standing is a question of whether or not the party bringing the case is the actual party injured by the 
actions of the defendant/other party, and whether or not the court can remedy that injury.  Thus the three 
elements the court evaluates are: whether there is an injury in fact, if the action can be traced to defendant’s 
conduct, and finally if the Court can redress the injury.  Compare Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) 
(determining that the nationwide class of Black parents lacked standing to sue the IRS to enforce 
regulations and revoke tax exempt status of segregated private schools because the parents alleged an 
“abstract stigmatic injury” caused by segregated private schools and shifting tax funding to public schools) 
with Massachusetts v. EPA,549 U.S. 497 (2007) (determining Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA 
over emissions regulations since the decreasing shoreline was a sufficient injury in fact traceable to 
emissions standards, which are overseen by the EPA). 
19 If a case is not yet ripe, the Court has determined that the injury has yet to manifest in a way that the 
Court feels comfortable deciding. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (deciding that a suit over a 
criminal statute banning contraceptives was not ripe since the doctor and married persons bringing suit had 
not been prosecuted and, in the Court’s opinion, were not likely to be prosecuted, meaning no injury was 
ripe for review) and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (discussing 
the relationship between ripeness and the “injury in fact” requirement of standing). 
20 Cases are dismissed as moot if the injury is no longer present; the dispute died before a final judgement 
could be issued.  Like ripeness, this is a determination that the standing requirement is not present, but 
usually happens over the course of litigation.  In some cases there may be a voluntary cessation or 
settlement mid-case that renders another issue being litigated moot, see Already LLC v. Nike LLC, 133 S. 
Ct. 721 (2013) (finding that a sweeping covenant not to sue by Nike was sufficient to remove the injury or 
potential injury for Already that the counterclaim to remove Nike’s trademark was also dismissed).  
However, a large exception exists in cases where the challenged conduct is “capable of repetition yet 
evading review,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (finding that case is not moot 
because even though the defendant corporation ceased producing waste in excess of EPA permits, the 
company retained its permit and could pollute again in the future, ceasing only to moot litigation). 
21 The Court will not issue advisory opinions based on its interpretation of Article III’s “case or 
controversy” requirement; requiring issues come to the Court as cases, rather than simply offering advice 
on matters of state to a coordinate branch.  Part of this evolves from the Neutrality Controversy of 1793, 
where President George Washington requested advice from Chief Justice John Jay on a statement of 
neutrality that would likely violate treaty obligations.  Chief Justice Jay declined to offer an opinion, noting 
“the power given by the constitution of the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, 
seems to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments.” John Jay, John Jay 
to George Washington: Correspondence 3:488-89, The Founders’ Constitution, Document 34 (1987) 
(emphasis in original).  The Court followed Chief Justice Jay’s lead and still declines to issue advisory 
opinions. For further discussion, see e.g. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
1002 (1923) and Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 603, 644-645 (1992) (examples of the standards for what constitutes an advisory opinion). 
22 Issues which show “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department, or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” will be 
dismissed as political questions.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (deciding that issues of 
redistricting are justiciable because a loss of voting rights makes other avenues for remedy inaccessible).  
Other elements of the doctrine include: the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination 
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imposed boundaries for intervention in social issues.  Erwin Chemerinsky points out that 
“the entire area of justiciability is a morass that confuses more than it clarifies;”23 it 
provides ample fodder for law school exams and a vague body of judicial doctrine which 
enables the Supreme Court to dismiss cases on procedural reasons, rather than address the 
substantive issues. 
In Allen v. Wright, for example, the Supreme Court avoided addressing 
discriminatory impacts of white flight on public schools through the doctrine of standing.  
Black parents with children in public schools filed a class action suit against the IRS, 
alleging that the IRS’ failure to enforce nondiscrimination policies in granting tax exempt 
status to private schools.24  None of the parents had attempted to enroll their children in 
the private schools, but instead sought declaratory judgement and an injunction against 
the IRS, pointing to the nationwide discriminatory impact that is caused by the rise in 
private, tax exempt schools following school desegregation orders.25  In other words, the 
tax exempt status of private schools combined with white flight caused public school 
funding to decrease, and Black parents asked the Court to require the IRS to enforce the 
law as written.  But, the Supreme Court avoided the substantive issues of white flight, tax 
exempt status and school desegregation entirely by finding the parents lacked standing to 
                                                 
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question).  Id. 
23 Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677 (1990). 
24 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
25 Id. at 746. 
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bring the suit.  Standing requires an injury in fact, causation, and redressability.  Supreme 
Court decisions since Brown v. Board26 clearly established that segregated schooling is 
an injury and courts had the power to redress it.  In Allen, the Court recognized the injury, 
but found the IRS’ grants of tax exempt status “attenuated at best,” and dismissed the 
case for lack of standing based on the Court’s understanding of the causal chain in the 
claim.27  The Court did not address the role of the IRS and taxation in funding public 
education for Black students, but instead decided that the connection was not worth 
exploring in a court of law.  The Court’s power to decide substantive issues coexists with 
the power to avoid substantive decisions on procedural grounds like justiciability. 
Certiorari and justiciability doctrine highlight the Court’s power to decide cases 
and concurrent power to decide which cases it decides.  Certiorari operates by an 
uncodified “Rule of Four” that requires the votes of four Justices to accept a petition of 
certiorari and review the case.  A judgment of the Court requires a plurality of votes, 
though not all Justices may agree in the same opinion.  In written opinions, one Justice 
will write the judgment of the Court while Justices may concur, dissent, or both in a 
separate written opinion.   
Justices still add their own style to the written opinion, making authoritative 
statements of law, called “dicta.”  Dicta is meant to be a binding statement of the law, but 
forms the background reasoning and rhetoric of the court.  Dissenting opinions make 
                                                 
26 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
27 Allen, 468 U.S. at 757. 
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statements of law, but lack the binding force of law.  As Lani Guinier notes, “the Court 
gains authority when it speaks with an institutional rather than an individual voice.”28  
Whether with the institutional force of the majority or in separate concurrences, “Justices 
teach by their opinions.”29  Opinions of the court speak not only to other justices and 
those trained in the law, but speak to society—at times attempting to mobilize non-legal 
sources of authority to change the law that motivated the majority opinion.  Guinier and  
Gerald Torres thus argue that some opinions function as “demosprudence,” which is less 
concerned with the “legal principles that animate and justify a judicial opinion . . . instead 
focus[ing] on enhancing the democratic potential of the work of lawyers, judges, and 
other legal elites.”30  As the judiciary speaks to society, especially through dissents, law 
may be changed through legislative action or social movements that gain support from 
the authority of a Justice’s opinion—even if that authority is not through law. 
The Court’s authority, derived from the Constitution and dispersed through legal 
and social perception, is a powerful tool in shaping or reflecting society.  Vested with the 
judicial authority of the nation—the power to determine the law and the meanings of 
rights under the Constitution—the Supreme Court is a definitive source of legal meaning 
which extends into society.  The law has very real effects for those detained in criminal 
trials or those who are arguing for rights or responsibilities through constitutional claims.  
Opinions of the Court, whether dicta or a binding ruling, have the power to “transform 
                                                 
28 Lani Guinier, Demosprudence through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (2008). 
29 Id. at 14. 
30 Id. at 16. 
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racial ideas into a lived reality of material inequality, [and] the ensuing reality becomes a 
further justification for the ideas of race.”31   
The meaning of the law also includes the meanings of race under the law—both in 
openly racialized legislation like the three-fifths clause which has since been removed 
from the Constitution, to modern interpretations of the 14th Amendment that favor 
avoiding discussion of race altogether.  Recently, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, the Supreme Court held that a state’s ban on affirmative action—
rebranded as a “prohibition on race- and sex-based discrimination and preferential 
treatment”—did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32  
Schuette effectively empowers states to bar the consideration of racial inequality in public 
services by eliminating and banning any “race conscious” policy in education or 
employment.  This not only shapes discourse in employment and education, but practical 
outcomes too because, as Justice Sotomayor so eloquently states in her dissent, “race 
matters” as a historical, political, legal, and economic inequality: 
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only 
perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that 
race matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the 
Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial 
discrimination. As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to 
carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish 
away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society. It 
                                                 
31 Ian Haney López, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 13 (1997). 
32 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014). 
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is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion that what 
makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does matter.33  
 
Decisions of the Supreme Court set the tone for what race means in society, by 
proscribing or circumscribing meaning through ideology, institutional power, and what 
individual rights mean for different bodies under the law.  Justice Sotomayor’s emphasis 
on the everyday impacts of race, when dealing with legislation that sought to eliminate 
discourse on race and inequality, highlights the influential role that the law and the 
Supreme Court has over the multilayered experiences of racialized people in society.  As 
Justice Sotomayor highlights, the letter of the law in racial discrimination is just as 
important as the Court’s intervention or lack thereof.  The Constitutional structure 
empowers the Court to operationalize race through ideologies of race and status, social 
institutions, or individual rights.  Therefore, the next section turns to the ideological 
relationship between race and the Court, particularly the ways in which the Court shapes 
ideas of race, racialization, and discrimination. 
2.2 Pillar I: Racial Ideologies 
At the center of the pillars of power of the Supreme Court is the ideological 
function of the Supreme Court.  Justice Sotomayor called out the Court’s attempts to 
“wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society” in 
Schuette,34 but just as the Court’s uses its silence to dismiss cases on procedural rather 
than substantive grounds, the Supreme Court ruling or declining to rule on issues of race 
                                                 
33 Id. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).  The entire dissent highlights the multifaceted and layered nature 
of race in society in was that the Supreme Court rarely speaks, outside some previous demosprudential 
dissents like those highlighted by Lani Guinier. 
34 Id. 
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perpetuates and facilitates racial ideologies in society and in the law.  Law appeals to 
commonsense understandings of society, including social definitions of race, by 
“embody[ing] and reinforce[ing] ideological assumptions about human relations that 
people accept as natural or even immutable.”35  Law engages in an ideological “racist 
‘call-and-response’ with society” by reaffirming hierarchies of white supremacy through 
neutral-sounding concepts like “equal protection.”36  Ian Haney López argues the 
Supreme Court constructs race through ideology through legitimation and transcendence.  
First, the law legitimates existing racial hierarchies and definitions, “affirming the 
categories and images of popular racial beliefs and making it nearly impossible to 
imagine non-racialized ways of thinking about identity, belonging, and difference.”37  
Second, “the law helps racial categories to transcend the sociohistorical contexts in which 
they develop.”38  The Supreme Court builds on the common law precedent created by 
previous decisions, thus a decision made in 1823 may control and determine the outcome 
in a 2016 opinion—as in United States v. Jones, where Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority 
opinion used case law going back to 1886 to determine the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures for GPS tracking 
                                                 
35 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:  Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988). 
36 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1608 (2009): 1608. 
37 Haney López, supra note 31, at 87. 
38 Id. at 88. 
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devices.39  If the authors of the Constitution, or any of the Justices alive at the time of the 
case law could see a GPS tracking device they might be more perplexed by the car it is 
attached to than the device itself.  Similarly, the technologies and science behind 
constructing racial categories has long changed, yet, particularly in the law, remains 
mired in past opinions and decisions of what is factual.40  
Courts serve a hegemonic function in legitimizing ideologies of racial definition 
by clothing them with the “illusion of necessity because it embodies and reinforces 
ideological assumptions about human relations that people accept as natural or even 
immutable.”41  Lawlessness and anarchy are used as political talking points to scare 
voters every election cycle, or even just to characterize Black protests as “riots"—
however the underlying assumption of the law as a necessary force is precisely what 
gives it legitimating power.  Law has such legitimating power that it can give authority to 
scientific practices of dubious scientific value, like masking white supremacist eugenics 
as a legitimate public health issue in miscegenation and forced sterilization laws.42  
                                                 
39 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (quoting Lord Camden and relying on 
common-law definitions of trespass to determine that governmental placement of a GPS tracking device on 
a car, without a warrant, violated the Fourth amendment). 
40 See Dorothy Roberts, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (discussing how racial categorization is reinscribed in new 
technologies and laws, like supposed DNA tests for ancestry which use statistical correlations between 
genetic markers to guess about ancestries and geographies as a substitute for racial categorization). 
41 Crenshaw, supra note 35, at 1352. 
42 Troy Duster extensively explores the pseudoscience of forced sterilization and the Court’s tendency 
towards white supremacy in the case of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) see Troy Duster, BACKDOOR TO 
EUGENICS 11 (2nd ed. 2003).  Furthermore, anti-miscegenation laws were created to ensure white racial 
purity as a similar eugenics effort labeled as public health law, particularly for Blacks and Asians, see Leti 
Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and Anti-Miscegenation Laws in California, in MIXED RACE AMERICA 
AND THE LAW: A READER 86 (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2003). 
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Maintenance of racial power therefore serves the more important purpose of maintaining 
the power of the state in society by making it appear legitimate, timeless, and necessary. 
2.2.1 State Apparatus and Interest Convergence 
Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser argues that the Court, and the law generally, 
represent a state apparatus that enforces state power both as a “Repressive State 
Apparatus (RSA)” and an “Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).”43  As a RSA, the Court 
and law “functions by violence” (physical or non-physical) to assert the power of the 
state over a person44—for example when the Supreme Court rejects a death penalty 
appeal, the administrative power of review merges with the physical power of state 
violence in taking life.  Conversely an ISA functions through “the ruling ideology,” 
which turns imaginary relations into material reality.45  Ideology operates by constructing 
sites of meaning and rituals of participation.  For race and the law this could mean 
everything from segregation of public and private facilities to the use of Supreme Court 
cases to end those practices.  Althusser envisions this in terms of class, noting that the 
ruling class sets state ideology,46  but for race this means that white supremacy serves to 
structure the relationship between race and the law.  The Court maintains racial power in 
that gains for racial justice ultimately come through Constitutional processes—legislation 
like Civil Rights laws, Constitutional amendments, or even Supreme Court decisions like 
                                                 
43 Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in 
MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES: KEYWORKS 79 (Rev. ed., Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. 
Kellner, eds. 2009). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 82. 
46 Id. at 81. 
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Brown v. Board of Education.  The structure becomes stronger as challenges to its 
authority become integrated into the rhetoric and ideology of the state. 
Brown v. Board of Education serves as a prime example of the way the Court 
insulates existing structures of power against challenges, as the Court decides briefly and 
unanimously that segregation in public education is unconstitutional.47  Brown is properly 
considered a landmark victory for Civil Rights at the Supreme Court, and is more 
shocking as a, brief, shift in tone for the Court—confronting race and discrimination 
more directly rather than following its history of avoiding jurisdiction to ensure slavery in 
Dredd Scott,48 striking down the 1875 Civil Rights Act’s attempts to ban racial 
discrimination in The Civil Rights Cases,49 and gutting the critical “privileges or 
immunities” section of the 14th Amendment just years after it was ratified in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.50  Most of the Supreme Court’s history was adverse to rights of 
Black people, so what made the Court unanimously change course?  First, as the Brown 
opinion notes, legal precedents had been seeded in previous opinions of the Supreme 
                                                 
47 Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
48 Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because Mr. 
Dredd Scott was determined to be as slave, and therefore not a citizen of any state and unable to avail 
himself of the Court’s 28 U.S.C. §1331 diversity jurisdiction). 
49 The Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (finding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 an unconstitutional use of 
congressional power under the 14th amendment since the 1875 act would ban all racial discrimination, not 
just racial discrimination by state entities.  The Civil Rights Act would not be amended or any similar 
legislation passed until the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
50 The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (in the first opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court held that the privileges or immunities clause did not ensure full privileges or immunities, but a 
limited set recognized by federal law and bounded by state police powers.  The Fourteenth Amendment, 
read as the dissenting four Justices and most scholars of history would understand, should guarantee full 
citizenship rights and all incidental rights to being a citizen, including travel and accommodations, and 
could have ended segregation under the strict letter of the constitution). 
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Court and lower federal courts, creating a network of opinions on specific issues like 
graduate education that were used to undermine racial segregation generally.51  However 
social forces also arguably played a role as mounting social pressure was pushing the 
United States to either incorporate non-whites more fully into the polity or face serious 
Constitutional crisis and international scandal. 
Returning to Derrick Bell’s principle of interest convergence demonstrates how 
this potential for change is still mediated by the interest of the Court and state apparatuses 
in maintaining the underlying ideological power behind existing practices.  Bell’s interest 
convergence holds that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”52  Even dramatic 
shifts in racial policy, like Brown’s repudiation of segregation in education, do not come 
from recognition in the oppressive power of white supremacy.  Rather, Bell argues that 
Brown emerges in a historical moment when the United States needed to maintain 
governmental legitimacy in three main ways:  
First the decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s 
struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging 
third world peoples. . . . Second, Brown offered much needed reassurance 
to American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded 
during World War II might yet be given meaning at home. . . . [Third,] 
segregation was viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the 
South.53  
                                                 
51 The Court in Brown cites specifically Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. 
Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
52 Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
518, 523 (1980). 
53 Id. at 525. 
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Although Brown dismantles a significant social institution which maintains white 
supremacy, the decision fails to undermine underlying ideologies or conditions of white 
supremacy.  Ideologies remain stable while the implementation and reasoning shifts. 
2.2.2 Colorblind Constitutionalism 
After Brown, colorblindness replaced segregation under the guise of justice.  
White supremacy became increasingly covert, wrapped in rhetoric of equality and 
opportunity.  As Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains, race is loosely constructed through 
ideology to allow for “accommodation of contradictions, exceptions, and new 
information.”54  Racial ideologies are effective “not by establishing ideological 
uniformity, but by providing the frames to organize difference.”55  Racial frames allow 
ideologies to shift and adapt, effectively organizing social differences, but allowing for 
accommodation and exclusion.  The “abstract liberalism” frame, for example, utilizes 
legal and political ideas associated with liberalism to explain racial matters with terms 
like “equal opportunity” or “individual choice” while ignoring “the multiple institutional 
and state sponsored practices” that reinforce white supremacy.56  Framing race in this 
way is permissive towards broad state language of inclusion, while remaining silent on 
exclusionary effects. 
                                                 
54 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND RACIAL INEQUALITY IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 10 (3rd ed., 2010). 
55 Id. at 171. 
56 Id. at 28. 
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State language is crucial in maintaining racial ideologies, particularly through the 
Supreme Court, since the Court is so centered on text—it writes opinions interpreting the 
Constitution based on briefs and other documents submitted to it.  Terms like “equality” 
can be interpreted and applied broadly or narrowly based on the Court’s interpretation of 
scope or applicability.  Myths of colorblindness and postracialism gain significant legal 
traction because the language may not blatantly address race in overt ways—like the 
three-fifths clause or segregation—allowing the Court to overlook the effects of 
discrimination because the language itself is supposedly colorblind.  Justice Harlan’s 
infamous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson decries the majority’s affirmation of segregation, 
instead arguing that “our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”57  
Textual equality was sufficient for Justice Harlan.  If the constitution makes no explicit 
mention of race or color, it must therefore be color blind in giving rights.  Historically 
and presently we know this to be untrue simply from experience, but Justice Harlan’s 
argument that the text itself is colorblind continues to hold sway in the Supreme Court.58  
Neil Gotanda demonstrates that the Court’s use of color-blind and related 
ontologies “legitimate[] racial inequality and domination” in its framing of race and 
discrimination issues.59  In essence, the Court  neglects the multidimensionality of lived 
                                                 
57 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
58 In the last fifteen years, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas have quoted Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
their opinions.  See Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1648 (Roberts, C.J. concurring); Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. at 
2758 Fn. 14; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 at 378 (2003) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
59 Niel Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’ 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991). 
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racial experience by reducing race to exclusively to social status, formal categorization, 
past/ongoing racial discrimination, or cultural consciousness/experience.60  Narrowly 
framing race in these ways produces colorblind constitutionalism, which Gotanda 
identifies based on five distinct themes.   
First is a “public-private distinction” which creates a protected private sphere 
where “the due process right to contractual freedom protects economic activity from 
governmental regulation.”61  This creates what amounts to a private right to discriminate, 
since the Court interprets the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as applying only to 
federal or state actors, not private individuals or companies unless it is a criminal law or 
the private entity receives federal funding.  Second, the Court “notices but does not 
consider” race—ignoring, discounting, repressing, or outright denying racial 
subordination.62  Paradoxically acknowledging the importance of race and proceeding to 
focus “exclusively on the nonconsideration by denying the existence of the consideration 
component” and claims moral superiority for doing so.63  This is exactly what Justice 
Sotomayor scolded the majority of doing in Schuette, as the Court attempts to wish away 
racism by ignoring the persistence of race.64  
                                                 
60 Gotanda labels these as four distinct ideas: status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race.” Id. 
61 Id. at 8. 
62 Id. at 22. 
63 Id. at 23. 
64 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1676. 
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Thirdly, the Court treats racial categorization as value neutral scientific 
observation, as biological or immutable.65  This approach ignores social constructions of 
race in favor of essentialism and places science, particularly biology and anthropology, 
on a pedestal of objectivity and uncritical acceptance.  Similarly, Gotanda’s fourth frame 
“Formal-Race and Unconnectedness” identifies when the Court relies only on blanket 
racial categories like Black or white and disconnects race from racialization and the 
historical processes that create present-day inequalities.66  This is especially relevant in 
the context of judicial review of affirmative action policies. While affirmative action is 
designed to remedy the historical exclusion from higher education or employment, the 
Court takes racial categories at face value, treating them as interchangeable and ignoring 
racial subordination.  Opponents to affirmative action at the Court make race only a 
category: a box to be checked at admission that unlocks some secret pathway to benefits 
that others are being denied—disconnecting admissions policies from the histories of 
exclusion and disenfranchisement that made affirmative action policies necessary and 
enabling whites claiming discrimination in admissions simply because race is involved in 
some way.67 
Gotanda’s fifth and final frame of color-blind constitutionalism identifies how the 
Court idealizes color-blindness “as a means and as an end for American society” that re-
                                                 
65 Gotanda, supra note 59, at 36. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 51. 
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centers whiteness and devalues historical/cultural Blackness.68  Colorblindness seeks to 
eliminate formal racial categorization only, not the underlying inequalities created by 
white supremacy, patriarchy, capitalism or other social hierarchies.  In all, these five 
frames of color-blind constitutionalism span the Court’s post-Brown decisions, 
reinforcing racial ideologies of white supremacy in distinct ways.  Gotanda argues that if 
color-blind constitutionalism is successful “the Supreme Court risk[s] perpetuating 
racism and undermining its own legitimacy.”69  However, the very existence of these five 
frames which Gotanda identifies, with the nested sub-issues within, represents the 
Court’s ability to maintain legitimacy while reinforcing white supremacist racial 
ideologies by adapting the ideology to different cases through racial frames.  The 
legitimacy of the Court is also kept in check by interest-convergence, since the Court, as 
in Brown, can make symbolic decisions for self-preservation. 
2.2.3 Evolution to Post-Racialism 
Colorblindness was a key feature of the post-Civil Rights movement retrenchment 
on race as Supreme Court cases started to focus less on racial discrimination and more on 
the effects of anti-discrimination legislation on society, namely whites.  The first major 
affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,70 questioned the 
benefit of policies that benefitted disenfranchised people of color and white women based 
on the claims of exclusion from a white man—a group very significantly represented in 
                                                 
68 Id. at 54. 
69 Id. at 68. 
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higher education to this day.  Affirmative action would survive because the Court saw the 
necessity of such policies in remedying past discrimination, but aspired to a day when it 
would be unnecessary.  This aspiration is the key feature in the evolution of 
colorblindness into post-racialism, defined by Sumi Cho as “a retreat from race”71 under 
the mistaken belief that “significant racial progress has been made” and thus state-
imposed mechanisms and remedies for evaluating racism should be abandoned.72  While 
color-blindness represents “a largely normative claim,” post-racialism authorizes a 
material, sociocultural, and political retreat from race—including the destruction of what 
few institutional mechanisms exist for combating racism in society.   
Cho therefore identifies four interdependent but non-exclusive key features of 
post-racialism: the trope of racial progress, race neutral universalism, moral equivalence, 
and a distancing move.73  In essence, post-racialism advocates the elimination of race as a 
discourse in society, based on the existence of markers and mechanisms for identifying 
racial inequality in society.  Like Gotanda’s analysis of non-recognition under color-blind 
constitutionalism,74 post-racialism is a self-congratulatory, self-contradictory analysis of 
history.  Postracialism would claim that because Brown v. Board desegregated schools 
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when segregation was a significant manifestation of racism in society, which is a big 
move for racial progress, therefore racism no longer exists fifty years later.  Particularly 
for the Court, with principles of stare decisis (Court precedent)75 and strict scrutiny,76 
moral equivalence weighs heavily in the Court’s modern decision-making process.  If 
segregation was a bad state practice, moral equivalence places blame on the existence of 
race as a category—rather than racism and white supremacy.  Thus, any categorical use 
of race merits strict scrutiny—equivocating the consideration of race as a sociohistorical 
remedy with the consideration of race for segregation.  In this view, policies like 
affirmative action are equivocated with the structural racism it is meant to remedy—
because affirmative action relies on racial identities and groups, the mere mention of race 
invokes the specter of segregation and oppression as equivalents, rather than opposites. 
Similarly, tropes of racial progress, glorifying decisions like Brown, are used to 
reinforce race-neutral universalism as a principle of law—equal protection created 
landmark decisions and legislation, and therefore is neutral in providing benefits to all.  
This becomes particularly problematic for ensuring the legacy of remedies created by 
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these landmark decisions, as the Court in cases like Parents Involved or Shelby County v. 
Holder77 rhetorically invokes racial progress to eliminate programs to remedy oppressive 
racial ideologies.  As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argues in her scathing dissent in 
Shelby County, eliminating remedies that have, arguably, worked to combat 
discrimination “is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not 
getting wet.”78  The umbrella of remedies available under the law constitute the final 
mechanism of the Court as an institution, which, under post-racialism, have been cast as 
“partial and divisive, and benefitting those with ‘special interests’ versus all 
Americans.”79  
 
2.2.4 Dissents to the People 
The post-racialist tendencies of the current Roberts Supreme Court do not bode 
well for governmental programs, but the opinions of dissenting Justices, like Justice 
Ginsburg in Shelby County or Justice Sotomayor in Schuette are not only speaking 
against legal standards and ideologies put forward by the majority.  Instead, these 
opinions are heavily based on facts involved in the case, highlighting issues and examples 
not discussed by the majority opinion, and writing instead toward a broader audience than 
the collection of attorneys, legal scholars, overeager law students that read full Supreme 
Court opinions.  As Lani Guinier argues, these dissenting opinions are writing to the 
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public.  Through “demosprudence,” Justices shift their argument from the Supreme Court 
to the court of public opinion. Lani Guinier explains that 
A demosprudential dissent uses multiple stylistic or narrative tools . . . to 
facilitate an ongoing public conversation . . . about the issue at the heart of 
the conflict . . . in ways that inform (but do not necessarily prescribe) the 
relationship between law and democracy.80 
  
The dissenting Justice[s] thereby use their institutional authority as a part of the 
ideological state apparatus to question the professed institutional ideology of the Court on 
an issue.  Even majority opinions like Brown v. Board of Education are written with the 
public in mind, focusing less on the legal standard than the moral, social argument to the 
public.81  Frames of Judicial reasoning, like color-blind constitutionalism, can therefore 
be altered or countered by the opinions and reframing by opposing Justices from the 
bench.  Guinier argues that because a dissent “is a story told without the coercive power 
of the state,”82 demosprudential opinions can serve a counter-hegemonic purpose as 
pedagogy.  Demosprudential dissents thus enabling social movements to tap into 
ideological meta-narratives of law by lending the legitimacy of a Supreme Court Justice 
to the ideological struggle in society. 
2.2.5 Courting Ideology 
At core, the Court serves to create and legitimate racial ideologies, and thereby 
maintain existing structures of racial power.  As Derrick Bell points out, the Court does 
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not interrogate the underlying ideologies of white supremacy in society, but by “rewiring 
the rhetoric of equality” it constructs manifestations of white supremacy like segregation 
as “an eminently fixable aberration.”83  The ideology underlying the practice thus 
remains untouched, and is even reinforced with a new packaging of color-blindness, 
states’ rights, and equality.  Kimberlé Crenshaw argues that Courts take on a restrictive 
view of equality, narrowly focused on preventing and isolating “future wrongdoing rather 
than [redressing] present manifestations of past injustice.”84  Ideologies of white 
supremacy are rationalized in society through science in the development of IQ tests, 
forced sterilization,85 or even in the associations of Blackness and criminality,86 and then 
given a legal legitimation through the decisions of the Supreme Court.   
As these rationalizations and respondent practices fail, the Court legitimizes new 
practices to replace the old.  Colorblindness and postracialism replace segregation,87 
genetics replace hypodescent,88 the periphery spins while the ideological core remains the 
same.  Each rotation develops new practices for maintaining ideologies of white 
supremacy, redefining race and racism to fit social rhetoric that maintains the legitimacy 
of existing structures.  Ideology is the central pillar of the Court’s racial power, forming a 
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superstructure to rationalize and legitimate the definition of race within institutional 
practice and its application to people.  The Ideological pillar bears the lode that enables 
the Court’s rulings on social institutions and individual rights.   
2.3 Pillars II and III: Social Institutions and Individual Rights 
Racial ideologies are animated and manifested in the Court’s interpretations of 
institutional power and individual rights.  In these two areas, the Court defines legal 
relationships between people, government, and organizations in society through its 
opinions—setting the floor for what rights people have and ceilings on exercises of 
governmental power over institutions.  The Court substantiates textual and ideological 
commitments of the law through legal procedure and principles89—deciding what claims 
are cognizable under the constitution, what standards apply to claims of racial injustice, 
and what rights or remedies are available to individuals and communities.  Institutions 
and individual rights are distinct pillars of analysis in the power structure of race at the 
Supreme Court, but are deeply interrelated as racial institutions and institutional racisms 
effect individual rights. 
2.3.1 Impacts of Institutional Discrimination 
Racial conflicts between individual rights and institutional power are easily 
visible in the criminal justice system.  The Sixth Amendment proscribes a series of 
individual rights of the accused in criminal trials— “a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. . . to have the 
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Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”90  Criminal defendants are guaranteed an 
“impartial jury” but it is left up to the Supreme Court to determine the ultimate meaning 
of the phrase.  The administration of jury trials is a part of the institution of the courts, 
involving administrators, bailiffs, judges, and jurors.  Race may play a factor in the 
decision-making process at any of the different institutional levels, but result in racialized 
disparities in the jury process.  The Supreme Court will recognize racial bias if it involves 
individuals, such the recent case of a prosecutor abusing power by using discretionary 
challenges during jury selection to remove all qualified Black jurors.91  The Supreme 
Court in such cases recognizes that an individual’s right to a jury trial was violated by 
racial discrimination, but the racialized disparities in sentencing for black defendants with 
white juries, particularly in death penalty cases, fails to meet the level of institutional 
concern for the Court.92   
                                                 
90 U.S. Const. Art. VI. 
91 Foster v. Chatman, Warden, 136 S.Ct. 1737 (2016) (Prosecutor in this case targeted prospective Black 
jurors explicitly as discovered by the defendant under an open records request, which included:(1) copies of 
the jury venire list on which the names of each black prospective juror were highlighted in bright green, 
with a legend indicating that the highlighting “represents Blacks”; (2) a draft affidavit from an investigator 
comparing black prospective jurors and concluding, “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black 
jurors, [this one] might be okay”; (3) notes identifying black prospective jurors as “B#1,” “B#2,” and 
“B#3”; (4) notes with “N” (for “no”) appearing next to the names of all black prospective jurors; (5) a list 
titled “[D]efinite NO’s” containing six names, including the names of all of the qualified black prospective 
jurors; (6) a document with notes on the Church of Christ that was annotated “NO. No Black Church”; and 
(7) the questionnaires filled out by five prospective black jurors, on which each juror’s response indicating 
his or her race had been circled). 
92 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical disparities in death penalty 
sentencing, indicating that the race of the defendant and race of victim correlated with increased likelihood 
of death penalty convictions for Black defendants in Georgia, were not significant enough to warrant an 
unconstitutional discriminatory purpose or cruel and unusual punishment). 
 69 
Instead, the Court largely declines to consider systemic processes of racism that 
harm people of color without a showing of intentional racial discrimination.  Institutional 
power and processes are therefore prioritized over individual rights since, without a 
showing that someone intended for a person to be harmed, the system having racist 
consequences for people of color is simply an unfortunate consequence.  While there are 
certain areas where the Court does recognize discriminatory impact—voting,93 
employment,94 and recently housing95—the Court is incredibly permissive of institutional 
racism. Ian Haney López defines institutional racism as “unconsidered actions. . . the 
background scripts and paths that mark social and organizational life.”96  Institutional 
racism is a procedural manifestation of ideologies of white supremacy in society.  The 
“unconsidered” action does not necessarily remove intentionality, but suggests that 
racism is so deeply engrained in social and organizational life, that processes within 
institutions mirrors socially life while remaining “theoretically distinct.”97  Haney López 
thus argues that within courts, institutional racism particularly manifests through “status-
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enforcement,” defining a racial group’s social position, through “path racism” and “script 
racism.”98  Script racism simply follows established procedures for (racist) institutional 
action, while path racism “occurs when persons enforce racial hierarchy after carefully 
considering, and rejecting, the idea that race informs their actions.”99   
Institutional racism illuminates what happens when the Court ignores existing or 
potential systematic exclusion that has no single, explicit actor.  Consider Ricci v. 
DeStefano, where the Court ruled that a city’s attempt to avoid disparate impact liability 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.100  The City used a test to select firefighters for 
promotion to lieutenant and captain, and in each round of testing the pass rate 
disproportionately favored white candidates.  The city discarded the test results, fearing 
disparate impact liability under federal employment law, and was subsequently sued by 
white firefighters claiming that discarding the test results was racially discriminatory.  
The Court found that the city discarding the test results was “race-based action. . . 
impermissible under Title VII” and did not meet the “strong basis in evidence” standard 
established by disparate-impact case law.101  In other words, because the City had failed 
to follow procedures for reconsideration under Supreme Court case law, its attempt to 
avoid liability for a test that had discriminatory results was, in the eyes of the Supreme 
Court, discriminatory against the white firefighters who had passed the (racially biased) 
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test.  This procedural loop turned the Court’s disparate-impact case law on its head by 
essentially preserving the interests of whites who benefit from discriminatory institutional 
practices if the institution does not follow proper procedures in considering whether it 
was discriminatory in the first place.  Individual white entitlements are given procedural 
priority for reconsideration above potential racial discrimination. 
2.3.2 Procedures and Court Doctrines 
Examining the institutional procedures of the Supreme Court therefore reveals 
how Court doctrines bolster the Supreme Court’s power to define race by creating 
internal mechanisms and standards that the Court can use to measure racial impact.  
Creating a standard does not mean it is clear or applied evenly, but only creates a way of 
validating and legitimizing the way the institution itself functions—particularly for those 
enacting the processes that have become normalized.  Institutional actors, like the Justices 
on the Supreme Court down to prosecutors at trial courts may perpetuate racist impacts 
and systemic effect without expressed racial animus.  Charles Lawrence’s germinal 
critique of “unconscious racism,” identifies how race is so deeply embedded in the 
United States so that the “actor himself will be unaware that his actions, or the racially 
neutral feelings and ideas that accompany them, have racist origins.”102  Systematic 
effects of racism are felt by people of color and largely ignored by whites, consciously or 
unconsciously, in part because white people have not historically, socially, or personally 
experienced racial discrimination from governmental entities, social institutions like 
schools or churches, and especially other racist individuals.  Seeing, reporting, and 
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studying may create knowledge, but experience generates meaning and understanding.  
Lawrence suggests a “cultural meaning test” for evaluating racism in the Court to 
circumvent unconscious racism: “this test would evaluate governmental conduct to see if 
it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance. . . .  As a 
result, it would apply heightened scrutiny.”103  Lawrence argues this would shift the focus 
from causal to interpretive judgements, by providing social context.  Problems of judicial 
bias in interpretation remain, since the Court has the power to remake the meaning of 
contextual clues, but Lawrence contends that this makes the cultural meaning test more 
beneficial, since “it forces [judges] to take responsibility for their own biases and 
preconceptions.”104  However it also leaves out the privileges of judges and justices, both 
the social status privilege they hold by virtue of their office, but also the privilege to 
ignore important contextual clues at their discretion. 
Reliance on the Court’s strict scrutiny standard however falls back into the 
procedural mechanisms the Court has developed from precedent that establish vague 
levels of scrutiny that are supposed to be tools for analysis that often become outcome-
determinative standards.  The doctrine consumes the principles it stands for, since setting 
the appropriate level of scrutiny becomes the central contested issue that will decide the 
entire case.  Decision-making doctrines like scrutiny supposedly introduce “limiting 
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principles” that attempt to curb wide sweeping decisions “in response to the genie of 
equality that had been let out of the bottle.”105  Limiting principles become necessary to 
maintain the status quo in the face of announced radical change—compare the sweeping 
opinion of Brown I which declares segregation in education unconstitutional with the 
toothless remedy of Brown II which defers to school boards.  Ideologies of law are 
implemented in a practical context, as particular cases are decided under guiding 
principles of constitutional scrutiny.  For the Supreme Court, issues of equal protection 
and race trigger “strict scrutiny,” requiring narrowly tailored plan to meet compelling 
state interests.  The standard was applied in Korematsu v. United States, declaring  
all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.  That is not to say all restrictions are unconstitutional.  
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing 
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; 
racial antagonism never can.106  
 
The Korematsu Court proceeded to find a public necessity for Japanese exclusion and 
internment based on fraudulent documentation of spying, but the suspect classification 
and language of “rigid scrutiny” created precedent for decisions like Brown v. Board of 
Education.  However, strict scrutiny has come to be applied in any case involving race.   
Particularly in affirmative action jurisprudence, the Court has turned this standard 
for identifying racial animus to attack programs that would undermine historical 
inequalities experienced by people of color.  The Court, in the name of colorblindness, 
evaluates affirmative action programs under strict scrutiny for curtailing the presumptive 
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entitlement of whites to all higher education, arguing that programs designed to rectify 
historical disadvantages to people of color prevent whites from present and future 
success.107  Cheryl Harris notes that the problem comes not from extending 
constitutionally guaranteed equal protection jurisprudence to all persons, but  
lies in extending the protection of the law in the form of strict scrutiny 
review to whites as whites. . . . After all, race oppression has meaning in 
this country not because of what has been done to whites because of their 
racial identity, but what has been done to those who are not white in the 
name of protecting whiteness.108  
 
Thus, the textual standards of the law, like equal protection, form the basis for 
mechanisms of decision-making that then insulate ideological white supremacy by 
holding to strict definitions of race merely as a category without context. 
Recent developments in the Court even advance beyond the mechanisms of color-
blind constitutionalism, turning strict scrutiny into a catch-22 for restorative social 
projects like affirmative action.  In Parents Involved v. Seattle School District no. 1, a 
group of predominantly White parents sued school districts in Seattle, Washington and 
Jefferson County, Kentucky which attempted to orchestrate district wide diversification 
by ensuring a balance of white and non-white students within schools that mirrored 
community demographics.109  The attempt at diversification through balancing was found 
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unconstitutional by the Supreme Court under strict scrutiny because, as Sumi Cho 
explains, that the Court paradoxically narrows the narrowly tailored requirement: 
The Court’s decision, based on narrow tailoring’s remedial inefficiency, 
represents a strict-scrutiny catch-22 where a narrowly tailored remedy is 
invalidated because compliance thereto will almost always fail to be the 
most effective remedy, while a failure to narrowly tailor is always 
invalidated.110 
   
The Court’s extremely narrow standard thus negates the compelling interest requirement, 
since making race such a minor factor in the School’s consideration of student placement 
makes race ultimately irrelevant and eliminates any need to consider it in the first place. 
The proposed remedy in Parents Involved eliminates the basis for the original claim, 
following Chief Justice Robert’s paradoxical logic that “the way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”111  Racial discrimination, 
in this view, cannot happen if we simply stop talking about it—remedying ongoing 
oppressions by silencing attempts to remedy those same ongoing oppressions. 
2.3.3 Remedies, Rights, and Responsibilities 
Chief Justice Robert’s logic on discrimination in Parents Involved does little for 
remedying centuries of racial discrimination, but does wonders for highlighting the 
Supreme Court’s power to determine what remedies are available to parties coming 
before the court.  If the Supreme Court rules that a process is unconstitutional, this does 
not necessarily end the case.  The Supreme Court decides primarily whether to reverse or 
affirm the opinion of the previous Court—it may proscribe social hierarchies and ideas in 
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the rhetoric and conceptualization of an issue, but the orders given are to other 
institutions.  Lower courts are ordered to enforce a decree, stop governmental action, 
compel parties to act, create judicial oversight—particularly in elections and school 
districts—or even incarcerate/free an accused person. 
As Bell notes, even in landmark cases like Brown where the Court decries 
segregation as socially incompatible, the remedy gives deference to the very same 
processes which created the inequality in the first place.  After delaying the question of 
remedies for a year following Brown, the Court deferred to the school districts 
recommending “all deliberate speed” in integrating schools; “an unknown and never 
really defined legal standard that those committed to segregation interpreted as never.”112  
The institutional, remedial power of the Court was therefore diffused throughout the legal 
system.  If Brown was a demosprudential decision appealing to the best of democratic 
society, Brown II was a resignation to let the worst continue.  Remedies therefore form 
one of the most critical tasks of the Court—exposing how ideology is maintained through 
the proposed institutional solutions. 
A large part of determining remedies in United States law is defining what vested 
rights or interests were infringed upon—identifying an expectation of property, capital, or 
privileges that were unconstitutionally denied.  Cheryl Harris’ formative work 
“Whiteness as Property” identifies how law and the Courts conceptualize race as a vested 
property interest, particularly the interest in whiteness and the accompanying rights and 
privileges in a society rooted in white supremacy.  In United States law property 
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represents a legal entitlement which, Harris argues, includes entitlement to privileges 
based on race.113  Citing enlightenment philosopher Jeremy Bentham, Harris notes that 
property in the United States is “nothing but the basis of an expectation” and thus 
whiteness becomes “an ‘object’ over which continued control was—and is—
expected.”114  Law thus legitimizes not only “the settled expectations of whites built on 
the privileges and benefits produced by white supremacy, it acknowledges and reinforces 
a property interest in whiteness that reproduces Black subordination.”115   
Even Plessey v. Ferguson, part of Plessy’s claim involved a deprivation of 
property through damage to his “reputation [of being white] which has an actual 
pecuniary value’—without due process of law guaranteed by [the Fourteenth 
Amendment].”116  Importantly, Harris identifies the property value of whiteness in the 
fact that compensation would be owed for the loss of whiteness: “if Plessy where white 
any injury to his reputation would be adequately compensated by an action for damages 
against the company.”117  Conversely in Brown, the Court defers to the school districts to 
avoid “too deeply involv[ing] the judiciary in the operation of public schools,” ignoring 
the material inequalities that generated the decision in the first place.118  The deferential 
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remedy of Brown and Brown II, fails to address the property of material privileges 
created by whiteness.  Instead Brown “invited defiance and delay . . . [as] the level of 
white resistance dictated the parameters of the remedy.”119  White privilege thus survives 
as a vested form of property, in some ways triggering the long line of affirmative action 
litigation from Bakke120 through Fisher,121 involving white plaintiffs claiming their rights 
were violated by the presence of narrowly tailored affirmative action programs.  Again, 
the individualizing effect of the law takes precedence in attempting to remedy individual 
claims for white privilege, while failing to implement the remedial powers of the Court 
for entire groups and generations of people of color.122  
Part of this disconnect stems from the Court’s ideological conceptualization of 
race as formal, individual categorization.  Whites generally benefit from whiteness and 
Blackness has been legally constructed as a denial of rights, yet the Court and 
constitution have insisted that “constitutional protections inhere in individuals not in 
groups”—denying the existence of group identities like race while acknowledging the 
presence of racism at a reductionist level of acts of meanness against individuals.123  This 
view also fails to recognize the overlapping and intersectional nature of identity.  As 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s brilliant work on intersectionality reveals, the Court is unable to 
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apply remedies to groups unless they are made discrete and remove parts of social 
context.  Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality in fact spawns from anti-discrimination 
law’s view of identity on a “single categorical axis . . . eras[ing] Black women in the 
conceptualization, identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination by 
limiting inquiry to the experience of otherwise-privileged members of the group.”124  
Looking to opinions of federal courts analyzing remedies for employment discrimination, 
Crenshaw demonstrates that the Court’s single axis of remedy pervades efforts to end 
subordination along any axis.  In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, for example, the 
district court reasons that analyzing the discrimination against Black women as both 
Black and women under anti-discrimination law would “combine statutory remedies to 
create a new ‘super-remedy’ which would give relief beyond what the drafters of what 
the relevant statutes intended.”125  The Court’s narrow definition of race is revealed 
through the lower court’s inability to conceptualize race to include gendered, social, 
class, or other socially constructed implications.  Branding intersectionality a “super-
remedy” further entrenches a rigid institutional framing of race, as the categories of social 
construction are kept separate and unequal. 
2.3.4 Constitutional Personhood 
Ultimately, what rights are vested or what remedies are allowable to those at the 
margins depends on the legal conceptualization of personhood—the apex of how the 
institutional power of the Court shapes individual rights.  The Reconstruction 
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Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution) grappled with 
questions of personhood after abandoning slavery as a formal institution, providing broad 
grants of rights to “persons” and “citizens” of the United States with little qualification.126  
Though it would be decades before these rights of personhood would be—at least 
nominally—available to all, the constitutional text defines the limits for personhood 
under the law and therefore at the Supreme Court.   
In the words of Hannah Arendt, legal personhood defines who has “the right to 
have rights” under the law.127  As Cheryl Harris illustrated, personhood is not simply a 
metaphysical question of the law, but a question of how the rights are vested racialized 
bodies.128  The legal definition of person is thus entwined with definitions of race.  Colin 
Dayan notes that “the rules of law and the leeway within them enact and enable a 
philosophy of personhood and create a legal subject.”129  Focusing on the constructions of 
personhood through slavery and mass incarceration, Dayan notes that the Court’s 
deference to other institutions on matters of human dignity, and procedure—ignoring 
underlying moral conceptions of humanity: 
These legal opinions construct a legal person who thus stands in a negative 
relation to law, with a status so degraded that psychic violence and sensory 
deprivation continue to pass constitutional muster.  The judicial logic relies 
on the ‘subjective’ expertise of prison administrators and ‘deference’ to 
their special knowledge.130  
 
                                                 
126 W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: 1860-1880 690 (1935, 1998). 
127 Qtd. in Colin Dayan, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG 72 (2011): 72. 
128 Harris, supra note 9, at 1725. 
129 Dayan, supra note 127, at 73. 
130 Id. at 78-79. 
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Deference thus not only undermines the remedial power of the law, but it materially 
impacts the lives of those subjected to violence from other institutions.  The Court’s 
deference to experts in the field—scientific or administrative—enables inhumane 
practices under legal principles of fair treatment and justice.   
Restricting rights based on racialized personhood also extends to the Court’s 
construction of the “citizen” and “alien” under immigration law.  As Kevin Johnson 
explains, the citizen/alien binary under the law drastically affects the Constitutional and 
legal protections available: “Citizens can vote and enjoy other political rights. . . . Aliens, 
no matter what their ties to the community . . . cannot vote and risk deportation if they 
engage in certain political activities that, if they were citizens, would be constitutionally 
protected.”131  The legal “alien” represents the denial of important legal rights and 
protections, encouraging animosity from those deemed citizens.  Johnson notes that the 
alien was historically constructed as a racialized group; immigration legislation overtly 
and subtly targeted people of color and “alienage classifications all-too-frequently are 
employed as a proxy for race.”132  At the core of alien rhetoric is the dehumanization and, 
unsurprisingly, alienation of people of color by rationalizing differential treatment under 
concepts of citizenship rights.   
                                                 
131 Kevin Johnson, ‘Aliens’ and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons, Immigr. & Nat’lity L. Rev. 3, 264 (1997). 
132 Id. at 266-67. 
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Rhetorical usage of “alien” by the Supreme Court can “obfuscate the real 
impacts” on persons affected.133  Johnson contrasts the language use in Reno v. Flores to 
highlight the rhetorical power of the Court: 
On the one hand, Justice Scalia, who reads their constitutional rights 
restrictively, calls them ‘alien juveniles’ something akin to juvenile 
delinquents.  On the other hand, Justice Stevens, who would find in their 
favor, calls them ‘children.  Although the regulation directly affected 
children, its disparate impact on undocumented children from Mexico and 
Central America generally went ignored.134  
Language of citizenship is used to obfuscate highly racialized conceptions of rights, 
marking the “alien” other as undeserving under federal law.  Very real consequences 
arise from the rhetorical moves, embedding the racialization of incarceration through 
immigrant detention centers and allowing the expulsion of peoples through deportation. 
Just as alien is racialized to a non-white other, Ian Haney López highlights how 
citizen is conversely constructed through whiteness as immigrant groups vie for rights 
given to citizens under the law.  Though the Fourteenth Amendment textually guarantees 
birthright citizenship, the Court declined to extend citizenship to all racial minorities born 
under the jurisdiction of the United States until the Nationality Act of 1940—seventy-
four years later.135  
Even then, naturalization laws for the United States were highly racialized and 
gendered.  Immigration law in the early 20th Century at times made naturalization 
                                                 
133 Id. at 278. 
134 Id. at 280. 
135 Haney López, supra note 31, at 29-30. 
 83 
available only to white women who married citizens, even mandating expatriation for 
citizen women who married men “racially barred form citizenship.”136  Between 1878 
and 1952, naturalization was contingent on whiteness, making race a prerequisite for 
citizenship rights for anyone not born in the United States.137  The Court originally based 
the rationale for whiteness on scientific evidence, denying citizenship in Ozawa v. United 
States because “numerous scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to 
review” indicated whiteness was “synonymous with the words ‘a person of the Caucasian 
race.’”138  Three months later the Court dropped the scientific ruse it “failed to prove 
what was to the courts eminently obvious,”139 adopting “ ‘the understanding of the 
common man’ as the exclusive interpretive principle for creating legal taxonomies of 
race” in United States v. Thind.140  The Court used standards of race, both pseudo-
scientific and commonsense, to define citizenship in spite of broad textual commitments 
to all persons.  Ideologies of race and institutional commitments to deference and 
citizenship create a glass ceiling in the Court’s adherence to principles of individual 
rights.  Racial personhood therefore creates a non-white legal subject that is 
simultaneously citizen and alien, included yet otherized. 
2.3.5 Twin Pillars of Social Institutions and Individual Rights 
                                                 
136 Id. at 34. 
137 Id. at 35. 
138 Id. at 60 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922)). 
139 Id. at 70. 
140 Id. at 64 (quoting United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)). 
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The Court’s institutional processes thereby reinforce ideologies of racism like 
white supremacy by retaining propertied interests in whiteness while rejecting claims 
involving group identities for people of color.  Opinions of the Court are enacted by 
social institutions, lower courts, which in turn proscribe actions for other social 
institutions like schools, businesses, churches etc. What the courts tell institutions to do, 
and what powers they give or remove from these institutions are impacted by and effect 
individual rights.  I mean this not only in terms of conceptualizing a legal individual, as 
in the definitions of personhood, but also in determining what entitlements, rights, and 
remedies a legal person is deemed to deserve under the law.   Social institutions and 
individual rights therefore exist in tandem, co-constructing what effect the opinions of the 
Court may have on society by simultaneously determining what parties must act and what 
rights are allotted to persons under the law. 
2.4 Windows and Vents in the Master’s House 
President Barack and Michelle Obama’s ascendance to the White House was so 
often held to be a transcendent racial moment, it became trite before Obama first 
officially took office and the first family moved in to the White House—the house that 
slaves, their ancestors, built.  And although First Lady Michelle Obama now wakes up 
every day in a house built by slaves, long before President Obama’s term began and long 
after his second term ends, she will still wake up in a superstructure of racial power 
maintained by the Supreme Court’s three pillars of racial power I identified in this essay.  
These I’s of the Court, Ideology, Institutional power, and Individual rights, construct and 
define race in a multitude of ways, focusing on racial categories, pseudoscientific 
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evidence of racial superiority/inferiority, ahistorically, historical but “complete,” as a 
form of status property, or even as a definitional status of personhood.  Across these 
varied definitions of race, the Court consistently defines race and racism with the purpose 
of maintaining the legitimacy of racial hierarchy—namely white supremacy and 
antiblackness—as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the Court and the Constitution as 
driving, objective forces for adjudicating disputes.  Though there are some sources of 
hope for remedying injustices, with symbolic victories over established norms of racism, 
the Court’s ideology, institutional power, and construction of individual rights 
consistently regress to norms of white supremacy.  
Though the Constitution no longer provides an explicit outline for racial power—
with the elimination of the three-fifths clause—even the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection has become twisted into supporting white supremacist 
racial framings of the constitution in the opinions of the Supreme Court.  Chief Justice 
Robert’s opinion in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1 morphs an 
amendment that was created after the Civil War—during a time of reconstruction when 
guarantees of rights and citizenship were being made to Black peoples whose freedom 
and personhood was so recently recognized—into a means for white school parents to 
ensure their choice of school is prioritized over desegregation plans meant to remedy 
ongoing racial inequalities.  The Supreme Court plays an active role in the ongoing 
definition and redefinition of race and racism in the United States, by defining the scope 
of Constitutional protections, social programs, and governmental policy.  Each opinion is 
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infused with an ideological purpose, overt or unconscious, which maintains and 
perpetuates the Constitution and established power structures—namely white supremacy.    
Identifying and analyzing the Supreme Court as a pressure valve makes the 
institutional ethnography even more important in identifying what types of evidence 
influence the Court.  Evidence may not sway the Court easily, but an institutional 
ethnography of the Court can identify what types of facts the Court uses and how they are 
used or misused.  Even though the Court is only looking after the Constitutional structure 
and the racial hierarchies embedded therein, identifying how the Court currently works 
can identify strategies for change, either in the Court, legislation, or otherwise. The next 
chapter moves us one step closer by looking at the historical development of social 
sciences at the Supreme Court and he different ways of thinking about and classifying 
facts the Court has considered.
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3 Modern Authorities: Facts and Evidence 
“Quantum physics could never show you the world I was in” 
- Kendrick Lamar, Pusha T (f. Kendrick Lamar) - Nosetalgia  
 
Social science has always been embedded in the law of the United States.  Early 
opinions of the Supreme Court engaged in lengthy historiography rather than social 
scientific data, describing the evolution of law from England to the United States, or 
some assumed fundamental principle of the natural law that is deemed inherent in the 
structure of governance.  Take, for example, the landmark opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison.  In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall spends nearly forty pages explaining 
why the Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to decide the case.1  Justice Marshall’s 
discussion of the evolution of British law and constitutional history to establish doctrines 
of judicial review of legislation and outline the constitutional powers of the judiciary is 
more historically significant than the holding—lack of original jurisdiction to issue a writ 
of mandamus.2  Chief Justice Marshall’s historiography is used as empirical data to reach 
a legal conclusion, providing an early example of how external sources get incorporated 
into a particular legal case. 
                                                 
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803). 
2 Id. at 178 (concluding judicial review of legislation is “the very essence of judicial duty” under the 
constitution). 
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In the early twentieth century, shortly after the birth of modern sociology,33 social 
scientific studies were submitted to the Court to legitimize socially progressive 
legislation.  In 1903, Louis Brandeis—a progressive lawyer and future Supreme Court 
Justice—submitted extensive briefing on economic, demographic, and sociological 
studies in defense of legislation limiting women’s maximum work hours in Muller v. 
Oregon.4  Social science evidence was so central to Brandeis’ brief in Muller, the term 
“Brandeis Brief” has become synonymous with briefs that emphasize social science 
evidence over legal precedent.  The ultimate usefulness of the evidence in Muller is 
thoroughly disputed; most scholars conclude the brief may have simply confirmed the 
Court’s preexisting conceptions of gender and subordination of women.5  While the 
scientific studies “would probably not satisfy contemporary methodological standards,” 
the Brandeis Brief waves in both the Courts and social sciences as progressive labor 
attorneys used social sciences to protect and create legislation that was beneficial to 
workers, while activist social scientists similarly framed their work to appeal to courts.6  
                                                 
3 As Aldon D. Morris notes, the origins of modern sociology are typically traced to the Chicago school, 
founded in 1893 but blossoming in the early twentieth century.  Morris argues instead that W.E.B. Du Bois’ 
school of sociology at Atlanta University which birthed systematic empirical research in social life.  See 
Aldon D. Morris, THE SCHOLAR DENIED: W.E.B. DU BOIS AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY (2015). 
3  
4 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
5 See Angelo Ancheta, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 29 (2006); David L. 
Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 
38 EMORY L. J. 1005, 1008 (1989); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 359, 365 (2008)(also noting Brandies’ predominantly female research team which 
crafted the scientific argument presented before the Court); Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and 
the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 88 (2013). 
6 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 30; Faigman, supra note 5, at 1009 (“social science as suitor has been 
alternately embraced and rejected by the law”); Morag-Levine, supra note 5, at 99 (“The political and legal 
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Courts typically echoed and reaffirmed prevailing social sciences of their day; 
mixing—often unsourced—historiography and judicial/constitutional doctrine with racist 
science to create a judicial “commonsense” which legitimizes social difference.  For 
example in Ozawa v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected Mr. Ozawa’s application 
for naturalization because the law allowed only “free white persons” and Mr. Ozawa was 
of Japanese descent.7  The Court reasoned that Japanese people could not be classified as 
white because “numerous scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to 
review” indicated whiteness was “synonymous with the words ‘a person of the Caucasian 
race.’”8  Race in the Supreme Court was often legitimized through biological and 
anthropological assumptions, following the dominant scientific philosophies of the era, 
like Social Darwinism and eugenics.9  Even if the Court did not directly cite to a 
scientific source, the Court made blanket assertions of fact and generalizations with an air 
of scientificity.  Forced sterilization laws worked in tandem with anti-miscegenation laws 
under the guise of public health—giving white supremacist eugenics legal legitimacy in 
cases like Buck v. Bell when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes gave “eugenic theory the 
                                                 
requirement that social and economic reforms be framed as traditional health measures gave rise to a body 
of social scientific work aimed at providing the requisite justifications for legislation”). 
7 Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), qtd. in Ian Haney López, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 60 (1997). 
8 Id. 
9 See Ancheta, supra note 5, at 30-41 (describing the use of social science and racism throughout the mid-
twentieth century, including segregation cases, eugenics and naturalization cases); Troy Duster, BACKDOOR 
TO EUGENICS 11 (2nd ed. 2003)(emphasizing Buck v. Bell as a part of the legalization of eugenic social 
science); Haney López, supra note 7 (historicizing the Court’s development of whiteness, noting how the 
Court would use social science to legitimize opinions on race). 
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imprimatur of constitutional law in his infamous declaration, ‘three generation of 
imbeciles are enough,’” and upholding the forced sterilization of a woman for 
feeblemindness.10  Unlike the Brandies briefs, assertions of scientific fact like in Buck v. 
Bell did not merit lengthy citation to reiterate a white supremacist assumption.  Before 
Brown the Court lacked a trend in citation, wavering between Brandies briefs and blanket 
assumptions depending on the assumption of the judge.  Brown effectively bucked the 
trend, adding a layer of evidence and analysis that would expand the Supreme Court’s 
use of external facts through a seemingly innocuous footnote.   
3.1 Shifting the Status Quo 
By the mid-twentieth century, social scientific discourse on race in the United 
States had shifted.  Mainstream sociology reconceptualized studies of inequality based on 
culture and conditions rather than race and biology—though often reinforcing the same 
principles of white supremacy and antiblackness through “social pathology.”11  Wealthy 
philanthropists increased funding for studies on race, though largely out of fear of riots 
with the growth of Black veterans and Black social movements rather than dissatisfaction 
with social inequality.12  Black social scientists had also grown in numbers and 
                                                 
10 Dorothy Roberts, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 41 (2011); see also Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Duster, supra note 9. 
11 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 46 (quoting John P. Jackson, Jr., Social Scientists for Social Justice: Making 
the Case against Segregation (New York: New York University Press, 2005): 17-42); Khalil Gibran 
Muhammad, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN 
AMERICA 275-276 (2010). 
12 Morris explains this was more out of fear than benevolence:  
The Carnegie Foundation had deep interest in funding a comprehensive study on race during the 
World War II period.  The explosiveness of race was exacerbated as the Allied Forces geared up to 
defeat Hitler’s forces, which were tenaciously pursuing white Aryan supremacy.  African 
Americans were restless as they confronted lynching and racial degradation while their men 
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prominence, creating an alternative to dominant narratives of race in social sciences.13  In 
the law, the Legal Defense Fund for the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People had successfully challenged segregation in graduate education and 
housing at the Supreme Court,14 but had yet to reach the goal: “the total destruction of 
state-enforced segregation.”15  
 To meet this goal, the NAACP chose a broad strategy attacking the 
legitimacy of segregation as a legal and social force, beginning with an attack on the idea 
that separate could be equal.  Social scientists provided expert opinion at trial and 
consultation to lead attorneys on how to use the social science evidence in the cases that 
would be consolidated as Brown v. Board of Education at the Supreme Court.16  Using 
experts at trial was nothing new, but Brown represents a rare instance the majority 
opinion of the Court used to upend the status quo, rather than reaffirm or legitimize it.  
Footnote 11 of Brown describes a collection modern authority on social science that 
                                                 
donned the uniform to fight racism in a segregated military.  The fear of riots and other racial 
conflagrations hung heavy in the air.  Because these tensions concerned the philanthropic 
community, it prepared to open its coffers to fund a comprehensive race study.   
Morris, supra note 3, at 199. 
13 Id. at 196. 
14 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (states must provide legal training to all 
qualified persons within the state, including Black students; without a Black law school in the state, the 
University of Missouri Law School was required to admit Mr. Gaines); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (reaffirming Gaines); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(striking down racially restrictive covenants in housing); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
15 Derrick Bell, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR 
RACIAL REFORM 16 (2004). 
16 387 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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indicates the problems of segregation in society, not a particular study of the clients.17  
By some accounts, the social science cited by the Chief Justice was an afterthought.18  
Although the Court’s reasoning in Brown relied on the “modern authority” presented by 
social science, Brown did not make social science evidence a necessary or sufficient 
element in proving discrimination or its’ harms upon people of color.  Sanjay Mody 
argues that “Footnote eleven was a consequence of ordinary human intuition, not grand 
strategy. . . .  [It] can most plausibly be understood as an effort, though an accidental one, 
to lend authoritative force to an opinion that threatened to undermine its institutional 
standing.”19  Law has a legitimating power, but Brown’s use of social science shows that 
the law may also require external validation—using outside sources to ensure legal 
conclusions are supported outside the courtroom.  Brown’s use of social science was not 
only to inform lower courts of the harm of segregation, but to lend authority to an area in 
                                                 
17 Cited works are:  
K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development 
(Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and 
Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The 
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. 
Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under 
Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, 
Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., (1949), 44-48; 
Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An 
American Dilemma (1944). 
347 U.S. at 495 fn. 11. 
18 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 66. 
19 Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s 
Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 828 (2002). 
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which the Court has less direct expertise.20  The Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of 
federal law and the Constitution, which is why making blanket assertions of fact, comes 
quite easily.  Brown could just as well have simply stated segregation is unconstitutional, 
and be legally sufficient—incorporating external evidence as validation of the Court’s 
conclusions legitimizes the Court’s conclusion socially and historically.21  
Constitutional scholars of the time expressed concern over Brown—not because 
of the result, but due to the Court’s supposed reliance on social science in evaluating 
constitutional rights.  Law professor Edmond Cahn argued that Brown reaches the correct 
result, but that social science is a “dangerous” addition to jurisprudence:   
It is one thing to use the current scientific findings, however ephemeral they 
may be, in order to ascertain whether the legislature has acted reasonably in 
adopting some scheme of social or economic regulation; deference here is 
shown not so much to the findings as to the legislature.  It would be quite 
another thing to have our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with 
the latest fashions of psychological literature.22 
 
For Cahn, Brandies briefs are not useful to a Court, since “shrewd, resourceful 
lawyers can put together a Brandies Brief in support of almost any conceivable exercise 
of legislative judgement.”23  Cahn’s hypercritical approach to using social sciences in the 
                                                 
20 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 77-78 (noting social science in particularly used in cases on controversial social 
issues). 
21 Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 
279, 294 (2005). 
22 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955) (Cahn focuses heavily on Clark’s doll 
test, arguing that the study is not rigorous enough to warrant the conclusions Clark draws, and questioning 
the methodological rigor of social psychology as a field—arguing that it is unreliable because not all 
psychologists agree and there is a lack of “extrinsic empirical means” for verification). 
23 Id. at 153-54. 
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law was part of a larger disparagement of Brown and footnote eleven, with some calling 
the Court “the nine sociologists” and “commies” who “reject[ed] the intent of the 
framers.”24  Sociologists at the time did not take this slander kindly and adamantly 
defended Brown and Brandeis Briefs—what harm is caused by including data to 
demonstrate the reasonableness or unreasonableness of legislation?25  Harold Garfinkel 
argued that the footnoting of social science was by no means lowers its importance: 
The ‘modern authority’ which is called upon is graced with notice in the 
body of the opinion itself as is the argument which it serves to document.  
However, the ‘finding’ is that of the Court; the ‘authority’ of social science 
is called upon to support the finding of the justices, not vice versa.26  
 
Though Brown may have changed interpretation of the equal protection clause, the 
Constitution was still the centerpiece of the decision. 
However, some scholars believe the Constitution alone is enough.  Ronald 
Dworkin later echoed Cahn’s uneasiness with social science, arguing that it was 
unnecessary in Brown since “there is a fact of the matter, namely that segregation is an 
insult, but we need no evidence for that fact—we just know it.  It’s an interpretive fact.”27  
Clark’s doll test was a focal point for criticism of Brown and footnote 11,28  with many—
mostly legal scholars—questioning the methodology and implications, though is more a 
                                                 
24 Herbert Garfinkel, Social Science Evidence and the School Segregation Cases, 21 J. POL. 37 (1959). 
25 Id. at 41. 
26 Id. at 58. 
27 Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J. L. & 
EDUC. 3, 5 (1977). 
28 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 57-58; Martha Minow, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S 
EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 142-143 (2010). 
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misinterpretation of scope of Clark’s claims rather than a deficiency in the study itself.29  
David Faigman argues that the criticisms of empirical data in Brown and other cases 
where the Court arguably misuses social science research damages the credibility of the 
Court and limits the social impact of opinions like Brown or Roe v. Wade:  “rulings 
which rest on suspect factual bases will themselves be suspect.  Holdings resting on 
faulty premises have little or no persuasiveness, for they lack rationality—the source of 
judicial power.”30  In this view, the law has the potential to identify and redefine 
normative values, which social science may disrupt—it is the belief that the law has a 
permanence that social science may disrupt, and legal interpretations can identify 
problems and make social change without extensive empirical studies. 
Though legal scholars like Cahn and Dworkin challenged the worth of social 
science to the Brown opinion—and the law generally—Brown’s use of social science 
bonded equal protection and social sciences.  Civil Rights attorney and law professor 
Angelo Ancheta argues that Brown’s true influence is with advocates.  Attorneys 
understand the potential role social science may play, readying studies and experts in 
civil rights cases; social scientists better understand the potential for their studies to reach 
legal authorities and potentially influence opinions of the Court.   
Almost every major civil rights case after Brown has scientific authorities 
appearing somewhere—in the trial record, in the parties’ briefs, in amicus 
                                                 
29 David Faigman, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 64 (2008). 
30 David Faigman, ‘Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding:’ Exploring the Empirical Component of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 541, 604 (1991). 
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brief, or in the court opinions themselves.  The use of science in one form 
or another is nearly inescapable in contemporary civil rights legislation.31  
 
Similarly, Michael Heise argues that Brown indirectly empiricized equal 
protection law, particularly in educational opportunity, by conceptualizing equality in 
terms of measurable variables that indicate whether opportunity exists.32  Beyond equal 
protection, Heise argues that Brown was an “accelerant” for what he calls 
“multidisciplinarity” in the law—the integration of other non-legal disciplines as valid 
input on legal matters.33  Brandeis briefs planted the seed, but Brown signaled a huge 
growth in the Court and in legal scholarship.34  Regardless of the intentionality of 
footnote 11 or its importance to the outcome of Brown at the time, the effects are clear:  
social scientific evidence on racism has gained legitimacy in the Supreme Court.   
In the years following Brown, legislative changes spurred by social movements 
altered legal landscape on racial discrimination, and litigation turned to existing racial 
disparities that did not result from strict or overt policies, but from general social 
conditions caused by years of racial discrimination.  The Court analyzed racially 
disproportionate voting districts35 and jury selection practices,36 finding that the 
                                                 
31 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 68. 
32 Heise, supra note 21, at 296. 
33 Id. at 318. 
34 Heise notes that the “Law & Society movement” has rapidly grown over the past fifty years, integrating 
law and social sciences, especially economics, history, psychology and sociology. Id. at 316. 
35 See e.g. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (finding that the shape and apportionment of voting 
districts did not comport with the racial demographics of the area, excluding nearly all Black voters, and 
signified racial discrimination). 
36 See e.g. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) ( 
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statistical, demographic discrepancies were sufficient indicia of racial discrimination.  
Michael Selmi summarizes that “once states moved away from overt racial exclusions, 
the Court found it considerably more difficult to define what constituted discrimination.  
Yet the Court remained willing to invalidate discriminatory practices when it saw 
them.”37  By the 1970s, proving racial discrimination through statistical disparities had 
reached mixed results, with no clear standard.38  In Washington v. Davis the Court 
articulated a standard of proof, focusing on individual acts rather than disparate impacts:  
A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously 
to discriminate on the basis of race. . . . An invidious discriminatory purpose 
may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts. . . . 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of 
an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.39  
Thus, while the totality of the circumstances matters in racial discrimination lawsuits, 
statistical evidence is insufficient, absent a showing of individualized action or intent.   
                                                 
Under [the existing system for juror selection] the opportunity for discrimination was 
present and we cannot say on this record that it was not resorted to by the petitioners.  
Indeed, the disparity between the percentage of Negroes on the tax digest (27.1%) and that 
of the grand jury venire (9.1%) and the petit jury venire (7.8%) strongly points to this 
conclusion.) 
37 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination and the Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. 
L. J. 279, 300 (1997) (noting the early case law “seem[ed] to share the principle that underlies the Court’s 
pornography cases—that the Court knows discriminatory acts when it sees them.”). 
38 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (finding that because the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 protected against racially discriminatory consequences of employment practices, a showing of 
disparate impact was sufficient to show a statutory violation) with Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-
49 (1972) (finding statistical racial disparities in computation of welfare “would render suspect each 
difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however 
otherwise rational the treatment might be. Few legislative efforts . . . could survive such scrutiny, and we 
do not find it required by the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
39 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-242 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
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The Court would turn the Davis interpretation of invidious discrimination into a 
more acute evidentiary standard the next year in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp by identifying “subjects of proper inquiry.”40  
Arlington Heights began with the denial of a zoning variance that would have allowed 
construction of a multiple-family low- and moderate-income housing development.  
Arlington Heights is a Chicago suburb, and at the time, was approximately 99.9996 
percent white,41 but “approximately forty percent of those eligible to live in the proposed 
190-unit development would have been African-American.”42  Assuming Black residents 
made up forty percent of the development, “the village’s African-American population 
would have increased by one thousand percent.”43  The village did not state the housing 
was denied to prevent Black residents, but the respondents’ argued it would have the 
disparate racial effect of excluding Black residents from housing.  
Echoing Davis, the Court explained that a disparate impact “may provide an 
important starting point,” but absent a “clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than 
race . . . impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.”44  
Therefore Arlington Heights presents important, but not exhaustive, factors for 
determining invidious racial discrimination:  first the “historical background . . . 
                                                 
40 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
41 Id. at 255 (“According to the 1970 census, only 27 of the Village’s 64,000 residents were black”). 
42 Selmi, supra note 37, at 303. 
43 Id. 
44 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 99 
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes,” “the 
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” procedural or 
substantive departures from the normal sequence of events, “legislative or administrative 
history” including “contemporary statements by members of the decision making body, 
minutes of its meetings, or reports.”45  However in a footnote, the Court concludes that 
even if the proposed standard of proof was met, and racially discriminatory purpose was 
shown to be part of the motivation, it would not invalidate the challenged decision but 
instead “shifted . . . the burden of establishing the same decision would have resulted 
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”46  Thus the ambiguous 
standards of racially discriminatory disparate impact previous cases had morphed into a 
multiple factor test, that, if met, was still insufficient to overturn a discriminatory law or 
policy outright, but instead only shifted the burden of proof to the policymaker that racial 
discrimination was not the primary purpose.  Under the Arlington Heights standard, the 
Court rarely found racially discriminatory impacts sufficient, even when policies were 
novel and failed to meet procedural requirements.47  
3.2 Twenty-First Century Empirical Evidence 
                                                 
45 Id. at 267-68 (testimony of elected officials could be included, but “frequently . . . barred by privilege”). 
46 Id.at 271 n. 21. 
47 Compare. Memphis v Greene, 451 U.S. 100,129 (1981) (The City’ barricade on a main street connecting 
a predominantly Black area of the city and an all-White area, to reduce “undesirable traffic;” was 
exclusively supported by and benefitted the White area of town, but the Court however found that a racially 
disparate impact is bound to happen in “almost any traffic violation.”)  with Id.at 135-36 (Marshall, J. 
dissenting) (observing “the case is easier than the majority makes it appear,” since the reasoning for the 
city’s closure of the street are “little more than code phrases for racial discrimination”). 
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In the past decade, the relationship between social science and the law has 
blossomed as the Court is inundated with empirical data, especially in cases involving 
race.  Empirical data serves “factual inquiries to fill gaps in knowledge,” either providing 
case-specific precision or a broader social context and background for factual scenarios 
involved in the case.48  Legal evidence comes before the Court either through trial 
procedure—introduced by an expert in the original trial, under federal rules of 
evidence—or through amicus curiae, Latin for “friend of the court.”  Amicus briefs are 
submitted in bulk, vastly expanding the potential field of information before the Court. 
The amicus curiae brief vastly predates the Supreme Court, dating back to Roman law, 
but since Brown the number of amicus briefs has increased over 800% and are included 
in the majority of cases.49   
For example, in the 2013 affirmative action case Fisher v. University of Texas50 
nearly 100 amicus briefs were submitted—seventeen on behalf of Abigail Fisher (the 
party opposing affirmative action) and seventy-four on behalf of the University of Texas 
(defending affirmative action).51  A meta-analyses of the amicus briefs in Fisher by 
Eckes, et. al. indicated that most of Fisher’s briefs cited little to no social science 
research.  Some briefs “explicitly argued that social science research should not be relied 
                                                 
48 Angelo Ancheta, Science and Constitutional Fact Finding in Equal Protection Analysis, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1115, 1140 (2008). 
49 Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (2014). 
50 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (hereinafter Fisher I).   
51 Suzanne E. Eckes, David Nguyen, & Jessica Ulm, Fisher v. University of Texas: The Potential for Social 
Science Research in Race-Conscious Admissions, 288 ED. LAW REP. 1, 9-10 (2013). 
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upon” ironically relying on research to influence the Court to ignore other research.52  
The majority of the briefs defending affirmative action used empirical data, including 
qualitative studies of student experiences, longitudinal studies indicating correlations 
between diversity and critical thinking, and meta-analyses of social science research 
indicating diversity reduces prejudice.53 
However, there are very little regulations on amicus curiae.  No explicit standards 
exist for what may be included in an amicus brief, with little screening or quality control 
before a brief is submitted to the Court.54  The only major requirement is in Supreme 
Court Rule 37 which formally requires consent of the parties involved in a case.55  
Without a filtering mechanism, other than the Justice’s own expertise in reading briefs, 
misleading data, misstatements, unreliable sources, or even falsehoods, can infiltrate 
Supreme Court opinions masquerading as fact.  Allison Orr Larsen notes that many 
amicus cite information which is simply “on file” with the author, allowing information 
that may be unsupported by a large body of scientific research to appear as evidence.56  
For example, in the case against California’s proposition banning gay marriage 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,57 “social scientists supporting Hollingsworth [against gay 
                                                 
52 Id. at 12. 
53 Id. at 13. 
54 Larsen, supra note 49, at 1764. 
55 Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 37. 
56 Larsen, supra note 49, at 1784. 
57 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 102 
marriage] . . . filed data supposedly culled from the Canadian census to support the claim 
that children of gay and lesbian couples are less likely to finish high school.  This study is 
‘on file with’ the authors and not available publicly.”58  The validity or reliability of the 
studies in amicus briefs can therefore become obscured through citations, allowing 
blanket claims with little methodological explanation—that can be cited by the Supreme 
Court in a Justice’s opinion, validating bad evidence.59  Social scientists also submit 
briefs in opposition to bad scientific data, allowing some internal policing, but this does 
guarantee a Supreme Court justice will accept the more methodologically sound research. 
Standards for social science evidence are obscured when justices are citing 
evidence, but feature heavily in opinions attempting to dismiss or counter social scientific 
evidence.  Objections to social science evidence typically attempt to expose 
methodological flaws or claim studies are inaccurate based on researcher bias.60  Ben 
Grunwald summarizes that the most common methodological criticisms of quantitative 
data are: imprecise data/bad data gathering techniques, poor sampling design, presenting 
only data that confirms the hypothesis, and omitted variables which skew correlation 
results.61  For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,62 the plurality opinion does not use any empirical data in its discussion of 
                                                 
58 Larsen, supra note 49, at 1785. 
59 Id. at 1786. 
60 Ben K. Grunwald, Suboptimal Social Science and Judicial Precedent, 161 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1409 (2013). 
61 Id. 
62 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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inequality in public schools while Justice Breyer’s dissent emphasizes the litany of social 
science studies highlighting demographic and economic inequalities to be remedied.  
Meanwhile Justice Thomas’ concurrence dismisses social science evidence on school 
desegregation for lacking “unanimity” and “causal” linkages between race-conscious 
policies, racial diversity, and educational achievement.63  Both Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence and Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality in Parents place “stringent criteria for 
considering social science is so demanding as to make irrelevant many experts findings 
that could have informed the Court’s analysis.”64  Erica Frankenberg and Lilliana Garces 
argue that because Justices are not always trained in scientific research and “may not be 
necessarily inclined to consider social science evidence unless they can unambiguously 
understand: (1) the findings; (2) the strength of the research; and (3) how particular 
findings relate to an issue under consideration.”65  In essence, when the Justices disagree 
with social scientific findings, they can set the bar for methodological soundness 
impossibly high—requiring a level of scientific rigor that is not required by the most 
stringent review boards—so as to exclude the data and conclusions from legal analysis. 
With such high standards for external sources, there are no restrictions on the 
Court finding its own data.  Allison Orr Larsen argues that “judicial fact-finding” occurs 
frequently in the Supreme Court as the ubiquity of the internet has created ways for 
                                                 
63 Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science Evidence in Parents Involved and 
Meredith:  Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 703, 708 (2008). 
64 Id. at 733. 
65 Id. at 745. 
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Justices to add more non-legal sources.66  Larsen’s non-exhaustive study of significant 
Supreme Court decisions between 2000 and 2010 indicates that a majority of opinions 
contain facts found “in-house,” by the Justice’s (or their clerk’s) own research.67  While 
most of the citations within Larsen’s study are to “traditional legal sources” like law 
journals, nearly half were non-legal—ranging from academic sources to newspapers to 
personal correspondence.68  Larsen finds this incredibly problematic since citations are 
part of the “currency” of the legal system,69 arguing that law requires an adversarial 
process to present data and help screen sources for relevance and validity.70  Judges and 
Justices are not trained in the fields they are citing, making data analysis more difficult.71   
Justices have put their own gloss on empirical data since the foundation of the 
Supreme Court.  The modern trend of heavy citation simply makes external sources and 
interpretation more apparent—sometimes creating the illusion of legitimacy with dated or 
inaccurate research.  Since Brown the amount of research available to the Court has 
expanded exponentially, but the Court rarely makes its methods or methodology in 
researching or finding these new sources of information.  What is known for certain is 
that the Court is inundated with research from opposing parties in a case, amicus curiae, 
                                                 
66 Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012). 
67 Id. at 1261. 
68 Id. at 1286-88. 
69 Id. at 1282 (quoting Frank B. Cross et. al, Citations in the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Study of their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 490 (2010)). 
70 Id. at 1297. 
71 Id. at 1299-1300. 
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and even their own researching skills.  The Court cites to any and all of these sources in 
the course of an opinion, but how the Court distinguishes between fact and opinion is 
only made apparent in the way a Justice writes their opinion.   
3.3 Classifying Facts in the Supreme Court 
With so much empirical data appearing before the Supreme Court, different 
typologies have developed to classify the research, data, and evidence used by the Court.  
The foundational dichotomy, which has been integrated into the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, comes from Kenneth Culp Davis’ distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative fact-finding.72  Davis explains that adjudicative facts are highly particularized 
determinations of a judge or jury “concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, 
what the circumstances were, and what the background conditions were.”73  These are the 
juicy details that typically get reported first in news commentary or are the focus of your 
typical episode of “Law and Order”—who was at the crime scene at the night of the 
murder, whether the killer really contacted the victim from inside the house.  
Adjudicative facts are specific who, what, where, when, why, and how details of a case 
that are usually agreed on by the opposing parties or ultimately decided by the jury, i.e. 
whether the defendant committed the crime.  Conversely, legislative facts are those that 
deal with the “creation of law and determination of policy;” contextual data that helps to 
explain why or how a policy has developed.74  Examples include the Congressional 
                                                 
72 Kenneth Culp Davis, An approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. 
REV. 364, 402 (1942). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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record, statements made by legislators leading to the passage of a law or official notice 
and comments by administrative agencies on a new policy.  Appellate courts have very 
limited power of review over adjudicative facts since the judge or jury is more familiar 
with the details of a case.  Legislative facts are reviewed de novo—Latin for “from the 
beginning”—heavily scrutinized and often involve experts and extensive empirical data.  
Decisions of the Supreme Court deal primarily with legislative facts in trying to set 
general policy for other courts to follow, rather than the adjudicative fact of guilt, 
innocence, or liability.   
 
Figure 2: Davis, Monahan, and Walker taxonomies of fact 
Adjudicative and legislative facts can also overlap, as a broader social analysis is 
necessary to contextualize a fact in a case.  John Monahan and Laurens Walker therefore 
suggest a third category of “social frameworks” for cases which use “general conclusions 
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from social science research to determine a specific fact in a case.”75  For example, 
introducing social science evidence on the reliability of eyewitness identification to prove 
innocence in a criminal case that relies on the testimony of two eyewitnesses76 applies 
general social science data (legislative facts) to facts of a particular case (adjudicative 
facts), and does not cleanly fit in either category.  Courts perform a validity check within 
the field, to ensure that the type of data presented best fits the circumstances of a case.  
This type of analysis is rarer at the Supreme Court, since the Supreme Court is more 
likely to decide on a general standard and remand questions of particularized fact to an 
appellate or trial court for further hearings. 
Instead the Supreme Court focuses primarily on legislative facts—general 
questions of rights and responsibilities under the law, which often include some form of 
science from medical opinions to social science research.  David Faigman therefore 
refines the adjudicative/legislative fact distinction for Supreme Court cases through a trio 
of what he calls “Constitutional Facts,” which categorize the types of evidence presented 
to substantiate constitutional rights.   
                                                 
75 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA L. 
REV. 559, 563-70 (1987). 
76 See State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983) (the Arizona Supreme Court ordered a retrial because 
“there were a number of substantive issues of ultimate fact on which the expert’s testimony would have 
been of significant assistance” in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony based on social science 
research). 
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Figure 3: Faigman's taxonomy of facts 
First are “Constitutional doctrinal facts” which substantiate a particular 
interpretation of the constitution and justify development of rules or standards that would 
apply to all similarly situated cases.77  Debates over originalism and textualism rely on 
doctrinal facts, usually using historiography and document analysis in establishing 
constitutional meaning, but can include social sciences.78  Second are “Constitutional 
reviewable facts,” which mirror Monahan and Walker’s social frameworks and are used 
                                                 
77 Faigman, supra note 29, at 46.  In previous writings Faigman identified this area as “Constitutional-rule 
facts” which serve essentially the same purpose, but with amended language to understand it is more than 
just the ruling but also the doctrine of the Court.  See Faigman, supra note 30, at 553. 
78 Faigman, supra note 29, at 46. 
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to examine facts “under the pertinent constitutional rule” but “transcend particular 
disputes and thus can recur in identical form in different cases and varying 
jurisdictions.”79  Here facts underlying a particular piece of legislation are utilized in 
conjunction with Constitutional doctrine—for example the Supreme Court in affirmative 
action cases which look at the facts underlying the policies of affirmative action and then 
applies strict scrutiny to decide whether the state or federal power acted within its 
constitutional authority to pass legislation.   
Finally, is what Faigman calls “Constitutional case-specific facts. . . [which] refer 
to factual determinations that are relevant to the application of constitutional rules in 
particular cases.”80  Analysis of facts in these cases is more specific and may lead to 
general standards, but is highly particularized.  Questioning whether an employer 
intentionally discriminated against an employee in using standardized testing that 
statistically favors whites is a case-specific fact since it looks at the particularities of the 
test in that case, rather than the general idea of testing or whether testing is a 
constitutional right, even though there may be constitutional rights at issue. Faigman 
emphasizes these categories are not exclusive and there are no clear boundaries between 
the three.  Doctrinal facts set the standards, reviewable facts apply the standards, and 
case-specific facts establish how well the standard fits the case before the Court.  
To illustrate, imagine a Supreme Court case involving claims of racial 
discrimination in violation of the Voting Rights Act.  Doctrinal facts would be the text of 
                                                 
79 Id. at 47. 
80 Id. at 48. 
 110 
the Voting Rights Act and documents indicating for what purpose it was passed (to stop 
racial discrimination in housing), possibly even histories or studies submitted to Congress 
with examples or statistics on racial voting and representative disparities.  Reviewable 
facts would be previous decisions of lower courts regarding voting rights that apply to the 
same type of situation, even though some details may be different—one case was in 
Texas involving Mexican Americans, another in Florida involving Puerto Ricans, while 
the case at hand is in Arizona involving Black and Latina/o communities in a major 
metropolitan area.  Case-specific facts could include any Arizona voting discrimination 
legislation, previous applications of voting law to Arizona, studies of voting patterns in 
Arizona, maps of voting districts etc.  Doctrinal are the broad legal histories and 
assumptions underlying a case, reviewable facts would be the decision of a lower court or 
an authorized monitor of voting rights. 
While Faigman’s typology establishes the importance of facts at every level of 
legal reasoning in the Supreme Court, Angelo Ancheta suggests that within the 
development of equal protection doctrine, there are five key functions of scientific 
evidence.  First, the most basic function of social science is informational, “enlightening 
courts on the state of the world” by shaping the perceptions of justices on current 
issues—like the research presented in Brown that informed the justices on feelings of 
inferiority among Black school-age youth.81  Second, social science serves an 
authoritative function in tandem with “constitutional precedent, theory, or contemporary 
values” to provide a support for legal reasoning in areas where the court lacks expertise—
                                                 
81 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 77. 
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precisely how it was used in Brown to establish Black children’s feelings of inferiority 
due to segregated schools.82  The third function is illuminating, to “reveal the underlying 
assumptions and values of the frameworks that guide their interpretations of the 
constitution,” particularly in questions of race as the social science provides concrete 
benefits which the court may rely on.83  Conversely, social science serves a legitimating 
function, demonstrating “thoroughness and circumspection in their analyses, even though 
normative judgements may ultimately be at the root of their decisions.”84  In other words, 
rather than propose vague hypotheticals, scientific literature is used to add credibility to 
the Court’s assumptions of the world.  The final function is rhetorical, as courts invoke 
“an independent expertise and trustworthiness that is untainted by the partiality of 
advocates. . . . [and] science, left unquestioned, thus becomes ‘truth’ in the constitutional 
analysis.”85  In other words, because both sides in the legal case cannot agree on an issue, 
(any) scientific third party becomes an “objective” source since they lack stake in the 
claim before the Court.  Ancheta’s functional approach highlights the many ways the 
Court may interpret and therefore use scientific evidence, though which use the Court 
favors will depend on specific facts, or even a Justice’s own interpretation of the 
evidence. 
                                                 
82 Id. at 78. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 79. 
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For all these typologies, a key element of is still missing:  “because the courts 
have not developed clear methodologies to engage in constitutional fact finding, all of 
these different roles for scientific evidence . . . can be at play in a given case.”86  Each of 
these five functions blur together in the Supreme Court’s opinions, as a citation like 
footnote eleven in Brown may serve many functions simultaneously—illuminating the 
harms of segregation, while providing an authoritative counterpoint to previous opinions 
of the Court, legitimating the Court’s overturning of precedent and making a rhetorical 
appeal to end segregation.  Faigman argues that the Court’s failure to “impose any 
systematic order on its reception of facts in constitutional cases . . . gives the Court great 
latitude in its interpretation and application of the Constitution, [and] weakens the 
institution’s rightful authority.”87  Particularly in equal protection, Ancheta argues that 
“when push comes to shove, constitutional theories and judicial values can trump the 
factual and scientific evidence. . . . Constitutional interpretation is, at bottom, an art and 
not a science.”88 However the existence of patterns that give rise to typologies proposed 
by Davis, Faigman, and Ancheta signify that there is something systematic at play, 
blurred by the Court’s shifting usages.  The Court’s use of social science is more than just 
an amalgam of citations that bulk up lengthy opinions, but a means of understanding.  
Faigman concludes his book on constitutional facts saying that “it is, therefore, 
incumbent on the Court to have a good understanding of [the social] world if it is to give 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Faigman, supra note 29, at 180. 
88 Ancheta, supra note 5, at 160. 
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the Constitution effect.”89  The Court’s understanding of research, the ontology and 
epistemology of scientific evidence in the Supreme Court, may then hint at the 
understanding of the world—legal understandings of philosophies of science may be a 
significant breadcrumb on the path to a legal methodology. 
3.4 Legal or Social Philosophies of Science 
Underlying the frayed connection between social science and the law is an 
apparent conflict between the ontology of the law and social sciences.  Like Nick 
Carraway in The Great Gatsby, the law’s relationship to social science is “within and 
without, simultaneously enchanted and repelled by the inexhaustible variety of life.”90  
Justices are simultaneously enchanted with social science’s potential for discovering 
grand social truths and repelled by social science’s perceived subjectivity that may 
undermine the presumed objectivity of legal truths.  The Supreme Court tends to 
“construct an empirical world that serves the normative vision it holds for the 
Constitution.”91  Law and the Supreme Court operate under a presumption of 
permanence; the constitution may be amended but the text remains the same since it was 
originally written.  Interpretations of the text may shift, but the idea of the law, 
supposedly remains the same.  Edmond Cahn and Ronald Dworkin’s uneasiness with 
Brown hinged on the idea that the law could become subject to fads in social science that 
might alter fundamental rights.   
                                                 
89 Faigman, supra note 29, at 181. 
90 F. Scott Fitzgerald, THE GREAT GATSBY 35 (1925, 2004). 
91 Id. at 25. 
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Similarly, Allison Orr Larsen’s analyses of the Supreme Court’s use of amicus 
briefs and in-house empirical research are very concerned with facts distorting the law.  
Within this is an assumption that there may be some form legal reasoning or 
constitutional doctrine that develops independent of empirical analysis which may be 
tainted by the addition of external analysis.  Larsen suggests “minimalist” and 
“maximalist” views on the inclusion of empirical data.  Minimalists would severely 
restrict fact-finding “to sources presented by the adversary system” while maximalists 
would “open up the adversary system so that information flows more freely.”92  Yet both 
approaches assume that the Court’s epistemology of empirical data is correct.   
The Supreme Court will often accept the soundness of research while denying its 
application to a particular case under the auspices of criticizing social science 
methodology—“accepting the validity of empirical research, while simultaneously 
discounting the relevance of that very research.”93  The Supreme Court’s mistreatment of 
social science often misuses, rejects, or disparages data “when the research does not 
support its views” in spite of the rigor and soundness of social scientific techniques.94  
Donald Bersoff and David Glass are less kind in their assessment of the Supreme Court 
as “the ultimate arbiters” on the legal validity of social science research:  “it is frustrating 
to work in an area where the judges are, at times, ignorant, arbitrary, fraudulent, 
                                                 
92 Larsen, supra note 66, at 1305. 
93 Faigman, supra note 30, at 593. 
94 Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court’s Continuing Misuse of 
Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 293 (1995). 
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duplicitous, confused, and unprincipled.”95  Even if research indicates social or statistical 
significance, legal significance may be entirely divorced from scientific principles. 
Normative values in constitutional law have a “romance” that “inspire lawyers to 
poetic heights” in advocating for principles of equality, fairness, or justice.  Faigman 
argues that “knowledge of the factual world cannot dictate constitutional values.  But 
such knowledge is a tool upon which the Court must sometimes rely to ensure that those 
values are realized.”96  The Supreme Court and the law thus need procedural guidelines 
that would systematize scientific evidence since “the poetry actually lies in the details.”97  
The abstract concepts that inspire lawyers and others to work within the boundaries of the 
law are inherently tied to practical realities of a particular case or a particular law.   
Process and practicality ground abstract values, but too often become mired in 
legal rhetoric; becoming what Felix Cohen called “transcendental nonsense.”98 Writing 
against legal fictions like corporate personhood, Cohen argued that law’s 
conceptualization of society exists outside of ideals and reality, yet depends on both. 
In every field of law we should find peculiar concepts which are not defined 
either in terms of empirical fact or in terms of ethics but which are used to 
answer empirical and ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to 
intelligent investigation of social fact and social process.99 
  
                                                 
95 Id. at 302. 
96 Faigman, supra note 29, at 181. 
97 Id. 
98 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
99 Id. at 820 
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Instead, Cohen argued for legal “functionalism,” a form of positivism that would remove 
legal fictions—terms-of-art given social meaning by the law—and jurisprudential 
questions of law in favor of two basic questions: “How do courts actually decide cases of 
a given kind?  [and] How ought they to decide cases of a given kind?”100  Functionalism, 
in Cohen’s view, creates an “independent science of law” through a blend of “objective 
description of the causes and consequences of legal decisions” and “a critical theory of 
social values.”101  In other words, the law has become so mired in legalese that it has lost 
social relevance other than the power of “the law,” and must be realigned with scientific 
thought by incorporating a positivist approach.  Cohen’s functionalism predicts a 
fundamental shift in legal philosophy and methods that would integrate (positivist) social 
sciences102 that never came to be as present-day United States courts continue 
misunderstand, misuse, or fail to use social science evidence.103  
 At the core of this conflict is a misunderstanding of social scientific 
subjectivity.  Methodological criticisms of social science often get mired in debates over 
researcher bias—though the biases of the justices and the Court are rarely, if ever, 
brought into play within the opinions of the Court.  Faigman praises replicability and the 
predictive value of social science methodology because it lacks a “particular ideological 
                                                 
100 Id. at 824. 
101 Id. at 849. 
102 Id. at 834. 
103 See Ancheta, supra note 5; Faigman, supra note 29. 
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agenda,”104 bemoaning the biases of social science researchers while acknowledging that 
common practice requires disclosure from researchers.105  For Faigman, the problem is 
“ideology masquerading as science” which interferes with what he believes to be the 
ideal purpose:  “Social science does not make the difficult policy choices easier; its value 
lies in making the difficult choices clearer.”106  However, this acknowledgment of a 
“difficult choice” still acknowledges the value laden decision of the Court—a justice’s 
ideological frame of reference will alters perspective of both law and fact.  Faigman’s 
belief in the rigors of methodology and the biases of researchers mirrors Larsen’s 
skepticism of amicus curiae and judicial research.  Both seem to believe that there is a 
correct decision to be made; the question is only whether the evidence is strong enough 
to support it.  Even Cohen’s functionalist approach relies on a positivist scientific 
philosophy, an objective nature of reality that can be explored through scientific rigor. 
Yet despite the pages upon pages of procedure used by lawyers, scholars, and 
judges, law has failed to match social scientists’ understanding that rigor and subjectivity 
are not mutually exclusive.  Gayle Leatherby, John Scott and Malcolm William’s 
discussion of objectivity explains that the values and subjectivity of a social scientist are 
in fact necessary to the objectivity of research in creating robust descriptions that are 
                                                 
104 Faigman, supra note 5, at 1094. 
105 Id. at 1030. 
106 Id. at 1094. 
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necessarily in flux with society.107  Malcolm Williams argues that objectivity is not 
neutral, but is a value unto itself consisting of three necessary values: purpose, 
differentiation, and truth.108  Purpose refers to the investigation and motivation, the 
driving force that inspires action and the practices which define how that investigation 
takes place—both of which are contextually defined by varied societal values.  
Differentiation refers to the means of categorization, levels of measurement, or 
whichever mechanism by which a researcher refers to and distinguishes between objects.  
Finally, truth refers to claims and hypotheses made by researchers which are necessarily 
disputed and falsifiable, though not necessarily always what is found in social science 
research.  Williams therefore argues for “situated objectivity,” understanding that 
objective is not a dichotomous concept—one is not simply objective or unobjective—but 
rather exists in tandem with subjectivity, defined by social context/applicability and 
disciplinary culture/methodology.109   
Gayle Leatherby supplements Williams’ situated objectivity with “theorized 
subjectivity,” finding objectivity in the researcher’s reflexive social practice, which 
“requires the constant, critical interrogation of our personhood—both intellectual and 
personal—within the knowledge production process.”110  However voyeuristic social 
                                                 
107 Gayle Leatherby, John Scott, & Malcolm Williams, OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL 
RESEARCH 6 (2013). 
108 Id. at 61. 
109 Id. at 71-72. 
110 Id. at 80. 
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sciences may seem, Leatherby draws on Charles Wright Mills’ sociological imagination 
to understand that “the social scientist is part of society and not an externally located 
observer. . . ‘the question is where he [sic] stands within it.’”111  Rather than define 
objectivity by the removal of bias, Leatherby, Scott, and Williams argue that objectivity 
is derived by embracing subjectivity, both in qualitative and quantitative methods.  
Objectivity in this sense is less a question of neutrality, and instead a question of 
methodology “as a bridge between a metaphysics of the social world . . . and its 
methods.”112  Methodology identifies the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
that drive decisions about how research is performed.  It is the ‘why’ embedded beneath a 
description of ‘how.’  Objectivity becomes problematic by failing to acknowledge bias 
and underlying values, in trying to “work without an ontology” and sticking exclusively 
to the observable—which, Williams argues, “shows order, but very little else.”113  
Ontological assumptions happen all the time in law, and particularly in the 
Supreme Court—the problem is that they are never acknowledged as ontology.  Take, for 
example, Chief Justice John Robert’s perspective on the role of a Supreme Court Justice, 
as described in his senate confirmation hearing: 
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges 
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role 
of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the 
                                                 
111 Id. (alteration in original). 
112 Id. at 115. 
113 Id. 
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rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the 
umpire.114  
 
What Chief Justice Roberts’ analogy fails to appreciate is the unique position of 
justices to make doctrine—to define the meaning of the constitutional principle.  Like 
umpires, justices and the Supreme Court get to make the decisions that under the written 
rules of the game, and their interpretive styles are consistently disputed by angry 
onlookers.  While nobody went to a game to see an umpire, the umpire’s calling of the 
game has a profound effect on the way the game is enjoyed.  If the fan’s favorite player 
strikes out rather than getting the opportunity to hit a home run, everyone goes home 
disappointed (except maybe the opposing team).  Justices largely keep their ontological 
assumptions of society under the robes, with a few notable exceptions.115  Even the 
justices themselves are part of the larger machinations of the Court as an institutional 
body—votes determine the outcome of a case and a justice’s writing style influences the 
reasoning in an opinion.  Obscuring the ontology also obfuscates methodology, as the 
methods of research (either in-house or gathering from secondary sources) are hidden 
behind a veneer of objectivity.  The question now becomes whether a situated objectivity 
                                                 
114 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
115 For example Justice Sotomayor was incredibly candid on how her personal outlook, and her legal 
opinion, are influenced by her identity as a Latina.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia 
Sotomayor, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 111th Cong. 126 (2005) (statement of Hon. Sonia 
Sotomayor, Nominee to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States).  Similarly Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s past as a lawyer working for social causes like civil rights and gender equity are 
part of the reason for her nomination.  See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, 103rd Cong. (1993). 
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or theorized subjectivity is even possible at the Supreme Court.  Opinions are often 
gilded with transcendental nonsense of constitutional rhetoric, even when drawing on 
social science evidence. 
3.5 Towards a Critical Race Methodology 
Key to developing a methodology for law is divorcing notions of neutrality from 
objectivity.  Positionality and reflexivity have developed special importance in critical 
social sciences as researchers recognize the power of knowledge production based on the 
experiences of marginalized peoples and try to work for the betterment of others.116  
Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva argue that  
critical social scientists on race matters can provide data, arguments, 
counternarratives, and all sorts of intellectual ammunition against dominant 
representations about racial groups and racial inequality . . . . [by being] 
race conscious and engaged in systematic analysis of racial stratification 
and its effects.117   
 
But all the ammunition gathered against white supremacy becomes futile if the Court 
does not accept the methods, premises, or conclusions—or outright ignores its existence 
altogether.  Mapping and analyzing the Supreme Court’s use of evidence through 
institutional ethnography will therefore provide a way of identifying sensitivities and 
weak points in white supremacist ideologies at the Court.  Of course, in the previous 
chapter I concluded noting the permanence of racism, meaning that any vulnerabilities to 
                                                 
116 See generally Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla Silva, WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND 
METHODOLOGY (2008); Leatherby, Scott, & Williams, supra note 107; and Dorothy Smith, INSTITUTIONAL 
ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE (2005). 
117 Tukufu Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, Telling the Real Tale of the Hunt: Toward a Race Conscious 
Sociology of Racial Stratification, in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 338 
(Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008). 
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be exploited might lead to a strengthening of the structure, rather than a change for 
oppressed racialized peoples—like the retrenchment and shift to colorblindness that the 
Court has taken post-Brown.  Yet the two cases I explore in the next two chapters 
represent a departure from the retrenchment that has been common place, since Justice 
Kennedy, author of both opinions, has rarely, if ever, authored the opinion of the Court in 
favor of racialized peoples, typically siding with the conservative wing of the Court.  
Mapping the social scientific evidence in these two major cases may indicate if there is 
any scientific evidence that lead to this change, or even if there is an intervening variable 
that needs to be accounted for.
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Intermission: Processing Methods 
Rethinking legal research and methods begins with an intervention for sake of 
transparency.  Discussions of justice in the Supreme Court often center on the legal 
process, but much less detail is given to the research process.  In law, the thinking, 
reasoning, discussion, or general hemming and hawing that leads up to a substantive 
decision is known as “dicta.”  Latin for “thing said,” dicta has become the catchall for 
legal reasoning that has weight because it is written in an opinion of the Court and 
therefore imbued with institutional power.  Often this is used to distinguish quotations or 
statements of law that appear in a judicial opinion, since the judgement of the Court—
known as the ruling or holding—becomes binding precedent that future cases should 
follow.  The dicta, nearly everything said leading up to that point, is reasoning and 
suggestion; it may influence a future opinion, but future courts are not obligated to follow 
its same reasoning.  This holding/dicta distinction can be frustrating.  Why read a lengthy 
opinion when the majority is dismissed as non-binding “dicta” and only the holding 
matters?  Some scholars feel that it is an efficiency standard, used to narrow down tomes 
of opinion into precise statements of law, and maintain the ultimate authority of the 
Court.1  In theory, dicta “helps ensure that like cases are decided alike while 
simultaneously confining the lawmaking authority of the courts to areas of their 
institutional competence”2  In essence, the dicta/holding divide is rooted in the idea that 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994) (discussing the role of 
dicta in courts under Article III); Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, Dictum ... Whatever, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 139, 
162 (2003) (discussing the role of electronic research in blurring boundaries between holding and dicta). 
2 Dorf, supra note 1, at 2070. 
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the Court, as an institution, is not meant to be bound by the writings of an individual 
judge, but through decisions on facts that establish general principles.  Dicta is the 
process by which the Court makes decisions, supporting reasoning with facts and 
opinions of a Justice and other external sources.  Much of what is studied and discussed 
in the law is ultimately dicta, and not binding, but supremely important.  Drawing 
attention to dicta draws attention to how law is understood by the judges and Justices 
who define the metes and bounds of the law; signaling ontological, axiological, or 
epistemological assumptions underlying the reasoning of a judge or Justice.    
In turn I want to use this chapter to draw attention to my own processes of 
analyzing the law, with this interlude on methods.  In the previous chapters I have 
summarized the theoretical and methodological underpinnings for this study, but I want 
to take a few pages to consider what it looks like in practice, to define and operationalize 
terms of study, and describe the coding process that developed throughout the analysis—
noting some mistakes and missteps along the way.  Some of this material is information 
that is usually stashed in appendices, or even footnotes, but I wanted to extract and 
collect this material in its own chapter that sits simultaneously in the middle of the 
Dissertation and outside the structure of the argument in the Dissertation.  This 
intermission documents practices to establish standards of analysis, to help create 
consistency in future research that I do, or anyone who reads this and wants to try and 
replicate or verify, following the notions of objectivity discussed by Leatherby, Scott and 
Williams, in creating subjective, but reflexive and (somewhat) replicable, research. 
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Though my methodology is firmly grounded in institutional ethnography, 
centering the Court and development of a decision, in practice the coding and reading of 
documents for this analysis draws heavily from David Altheide’s description of 
Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA).3  Content analysis is usually quantitative; 
counting and cataloging recurring themes or terms within a document to “measure the 
frequency or variety of messages. . . . To verify or confirm hypothesized relationships.”4  
Altheide explains that ECA decenters notions of objectivity by emphasizing the 
“reflexive and highly interactive nature of the investigator, concepts, data collection and 
analysis.”5  The goal is to “document and understand the communication of meaning. . . . 
[through] reflexive movement between concept development, sampling, data collection, 
data coding, data analysis, and interpretation.  The aim is to be systematic and analytic 
but not rigid.”6  ECA adapts to data by beginning from some general theoretical concepts, 
creating descriptive categories and narrative markers over the course of the analysis. But 
as much as the researcher must be reflexive and engaged in the process of coding and 
analyzing documents, “the aim of ECA is to place documents in context just as members 
do, in order to theoretically relate products to their organizational production.” 7  
Institutional ethnography and ECA therefore overlap in their use of institutional texts to 
                                                 
3 David L. Altheide, Reflections: Ethnographic Content Analysis, 10(1) QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY 65 
(1987). 
4 Id. at 66-68. 
5 Id. at 68. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 74. 
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analyze and theorize about the structure and function of institutions in society, but 
importantly centralizing the reflexivity of the researcher in the process.  Institutional 
ethnography focuses on the development of meaning through the institutional process, 
while ECA reinforces the methodological motivation with a reflexive process of 
transforming institutional documents into data for analysis.   
For both cases I followed the same general process, but as Altheide emphasizes 
with ECA, the process necessarily requires the structured “reflexive appraisal of 
documents,”8 and each chapter contains unique elements related to disparate impact or 
critical mass, but equally focus on race, the Supreme Court, and social scientific 
evidence.  This intermission represents an intervention for the sake of transparency in the 
coding process, not only in remaining descriptive, but honest and reflexive in the process 
of coding so I can say why specific data collection, coding, and analysis choices were 
made.  I wanted to forefront these issues, since my dissertation emphasizes the lack of 
these issues within the law, while also keeping this information from being lost in 
footnotes or asides.  That said, this intermission is less focused on formalities than the 
development and expression of a process that generates the final half of this dissertation. 
Data Collection 
Supreme Court briefs, even those of amicus curiae, are available for free online.  
All merits and amicus briefs were retrieved from the American Bar Association website 
which lists briefs from recent Supreme Court cases for the past twelve years.9  I used the 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 American Bar Association, Preview Briefs of the United States Supreme Court Cases, 
www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017). 
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official transcripts of the Court for documenting oral argument, and the official slip 
opinion released the day the case is announced, both of which are freely available on the 
Supreme Court’s website.10   
All documents are downloaded as .pdfs then organized in folders by type (record, 
amicus, merits, oral argument, opinion) and loaded in to an NVivo project. NVivo is a 
qualitative coding software, typically used for interviews, but has capability to code, 
organize, and connect a variety of data from different mediums, text, audio or visual.  I 
chose NVivo primarily because it had an emphasis on relationships and textual mapping 
embedded in the software which I thought would coordinate well with institutional 
ethnography.  NVIVO is also capable of reading text from .pdf files as searchable, and 
looked to be a user-friendly software, with discount subscriptions for my university.  
Other software seems equally capable or beneficial, but I have less experience with them, 
and many of the alternatives require internet access.  I wanted the ability to code, read 
and write from any location and not frustrate my efforts by relying on a quality internet 
connection to access my data.   
NVivo provides multiple ways of cataloging data, but for this analysis I focused 
mostly on using the Nodes, Cases, and Relationships classifications.  Nodes are general 
thematic markers that can be applied to text, and organized in hierarchies.  Cases are 
ways of distinguishing where data comes from, not only which document source, but also 
                                                 
10 Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Transcripts, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript (last visited Feb. 1, 2017); Supreme 
Court of the United States, Opinions, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/opinions.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2017). 
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identifying a speaker or author in any given source document.  Relationships allow you to 
classify ways in which different nodes or cases interact.  Here, I use cases to identify the 
source of the data being coded.  Cases were divided into Amicus Curiae, Merits Briefs, 
Oral Argument, and Supreme Court opinion.  Each was subdivided by the side supported, 
respondent or petitioner, and the author or speaker to better contrast different thematic 
codes based on the original speaker.  With each document coded based on the source of 
information, I turned to reading the documents to develop my substantive, thematic 
codes. 
How to Code 
Drawing on the “constant discovery and constant comparison of relevant 
situations, settings, styles, images, meanings, and nuances”1112 of reflexive analysis in 
Ethnographic Content Analysis, I wanted to avoid rigidly defined categories at the outset 
of the analysis.  Therefore, I did two simultaneous layers of coding, focusing on race, 
social science, and the institution of the Supreme Court.  The first layer of analysis 
happened in NVivo, building reflexive thematic categories that would grow over the 
course of the analysis.  This layer made it easier for creating the kind of maps imagined 
by institutional ethnography, creates quick reference points to important details, and 
helps to keep track of some basic data points on frequency.  The second layer was old 
fashioned pen and paper to track important ideas in five categories: Law, Scientific 
Evidence, Supreme Court Case law, Theoretical Asides, and Race.  These categories 
                                                 
11 Altheide, supra note  
12 Altheide, Reflections, at 68. 
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developed from the three focus areas of this dissertation (Race, Scientific Evidence, and 
Race), with two additional categories to note case law to highlight discussions of 
precedent, and a theoretical asides category so I could make substantive notes to myself 
on ideas or issues that arose from the text.  This category became the most free-form and 
reflexive in the coding process, identifying areas for analysis in the proceeding chapters.  
In a more traditional ethnography involving site visits and interviews, the NVivo codes 
function like interview transcripts, while the hand-written notes are like my field-notes 
for the coding process. 
NVivo Nodes and Cases 
After loading all the documents into NVivo for analysis, for Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project discussed in Chapter 
4, I created a few preliminary categories in NVivo based on hypothesized importance: 
definition of disparate impact, when disparate impact applies, and sources.  Similarly, in 
Chapter 5 analysis of Fisher II, I focused on definitions and applications of critical mass, 
descriptions of the University of Texas’ admissions policy, demographics, and sources. 
The definition and application of disparate impact and critical mass respectively help me 
to illuminate how statistical evidence is useful in defining legal principles.  Neither is an 
exact quantitative standard, but representative of policy aims in desegregating housing 
and higher education through the law.  Sources, then, show what authority is used to 
define these concepts. 
Originally the “sources” node in NVivo was a few discrete categories including 
Caselaw (grouping opinions of the Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals, and federal 
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district courts), procedural records (the judgments of lower courts in this case), and a 
general “external sources” category (books, law journals, etc.).   
 
Figure 4: Map of "Sources" node in NVivo for Chapter 4. 
As the analysis went on the Sources node grew into more categories, as shown 
above in Figure I.1.  Two categories, “External/Empirical data” and “Government or 
Professional Association,” grew dramatically as I thought it was important to note the 
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differences between the types of sources within these groups.  Different professional 
associations may be more authoritative or indicate the political leanings of a source—
reports by the Brennan Center and Heritage Foundation, in my mind, are not necessarily 
qualitatively the same.   
Other categories grew in NVivo coding, thinking about the purpose of legislation 
like the FHA, the role and effects of segregation, and even general comments on race, 
racialization, and segregation.  The full list of NVivo nodes for Chapters 4 and 5 are 
included in the appendices. 
Thematic Categories 
I used the hand-written notes to help conceptualize and operationalize the ways in 
which these themes emerge in the writings of the Court and involved parties, filtered 
through my own thinking.  The first category, law, refers to the ways in which the 
document enforces the “rule of law” or describes a legal purpose—whether that is the 
institutional legal purpose of the courts or the role and function of a statute like the Fair 
Housing Act.  This was probably my most used hand-written category, since so much of 
the Court’s opinions refer to the purpose of law, legislation, or courts, while the briefs try 
to impress some sort of duty upon the Court to either confront, resolve, or avoid a serious 
constitutional issue.  Second, scientific evidence, was used far less than expected, but 
refers to the use or treatment of scientific evidence, or even offhanded comments that are 
given the air of science.  Take, for example, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Inclusive 
Communities, that quotes various economists for general assertions on “measurable 
disparities” like the fact the National Basketball Association is predominantly Black, to 
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assert that racial disparities are not indicative of discrimination.12  While the NVivo 
coding captures what types of sources he is using for these statistics, the handwritten 
coding is noting that these non-legal sources are used to make a point about the role of 
statistics.   
My third thematic code, Case law, is a slight modification of the law thematic 
code, since this point looks at how the Court structures it’s authority in making a 
statement of precedent.  For the most part this was a very direct example, and overlaps 
with the NVivo coding since the recurrence of cases across multiple sources is captured 
both by NVivo coding and the thematic coding.  Fourth, Theoretical Asides, was used to 
draw attention connections and insights that emerged during the coding analysis.  Part of 
this was used to develop hypotheses or other NVivo codes as a part of the reflexive 
process, but also to pre-write commentary that would become part of my analysis.  The 
fifth and final thematic code was race and racialization, to identify areas when the Court 
made statements about race as a concept, experience, or practice.  This helped inspire the 
segregation and desegregation coding that became part of my NVivo coding, listed in 
appendices A and B.  Coding for race and racism in the Supreme Court was also 
important as a potential future source of data and information for other projects, 
considering that the Supreme Court Database, the most comprehensive quantitative 
summary of the Supreme Court,14 contains codes for civil rights issues and some finer 
                                                 
12 Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 46 
14 Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger, and Sara C. 
Benesh. 2016 Supreme Court Database, Version 2016 Release 01. URL: http://Supremecourtdatabase.org 
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legal points on segregation and discrimination, but lacks a code for race or racialization 
that I think would be important to future analyses, especially from a Critical Race 
perspective.  Thus, this category explores the ways that race is discussed, particularly 
“race neutral” and “race consciousness” that becomes a recurring argument in both cases.  
Developing codes for race, particularly with legislation, could assist in future studies of 
the Supreme Court and how courts define racial categories that it plays such a large role 
in defining—even as authorities like Chief Justice Roberts decry the existence of race. 
Coding Process 
My coding process involved a close reading of the document, coding the 
document in NVivo as it was read, making handwritten notes on thematic categories 
along the way.  In each case I worked my way backwards, beginning by coding the final 
decision of the Court—starting with the ending in each case to see what arguments were 
most important to the Court, and working backwards.   After coding Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion and Justice Thomas’ and Justice Alito’s dissents, I moved back into 
coding the Oral Argument, identifying each speaker as a “case” in NVivo.  After oral 
argument were Merits Briefs, followed by the many Amici in both cases, and finally the 
petitions for Certiorari that initiate the proceeding. 
Coding in this way enhanced my reflexive thematic coding in NVivo and by hand 
because then I could see in Amicus Briefs and Merits briefs which arguments inspired or 
directly influenced the final opinions.  It also helped to make connections through Oral 
Argument, identifying what arguments were most salient to the final decision, and which 
justices and counsel teased out those ideas at oral argument, if at all.   
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After manually coding in NVivo and in my own notes, I used NVivo to 
retroactively code the entirety of my data for key terms that emerged from my previous 
reading, and to map terms.  NVivo contains a word-tree and word chart features, which 
allow me to create additional visualizations based on key features from the texts.  Coding 
schemes in this way are straightforward, as the concepts are drawn directly from their use 
in the text.  I want to focus on how the Court develops ideologies, arguments, and 
meaning through its institutional authority, and what types of authorities are used to 
develop or reinforce the statements of the Justices of the Court.     
Foreshadowing and Missteps 
Remaining true to institutional ethnography, I proposed to visually map my 
analysis in the following chapters.  To keep the visuals streamlined, I will display the five 
phases of institutionally action in a Supreme Court Case (Certiorari, Merit Briefs, Amicus 
Briefs, Oral Argument, and Decision), and use charts to try and map the movement of 
sources, ideas, hypotheticals, and other elements of argumentation in reaching the 
ultimate decision. 
 
Figure 5: Example of Argument Map 
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The example above in figure I.2, demonstrates a simplified version of the maps 
that I intended to appear in Chapters four and five.  I believed this method of visualizing 
information will help to keep the analysis simple, consistent, and maybe even visually 
appealing.  However, in practice, these maps might be better suited to a narrower line of 
argumentation.  The maps developed from my handwritten notes, supplemented by codes 
from NVivo, and tracked lines of argument based on the cited authority or the general 
thrust behind the argument.  Attached in appendix c, Figure 17 shows a digitally mapped 
illustration of the line of argument from Chapter 4, and Figure 18 shows the hand drawn 
version that is used as the basis for the digital maps.  Because there are so many parties 
and lines of argument involved, they became unwieldy for a visual map, and are likely 
better suited to a single opinion or brief.  These maps are incredibly helpful thinking 
through such a glut of information, each case included thousands of pages of legal 
documents, with citations on top of that.  Mapping was crucial to keeping track of 
argumentation, but the maps become less helpful in relating the information to a reader 
visually.  Instead, the arguments are better deconstructed through text. 
As a final note before ending the intermission and ushering readers back from 
concessions, I want to suggest a hypothesis about the use of scientific evidence and race 
in these cases:  Based on the literature described in Chapter 3, I believe that more 
scientific evidence will come on the side advocating for racial change—meaning parties 
that are in favor of disparate impact analyses and affirmative action, seeking to alter, if 
not upend, existing status quos of race.  This is how scientific evidence became important 
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through Brandies briefs, and footnote 11 in Brown,13 it makes sense that tradition would 
continue into modern argument.   
I now return you to your regularly scheduled programming.
                                                 
13 See supra Chapter 3. 
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4 Unfair Housing: Disparate-Impact and the Fair Housing Act 
“Property, property, property, property, nigga I’m tryna invest” 
- 2 Chainz, Rick Ross (f. 2 Chainz and Gucci Mane) - Buy Back the Block 
 
“You know so we ain’t really never had no old money 
We got a whole lotta new money though” 
- Offset, Migos - Bad and Boujee 
 
In the summer of 2015, a group of teenagers gathered for a pool party in 
McKinney, Texas—only to have the police called on them.  Local police were dispatched 
in response to a reported “disturbance involving multiple juveniles at the location, who 
do not live in the area or have permission to be there, refusing to leave.”1  Police officers 
arrived to break up the gathering of teens.  One of the police officers was filmed drawing 
his gun on Black youths, using police training to tackle a young Black woman and pin 
her to the ground with his knees in her back.2  Video of the incident went viral on 
YouTube and Twitter, becoming part of public discussions on anti-Black police violence, 
public spaces, and the historical and racial significance of swimming pools.3  Later 
reports revealed the entire incident was instigated by a white woman assaulting Tatyana 
Rhodes, a 19-year-old Black woman hosting the party, who lives in the community with 
                                                 
1 Yoni Applebaum, McKinney, Texas, and the Racial History of American Swimming Pools: Backyard 
Pools and private clubs only proliferated after municipal pools were forcibly desegregated, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/troubled-waters-in-mckinney-
texas/395150/. 
2 Brandon Brooks, Cops Crash Pool Party (Original), YouTube https://youtu.be/R46-XTqXkzE. 
3 See e.g. Applebaum, supra note 1; Kriston Capps, Race, the Supreme Court, and the McKinney Pool: A 
pending case will decide whether suburbs far beyond Texas can use income to bar poor, black residents 
from more than just pools, CITY LAB (June 8, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/06/race-the-
supreme-court-and-the-mckinney-pool/395144/; Gene Demby, Who Gets to Hang Out at the Pool?, NPR 
CODE SWITCH, (June 9, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/06/09/412913702/who-gets-
to-hang-out-at-the-pool. 
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her family.4  By most accounts, the older white woman told Ms. Rhodes and other Black 
youth to leave the community pool and go back to section 8 housing5—housing rented 
through federal vouchers administered by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.  Fundamentally, the conflict centers issues of race and belonging—who 
belongs in public space, the community pool, and private space, residence in McKinney. 
Six years before the McKinney pool party incident, the Inclusive Communities 
Project (ICP), a Dallas-based nonprofit organization dedicated to opening access to 
housing in high-income communities, sued the city of McKinney and the McKinney 
municipal housing authority, alleging the city reinforced racial segregation by “making 
dwellings unavailable because of race.”6  The parties settled before trial.  In the only 
decision of the case, Judge Michael Schneider denied the City’s motion to dismiss, since 
the ICP pleaded facts sufficient to state a cause of action based on racial steering in 
violation of the Fair Housing Act.7  McKinney, Texas is split by U.S. Highway 75; East 
McKinney is 49% white, West McKinney is 86% white.8  All public housing and 
landlords willing to accept housing vouchers are in East McKinney.  ICP alleged the city 
                                                 
4 Naomi Martin, Racist comments prompted McKinney pool party fight, host says, DALLAS NEWS, (June 
2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2015/06/08/racist-comments-prompted-mckinney-pool-
party-fight-host-says. 
5 Id. 
6 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. City of McKinney Texas, No. 4: 08-CV-434 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 
2009). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
 139 
failed to “negotiate for and provide low-income housing units” in west McKinney.9  The 
City and housing authorities moved to dismiss for “failure to state a claim for which 
relief may be granted,” usually meaning the claim does not fall within the parameters for 
a claim or remedy under the applicable statutes or regulation.10  The Judge found ICP 
provided sufficient evidence for a claim, and denied the motion to dismiss.  But again, the 
parties settled out of Court, so the case never went to trial, and no trial record was made 
of the City’s segregation or the housing authority’s failure to remedy it. 
One year before the suit against McKinney, ICP filed a similar, but separate, suit 
against the Texas Housing Authority.  In the 2008 suit, ICP alleged the Texas Department 
of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) “intentionally discriminated based on 
race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 
U.S.C. § 1982, or that TDHCA’s allocation decisions had a disparate racial impact, in 
violation of §§ 3604(a) and 3605(a) of the Fair Housing Act.”11  After four years, a 
summary judgment decision and a bench trial, Judge Fitzwater found ICP proved the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit program had a racially disparate impact under the FHA, 
but found in favor of the TDHCA on the intentional discrimination claims.12  On appeal, 
the Fifth Circuit found the District Court decided the Case correctly, but still reversed and 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  
11 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. TDHCA., 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313-314 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
12 Id. 
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remanded.13  The District Court was instructed to apply the new standard for disparate 
impact under the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) guidelines published in 2013, 
the year after the original case was decided.  By 2015, Texas Attorney General 
successfully appealed to the Supreme Court on the limited question of whether the FHA 
permits a claim of disparate impact.14   
On June 25, 2015, twenty days after McKinney police arrived on the scene of 
pool party where White onlookers harassed Black partygoers to go back to section 8 
housing, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit in TDHCA v. 
Inclusive Communities Project, confirming the viability of disparate-impact claims under 
the Fair Housing Act.15  The McKinney incident and Inclusive Communities are rooted in 
segregated housing and racial discrimination, take place in the same metropolitan area, 
with an oddly parallel set of circumstances.  Had the city of McKinney not settled its suit, 
it likely would have joined the appeals in Inclusive Communities.   
Yet the synchronicity of these two events inverts business as usual in 
discrimination law.  Typically, courts will only recognize discriminatory intent, 
individual acts of racial meanness—like white bystanders telling Black youth to return to 
section 8 housing, or Officer Casebolt unreasonably tackling, injuring, and pulling a 
firearm on Black youths.  The Supreme Court rarely recognizes claims of discriminatory 
                                                 
13 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, 747 F.3d 
275, 283 
14 Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S.Ct. 46 
(2014) (granting certiorari limited to question 1). 
15 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2504, No. 13-1371 (2015). 
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effect, disparate impact, or other quantitative or qualitative showing of systematic bias 
and discrimination on the basis of race.16  Yet in these instances of housing 
discrimination in Texas, the individual acts of meanness have, so far, gone unpunished in 
court,17 but the Court upheld the disparate impact standard in Inclusive Communities. 
Racialized housing disparities raised in disparate impact claims are aggregations 
of history, policy, and personal experience.  The Court’s analysis of disparate impact 
therefore necessarily draws in multiple sources of authority for understanding how 
housing disparities come in to being, and how those disparities are to be evaluated.  
Housing discrimination is about social engineering, controlling the daily lives of people 
and what resources are available to them—jobs, schools, other people, etc. This chapter 
therefore takes a close look on how the Court considers disparate-impact in housing, 
looking to what arguments and authorities were persuasive, and the role of social 
scientific evidence in the process.   
Importantly, Inclusive Communities solidifying disparate impact signals potential 
for expanded consideration of racism, or at least institutional racial discrimination, in 
                                                 
16 See e.g. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistically significant showing of racial 
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty in Georgia was insufficient to indicate a violation 
of equal protection that would invalidate a defendant’s death sentence); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 
(2009) (holding a city’s invalidation of test results based on racially disproportionate exclusion of non-
whites violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
17 Neither Officer Casebolt, nor the woman who slapped the Black youth or bystanders who yelled epithets, 
faced any criminal charges, see Krishnadev Calamur, No Charges for the Texas Pool-Party Cop, The 
Atlantic   (Jun. 23, 2016) (available at https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/mckinney-pool-
officer/488525/).  However, the young Black woman tackled by Officer Casebolt has filed a civil suit 
against the officer, the city, and the police department.  Julieta Chiquillo, Girl pinned down at McKinney 
pool party sues ex-cop, city for $5 million, Dallas Morning News (Jan. 4 2017 (available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/mckinney/2017/01/03/girl-pinned-mckinney-pool-party-sues-ex-cop-
city-5-million).  
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courts.  Disparate impact is a theory of measuring racism, but this is not an exact science; 
no bright line statistical margin will automatically trigger a verdict for either side.  
Rather, disparate impact highlights an epistemology and ontology of scientific evidence 
in the law—allowing discrimination to be recognized as a structural, systematic effect, 
without having to prove particularized intent.   
Therefore, this chapter analyzes how disparate impact is conceptually defined and 
applied by the Supreme Court in TDHCA v. Inclusive Communities Project.  First, I 
contextualize housing discrimination in the Fair Housing Act (FHA), identifying the 
social, political, and historical context for the statutory controversy presented before the 
court in Inclusive Communities.  Next, I look at how the Court defines disparate impact 
under the FHA in Inclusive Communities, mapping how the standard develops and what 
authorities are used to make disparate impact clear.  From this working definition, I look 
to what hypotheticals, examples, and studies are used to illustrate or rebut disparate 
impact analyses in Inclusive Communities.  Argumentation in the law largely happens by 
analogy, so the examples and authorities used in each line of argument may reveal 
additional meanings underlying stated reasons for decision or dissent. 
Above all, this chapter examines how the Court conceptualizes claims of racism.  
Inclusive Communities revolves around a seemingly simple question of statutory 
interpretation: “whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act.”18  It is a question about the validity of standards and units of analysis—whether 
discrimination must be individual or can be shown in aggregate in a court of law.  Could 
                                                 
18 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2504, No. 13-1371 at 1 (2015) (Slip Op.). 
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Courts remedy systemic issues of racism like segregation, particularly once they become 
covert and obscured by ostensibly neutral policy?  Can systemic racism even be shown in 
a way courts will accept?  And of course, what types of evidence does the Court use to 
legitimize or impugn disparate impact?  The Court’s conclusion that disparate impact is 
valid, as promulgated by Housing and Urban Development regulations, is just as 
important as the reasoning used to reach that point and the way the Court contextualizes 
the purpose of the FHA.   
4.1 Identifying Housing Discrimination 
 Racialization and citizenship have consistently been tied to notions of home and 
property ownership in the United States.  Sociologist Matthew Desmond calls the home 
“the center of life. . . . The home is the wellspring of personhood.  It is where our identity 
takes root and blossoms.”19  Home’s centrality to identity and personhood make it a key 
site for regulations to maintain racialized boundaries and hierarchies.  Owning land was 
an early requirement for the right to vote, and many states carried that tradition into the 
20th century by using land ownership as automatic exemptions to discriminatory voting 
requirements like registration, literacy tests, or poll taxes.20  Race in the United States is 
embedded in systems of property—the dispossession of American Indian lands by 
reducing sovereignty to a right of use and occupancy21 or the dehumanization of African 
                                                 
19 Matthew Desmond, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 293 (2016). 
20 See Alexander Keyssar, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES. 6, 335-336 (2009). 
21 See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 144 
peoples and their descendants under chattel slavery—because race, and whiteness in 
particular are forms of property under the law.22  Housing is a basic element of civic life; 
where you live can determine what schools are available, what districts you vote in, 
access to affordable fresh foods, the types of policing strategies used near your home.  
Communities form around homes, not just in the style or type of housing, but in creating 
meaningful connections between people based on who lives in proximity to one another. 
Segregated housing is a policy-driven manifestation of white supremacy with 
two-fold purpose: maintaining strict racial hierarchy by reserving quality housing—and 
thereby intergenerational wealth—for whites, and eliminating avenues for interracial 
community building.  Richard Rothstein explains that segregated communities are not 
just the result of a few racist realtors, neighbors, or bad apples, but a coordinated effort 
between federal policy, homeowners’ associations, and realty associations.23  In an 
illuminating study on Ferguson, a segregated suburb of St. Louis, Missouri, Rothstein 
documents how a web of policies and practices create segregated, disparate housing 
standards at the expense of Black people: 
St. Louis was segregated by interlocking and racially explicit public policies 
of zoning, public housing, and suburban finance, and by publicly endorsed 
segregation policies of the real estate, banking, and insurance industries. 
These governmental policies interacted with public labor market and 
employment policies that denied African Americans access to jobs available 
to comparably skilled whites. When these mutually reinforcing public 
policies conspired with private prejudice to turn St. Louis’s African 
American communities into slums, public officials razed those slums to 
                                                 
22 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as property, 106 HARV. L. REV 1707 (1992)(arguing that whiteness is a 
form of status property to create rights and entitlements specific only to those who possess whiteness). 
23 Richard Rothstein, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES 1 
(Economic Policy Institute, 2014). 
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devote acreage to more profitable (and less unsightly) uses. African 
Americans who were displaced then relocated to the few other places 
available, converting towns like Ferguson into new segregated enclaves.24  
 
Thus, even short-lived discriminatory housing policies and practices create lasting racial 
disparities.  Discriminatory, restrictive housing restricts employment—by proximity, 
transportation costs, or overall expenses—which creates more housing disparities since 
income is inversely proportional to the ability to buy a home or change housing situation.  
Housing is also linked to education, both in the localities of schools youth attend and the 
tax base used to fund public schools, which effects higher education, and future 
employment.  Housing discrimination is thus a central feature in racialization and racial 
stratification in the United States.   
The Fair Housing Act is the primary mechanism under federal law to remedy the 
cumulative effects of housing discrimination.  President Lyndon B. Johnson created the 
Kerner Commission in 1967 to investigate sources of “civil unrest,” following major race 
riots—Watts, Los Angeles in 1965, Chicago in 1966, and Newark in 1967.25  The 
Commission’s findings were to the point: “White racism is essentially responsible for the 
explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War 
II.”26  The Kerner Report cited “[p]ervasive discrimination and segregation in 
employment, education and housing” as key areas where racism deprived Black people 
from “the benefits of economic progress,” pulling no punches in the description of 
                                                 
24 Id. at 30-31. 
25 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 6 (1968). 
26 Id. at 15-16. 
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segregation, white supremacy, and systemic racism that continue to influence the 
everyday lives of Black people.27  The Fair Housing Act was an attempt to remedy 
housing segregation through federal legislation, but had been blocked by filibuster for 
two years until the Kerner Report was released.28  After passing the Senate, the bill was 
stuck in the House rules committee until April 4, 1968 when the assassination of Martin 
Luther King Jr. and ensuing riots provided a “tragic momentum” to pass the Fair Housing 
Act within a week.29  While the Kerner Report directly indicted racism as the primary 
culprit of housing discrimination, the FHA makes broad prohibitions on discrimination in 
renting, selling, or to “otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”30    
However, the many exemptions permitted under the FHA, combined with the 
“anemic enforcement provisions” made the FHA  “largely symbolic.”31  In such a crucial 
area, where racism is prevalent and even directly identified in congressional reports, 
indictments of racism in the laws meant to remedy or prevent discrimination are largely 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 See Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative Hsitory and a Perspective, 8 Washburn L. J. 
149, 153 (1969); Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair 
Housing Act to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit; 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1766 (2005); 
29 Dubofsky, supra note 28, at 160; Orfield, supra note 28, at 1766; John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and 
Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1998); john a. powell, 
Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUN. DEV. L. 145, 146 (2008) (author does not capitalize his name). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 3604. 
31 powell, supra note 29, at 146. 
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missing.32  Myron Orfield’s analysis of the FHA is  more generous, proclaiming it as 
“one of the most hallowed accomplishments of American Law” with clear congressional 
intent to achieve racial integration, but still recognize that, “without persistent advocacy, 
even the clearest legislative pronouncements will not enforce themselves” urging housing 
advocates to utilize the FHA in addition to other potential remedies.33  John O. Calmore’s 
review of the FHA after thirty years argues that “racism has simply overwhelmed fair 
housing” as racist housing practices moved and adapted faster than Federal housing 
programs or the FHA could combat discrimination.34  john a. powell echoes Calmore’s 
sentiment in his forty year review of the FHA, noting that the “narrow antidiscrimination 
measure” of the FHA targeted older manifestations of housing discrimination, meaning 
housing advocates must “posit new mechanisms for intervention” based on evolving 
structures.35   
One of the major problems in the FHA’s attempts to address housing segregation 
is focus on individualized discrimination and remedy.  HUD surveys on public awareness 
in the early 2000’s revealed that although most people understood that housing 
discrimination violated the FHA, “eighty percent of the adults who reported having 
experienced forms of federally prohibited discrimination took no action.”36  Even if these 
                                                 
32 Id., see also Calmore, supra note 29, at 1071-1072. 
33 Orfield, supra note 29, at 1804. 
34 Calmore, supra note 29, at 1071. 
35 powell, supra note 29, at 159-60. 
36 Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and Segregation 
in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 INDIANA L. REV. 797, 805 (2008). 
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individuals had taken action, the remedies provided are too individualized to provide 
relief against systemic and systematic discrimination— granting attorney’s fees and small 
payments to successful plaintiffs.37  Claims for individual discrimination require some 
showing of discriminatory intent, which is often incredibly difficult to come by.  This 
requires plaintiffs to prove that a seller, realtor, landlord, or other person denied them 
housing because of their race—when a multitude of factors that correlate with race like 
credit score or criminal record can be used to claim non-racist motives and still maintain 
racist or discriminatory effects on people of color.38  Overt, individual acts of meanness 
and subtle, structural decisions both have racist implications and support white 
supremacy.  But despite these racialized harms, courts rarely use disparate impact to 
recognize the discriminatory effects beyond an individual act of meanness. 
Disparate impact claims take a broader view, looking to policies and practices that 
create barriers to expanded housing choices or housing improvements within 
communities of color.  Though the Fair Housing Act never says “disparate impact,” the 
language and aims of the FHA imply this approach.  Derived from the Court’s decision 
on employment discrimination Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in 1971,39 disparate impact 
litigation in housing took hold in district courts and courts of appeals in the mid-1970’s to 
                                                 
37 See Margalynne J. Armstrong, Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies to 
Achieve the Purpose of the Fair Housing Act, 64 TEMP. L.R. 909, 913 (1991). 
38 See e.g. Rebecca Oyama, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant Screening as a 
Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181 (2009) (comparing existing enforcement 
guidance under the Fair Housing Act, suggesting increased access to housing for persons with criminal 
records, since criminal record screening policies disproportionately affect people of color). 
39 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
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remove regulatory barriers to housing and help expose discriminatory intent in facially 
neutral practices.40  Although courts have consistently and overwhelmingly approved of 
disparate impact litigation, Stacy Seicshnaydre’s analysis of the past 40 years of disparate 
impact litigation in federal appellate courts shows that plaintiffs are rarely successful—
just eighteen of the ninety-two disparate impact claims received positive decisions.41  
Still, federal appellate courts have been unanimous that disparate impact is cognizable 
under the FHA, but with different standards of proof and review, until HUD implemented 
a new rule in 2013.42   
After forty years of judicial standards enforcing disparate impact standards 
derived from interpretation of the FHA, Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities would be the first time the Supreme Court weighed in 
on disparate impact under the FHA.   Disparate impact analyses are a courts way of 
engaging a sociological, quantitative, or even historical lens, in examining what housing 
practices have a discriminatory effect.  With established appellate case law, 
commentators were pessimistic when the Court accepted review,43 but as the next section 
explores, the Court surprisingly reinforced and centralized a disparate impact standard. 
                                                 
40 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of 
Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 Am. U.L. Rev. 357, 361-62 (2013). 
41 Id. at 393. 
42 Id. at 403. 
43 See e.g. Rigel C. Oliveri, Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing Movement Can Move On, 54 
WASHBURN L.J. 625, 625-626 (2015) (noting the conservative majority of Justices and recent decisions 
removing antidiscrimination law, “the Supreme Court may well pose an existential threat” to disparate 
impact); Cornelius J. Murray IV, Promoting “Inclusive Communities”: A Modified Approach to Disparate 
Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 75 LA. L. REV. 213, 232 (2014) (describing Inclusive Communities as 
the “potential knockout blow” to disparate impact under the FHA); Valerie Schneider, In Defense of 
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4.2 Disparate Impact under the Fair Housing Act 
Inclusive Communities presents a seemingly straightforward question of statutory 
construction; can the statute be read to allow claims of disparate impact?  Fundamentally, 
this is a question of method and fit—what legal approach best addresses problems of 
housing discrimination and segregation, and did Congress intend to facilitate such an 
approach?  Both the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (Texas) and 
the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP) agree the Fair Housing Act (FHA) was meant to 
address segregation by outlawing discrimination on the basis of race.  The dispute comes 
from the scope of the solution.   
The FHA gives a broad prohibition against discrimination, making it unlawful to 
“refuse to sell or rent. . . Or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. [or] to 
discriminate against any person [housing] because of race.”44  From the passage of the 
FHA, courts have interpreted these blanket statements against discrimination in housing 
to encompass both specific instances (discriminatory intent) and systemic issues 
(discriminatory effect or disparate impact).   
Texas, and its amici, embraces only the intent-based description of the issue, 
going as far as to say that disparate impact claims create a “constitutional quagmire.”45  
                                                 
Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing Act, 
79 MO. L. REV. 540, 544 fn. 8 (2014) (describing the Supreme Court’s “apparent interest in limiting 
disparate impact”). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 
45 Brief for Petitioner at 25, TDHCA v. Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ____ (2015) (No. 13-1371). 
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This near sighted, colorblind approach requires a conceptualization of racism as only 
individual acts of meanness, and frames any sort of consideration of race as an odious, 
unconstitutional practice in violation of the Equal Protection clause.  Conversely, the 
disparate impact paradigm does not exclude an intent-based approach; it adds 
consideration of racially discriminatory consequences.  Few housing authorities openly 
discuss how they intentionally deny housing or divide communities because of race.   
Instead, disparate impact litigation attempts to determine a statistical link between 
policies and practices in housing and their effect based on race.  The Housing and Urban 
Development regulations at the center of this litigation defined discriminatory effect as: 
a practice . . . [which] actually or predictably results in a disparate impact 
on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates 
segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin.46  
 
Defendants may raise a “legally sufficient justification” by showing that the underlying 
practice is “necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests” that could not be achieved by a less discriminatory alternative.47  Plaintiffs have 
a burden of proving “that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a 
discriminatory effect,” which in turn shifts the burden of proof to the defendant’s legally 
sufficient justification, though the court may still find the practice may be served by a 
less discriminatory alternative.48  
                                                 
46 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2014). 
47 Id. At § 100.500(b). 
48 Id. at § 100.500(c). 
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This regulation codifies a statistical burden of proof to indicate a direct 
relationship between a practice and racial discrimination or disparities.  As a burden of 
proof, it is appropriately vague to facilitate application in different cases.  There is no 
strict requirement of statistical correlation, significance, or method of showing the 
discriminatory effect in question.  Rather, the rule requires a causal link: “caused or 
predictably will cause.”49  Comments at the publication of the rule emphasize claims 
should not involve “hypothetical or speculative” discrimination or justifications, but must 
involve evidence.50   
Although these claims involve statistical evidence, notions of “proof” and “cause” 
are used in their legal, not statistical sense.  Requiring evidence and avoiding 
hypothetical are meant to avoid speculation and restrict litigation to actual cases and 
controversies between parties that have been injured in some way—ensuring parties have 
standing to sue.51  Cause is a legal requirement, not statistical one; courts are looking for 
statistically significant correlation that explains a relationship, not an absolute causal 
chain.52  In disparate impact cases this does not merely mean that there is an uneven 
distribution; merely showing 58% on one side of town and 42% on another is not 
evidence of discrimination.  Rather, the HUD rule and disparate impact claims identify 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Department of Housing and Urban Development, Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effects Standard; Final Rule, 78 Fed.Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (Codified at 24 C.F.R. Pt. 
100). 
51 U.S. Const. Art. III., § 2, Cl. 1. 
52 See e.g. Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 
773 (2009). 
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different factors in housing segregation; interrogating the relationships between these 
policies and race, and whether this relationship is acceptable under the Fair Housing Act.   
4.2.1 Interpreting Statutes and Regulations 
Nowhere in the FHA is there an explicit statement of disparate impact.  The 
disparate impact theory of liability developed shortly after the FHA became law.  
However, when this standard was interpreted under other anti-discrimination laws, the 
Court relied on the phrase “otherwise adversely affect” to indicate that the legislation 
targets discrimination both in intent and effects, and thus “compel[s] recognition of 
disparate-impact liability.”53  Unfortunately, the FHA never uses the key “otherwise 
adversely affect” phrase.  This lack of a key statutory phrase was a central point of 
contention in Texas’ certiorari54 and merits briefs.55  Without the accepted key phrase, 
there is more room for interpretation of the statutory language and purpose, since the 
Court’s decision is no longer so strictly limited by precedent. 
Yet interpreting the language of a statute is never as simple as reading the text and 
consulting a dictionary, no matter how many textualists are on the bench.  Rather, the 
Court typically refers to the legislative history, drafting documents, and previous 
opinions of the Court interpreting similar phrases.  In this case, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion finds the FHA’s use of “otherwise make unavailable” sufficiently 
                                                 
53 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 10, (comparing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005) (a 
disparate impact claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) and Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 (a 
disparate impact claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act)). 
54 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No.  13-1371). 
55 Brief for the Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371). 
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analogous to the “otherwise adversely affect” language, based on primary and secondary 
documents surrounding the passage of the FHA and previous opinions of the Court and 
courts of appeals.  Citing to largely the same primary and secondary sources, Justices 
Thomas and Alito completely disagree with Justice Kennedy’s conclusions, arguing that 
the “because of race” language that precedes the “otherwise make unavailable” limits the 
FHA to only discriminatory intent.  A seemingly straightforward question of textual 
interpretation becomes part of a network of statutory language, interpretations of other 
cases involving similar statutory language like Griggs or Smith, and secondary sources. 
4.2.1.1 "Otherwise Make Unavailable" 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion reflects the respondent ICP’s line of 
argument, joined by various amici, that draws parallels between the “otherwise adversely 
affects” language approved of if previous disparate impact cases and the “otherwise make 
unavailable” language in the FHA.  Justice Kennedy begins this argument by 
contextualizing the FHA through the Kerner Commission report.56  Almost all of the 
amicus briefs in support of disparate impact emphasized the purpose of the FHA:  
desegregating housing and removing obstacles to housing for people of color.57  Amici 
even included the drafters and sponsors the FHA, who bluntly stated it was their intent to 
remedy racial housing disparities and discriminatory effects.58 
                                                 
56 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 5-7. 
57 By my analysis, 16 of the 19 briefs in favor of respondent discussed the purpose of the Fair Housing Act, 
compared with 9 of the 16 briefs in support of petitioner. 
58 Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Inclusive 
Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 3. 
 155 
Even though it was not the same “otherwise adversely effect” language that has 
triggered disparate impact previously, the legislative history, statutory context, and 
purpose show “otherwise make unavailable” is sufficient to trigger disparate impact 
litigation.  Justice Kennedy resolves the issue primarily through case law and 
comparative analysis in the same way that ICP and its amici resolved the issue; applying 
the reasoning of Griggs and Smith, comparing statutory language of the FHA, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.59  Although the 
language is not identical, Justice Kennedy reasons that using the exact language “would 
have made the relevant sentence awkward and unclear.”60  Making it unlawful to 
‘otherwise adversely affect a dwelling’ “would be grammatically obtuse, difficult to 
interpret, and far more expansive in scope than Congress likely intended.”61  We see how 
proper grammar pays dividends, as part of the justification for preserving a statutory 
scheme that comprehends systemic racism.    
Justices Thomas and Alito present contrary interpretations to largely the same 
body of evidence.  Justice Thomas bluntly asks the court to “drop the pretense that 
Griggs’ interpretation of Title VII was legitimate.”62   Justice Alito extensively compares 
Griggs, Smith, and the FHA, but concludes that “make unavailable” is really an intent 
                                                 
59 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 12. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 1 (Thomas, J. Dissenting). 
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requirement due to the “because of” language.63  What Justice Kennedy and the majority 
interpreted as a causal link,64 Justice Alito reads as a very strict intent requirement that 
necessitates direct actions and actors.65  This obfuscates the entire purpose of Fair 
Housing, and even racial discrimination in housing.  Although it makes for great fiction, 
racism was not engineered by a secret cabal who documented their illicit practices.  
Racism, and especially housing discrimination, was created openly and notoriously in its 
time as part of a white supremacist ideology of segregation that was put in to practice and 
made law by legislatures throughout the country.  Law permits racial discrimination, even 
where segregation was not mandated and even now that segregation is unconstitutional.  
Housing discrimination in modern time relies on unspoken assertions and assumptions 
about people of color, like presumptions of criminality, that can go unpunished if 
unspoken.  Using to a broad disparate impact standard asserts that housing discrimination 
and segregation are unconstitutional in principle, while using Justice Alito and Thomas’ 
strict intent standard only recognizes the unconstitutionality of discrimination in very 
specific practices. 
4.2.1.2 The 1988 Amendments 
Interpreting the FHA also requires considering Congressional silence.  Congress 
did not mention disparate impact within the original text of the FHA, which makes sense 
considering disparate impact emerges from Griggs, three years after the Civil Rights Act 
                                                 
63 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 7 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
64 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 20. 
65 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 8 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
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and FHA became law.66  Once Griggs was decided, lower courts heard disparate impact 
claims under Title VII, Fair Housing, and other nondiscrimination laws, to varying 
degrees of success.67  By the 1980s, disparate impact litigation under the FHA was well 
established in district and appellate case law.  Every  appellate court reviewing a 
disparate impact claim accepted Griggs and its applicability to the FHA.68  According to 
Stacy Seicschnaydre, disparate impact had its highest rate of success in the 1970s and 
1980s, with plaintiffs succeeding in 12 of the 19 cases reviewed, with declining success 
for plaintiffs ever since.69  In 1988, Congress amended the FHA to add prohibitions on 
discrimination on the basis of “handicap” and “familial status,”70 as well as three 
exemptions to liability—number of occupants, drug distribution, and for appraisers.71 
                                                 
66 Justice Ginsburg made this point explicit at oral argument, calling it “a little artificial” to say whether 
Congress meant to say disparate impact at the time of the statute.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16,  
Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (No. 13-1371). 
67 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738-7399 
(2006) (summarizing district and appellate court decisions under disparate impact, showing a 19.2% 
success rate at the appellate level, and a 25.1% success rate at the district court level) and Seicshnaydre, 
supra note 40, at 400-403 (noting that disparate impact claims under fair housing do not have a high 
success rate, but claims challenging barriers to housing had a 44.4% percent success rate at the appellate 
level). 
68 See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F. 2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F. 2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977); Smith v. Clarkton, 682 F. 2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); Hanson v. 
Veterans Administration, 800 F. 2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F. 2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986); 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F. 2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Black Jack, 508 F. 2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F. 2d 1305 (9th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F. 2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984). 
69 Seicshnaydre, supra note 40, at 393-94. 
70 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.  100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620 (1988). 
71 Id. at 1622-23. 
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Despite these changes, Congress kept the same language for discrimination and 
liability.  Justices Kagan and Sotomayor pressed the issue at oral argument, particularly 
since the exemptions remove areas of litigation that could be used in a disparate impact 
analysis.72  Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion agreed, the failure to remove 
disparate impact by amendment indicates its presence in the statute: “Congress was aware 
of this unanimous precedent [in appellate courts]. . . And made a considered judgment to 
retain the relevant statutory text.”73  Congress could have changed the statute to remove 
disparate impact, since the courts were so clearly following the standard, but did not.   
Conversely, Petitioners and their amici held staunchly to Congress’ silence on 
creating a disparate impact standard.  At oral argument, Petitioner Texas introduced 
O’Gilvie v. United States  as a justification  that Congress’ silence may simply have been 
Congress leaving the law where it found it.74  Justice Alito’s dissent uses O’Gilvie to 
draw parallels between the punitive damages amendment in O’Gilvie and the 1988 FHA 
amendments.75  Justice Alito’s parallels overlook the O’Gilvie court’s reasoning that “the 
law was indeed uncertain at the time”76 of amendment, necessitating clarification—here, 
courts may have accepted and rejected claims of disparate impact, but no court doubted 
that the claim itself is cognizable under the FHA.   
                                                 
72 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (No. 13-1371). 
73 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 13-14. 
74 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (No. 13-1371). 
75 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 18 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
76 O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1996). 
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Debating the purpose of the 1988 amendments reveals the relationship between 
knowledges developed in the Courts and Congress for statutory analysis.  Justices 
Kennedy and Alito both rely on the congressional record at the time of the amendments.  
Justice Alito reads the floor debates over disparate impact liability against the 1988 
amendments and sees “all the hallmarks of a compromise” between proponents of 
disparate impact and those who wanted to reduce the FHA to strictly intent-based 
paradigms.77  However, the inclusion of exemptions for areas that might otherwise 
correlate with race indicate to Justice Kennedy, that Congress ratified disparate impact by 
narrowing the scope of disparate impact liability.78 
Ultimately the statutory interpretation comes down to a legal conceptualization of 
racism and standards of proof.  If racism is individual acts of meanness, then for anything 
to be done “because of” race means an individual choice was made to engage in 
discrimination in each instance of racial discrimination.  If racism can be institutional or 
systemic, then discrimination “because of” race contemplates broader connections and 
relationships.  Justice Alito’s emphasis on individual intent ignores the congressional 
purpose Justice Kennedy centralizes in his opinion: the FHA exists to remedy housing 
discrimination and widespread discrimination caused, in part, by governmental policy.  
Changing histories of segregation and discrimination is no small task, but Congressional 
policy at the passage of the FHA aimed at that ultimate purpose.  Disparate impact 
                                                 
77 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 17 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
78 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 14. 
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emerged as a potential tool in combating discrimination because it understands racism to 
be ingrained in decision making processes, even those that are not overtly racist.   
This textual dispute between “otherwise make unavailable” and “because of” 
shows an epistemological and ontological clash over the methods used for demonstrating 
racism and discrimination.  It revolves around a conceptualization of race as individual 
acts of meanness, represented by Justices Alito and Thomas, against a more contextual 
history of discrimination and attempts at remedying the lasting effects of racist policies, 
represented by Justice Kennedy and the majority opinion.  This textual dispute evokes a 
scientific debate in the standard of proof, whether race and racial discrimination can be 
shown by statistical evidence.  But before incorporating social sciences into a discussion 
of disparate impact and race, the Court must first operationalize—defining the 
measurement or meaning of—race and discrimination in housing. 
4.2.2 What's Race Got to do with it? 
Unfortunately, in operationalizing race, the Roberts Court tends to conflate race 
and racism.79  Considering race in determining how to remedy histories of segregation 
and racial discrimination are made equivalent to racism in the eyes of the Court.  
Remember Chief Justice Roberts’ wonderfully circular conceptualization of race and 
                                                 
79 See Sumi Cho, Postracialism, 94 IOWA L. REV 1589, 1594 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but 
Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L.REV. 653 (2015) 
(the Court’s recent opinions on race reflect that racial equality is a goal, but must be achieved through 
“race-neutral” criteria); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 
961-962 (2008)(describing the Roberts Court’s preference for reading the Fourteenth Amendment as 
colorblindness, countering that when Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment it did not engage in 
race-neutral policies, but created programs explicitly to benefit people based on race); and john a. powell, 
Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DEN. U.L. REV. 785, 787 (2009) (”The conservative uses 
colorblindness not just as a bar to engage the issue of race, but also as a justification to preclude any 
intervention”). 
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racism: “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race.”80  In this view, even the use of race to contemplate programs that 
would remedy histories of white supremacy and racial oppression are, in fact, racist and 
unconstitutional because they consider race.  Chief Justice Roberts’ race-blind approach 
to racial discrimination subverts the goals of remedial policy and reinstates the norms of 
white supremacy in society.  Failing to consider race, in any respect, decontextualizes 
racial discrimination; turning a policy like Fair Housing, meant to remedy a history of 
discrimination against people of color, into a toothless procedure that bars only the most 
blatant individualized racism while remaining apathetic to the ongoing, systematic 
function of white supremacy, segregation, and racialized poverty in housing.  
In Inclusive Communities, the HUD regulation at issue violates Chief Justice 
Roberts’ race-blind preferences by requiring a court to consider race in the presentation 
of statistical evidence of disparate impact and in determining a less discriminatory 
alternative in a burden-shifting framework.  Considering race in statistical evidence 
means not only defining race as a factor for analysis, but in an advanced statistical 
analysis that could identify how race is a statistically significant factor in housing 
disparities, requires significant consideration of race and circumstances that could work 
as intervening variables or lead to spurious correlations.  Furthermore, the search for a 
less discriminatory alternative under the HUD regulation consideration of disparate 
impact requires some consideration of race to determine what alternatives are more or 
                                                 
80 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768. 
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less discriminatory.  Chief Justice Roberts’ approach to race in the Supreme Court is 
playing an incredibly high stakes game of Taboo,81 where all parties must attempt to 
guess a remedy for racial discrimination without ever naming “race.”  Ignoring race 
cannot prevent, remedy, or even describe racial discrimination. 
Disparate impact and social scientific analyses reveal the ways in which race 
effects and influences society, even when race is not explicitly mentioned.  
Discrimination case law, particularly under the Roberts Court, has evolved into the search 
for “race-neutral” solutions that ignore or obfuscate the continuing significance of race 
and racism.  This line of thought frames race itself as the problem, conflating any 
consideration of race with racism.  The Roberts approach to racial discrimination 
envisions the Civil Rights movement as a clean slate for the United States; because policy 
has changed, slightly, there is no more need to remedy, rectify, or even consider the way 
that racism and white supremacy have shaped outcomes, lived experiences, and futures 
for people of color.  This leaves a status quo of racial inequality and racial inequities 
intact, while claiming success for having passed legislation that is consistently narrowed 
in applicability and consideration.82 
                                                 
81 For all those who have never played the board game Taboo, the board game is played by two opposing 
teams trying to earn the most points by correctly guessing the word on a card.  In each round, one member 
of a team gives clues to their teammates, trying to get them to say the word on the card without ever saying 
the actual word or a list of “taboo” words provided on the card.  Each team gains a point by correctly 
guessing a word, but loses a point if the clue giver says the word or taboo words on a card.  Hasbro, Taboo 
Instructions (2000) available at https://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/Taboo(2000).PDF.    
82 For a fuller analysis of the Roberts Court’s early penchant for postracialism see Cho, supra note 79, at 
1621 (noting Chief Justice Roberts is ‘quite adept’ at moral equivalences between racial remediation and 
racial discrimination).  See also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009)(concluding that New Haven took 
“impermissible. . . race-based action” in throwing out test results for promotion of firefighters because the 
test a severe statistical disparity in favor of white firefighters); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 133 
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Central to the legal significance of race at the Robert’s court, particularly in 
Inclusive Communities, is the division of “race-neutral” and “race-conscious” policies 
and practices.  In this context, race-neutral, or colorblind, policy theoretically does not 
mention or state race within the text or as a factor, but is somehow supposed to remedy 
racial discrimination.  In Inclusive Communities, race-neutral is described as a goal of 
anti-discrimination and civil rights laws; following Justice Roberts’ goals of post-
racialism and colorblindness.  Parties opposed to disparate impact are concerned that 
acknowledging statistical disparities may “compel race-conscious decisions,” which 
supposedly violate the Fourteenth Amendment.83  Respondent ICP and its amici highlight 
the importance of considering race in meeting the goals of the FHA,84, remedying racial 
discrimination, and in rooting out facially neutral policies that create significant racial 
disparities using disparate impact.85  
                                                 
S. Ct. 1236 (2013) (finding the coverage formula in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional 
because of its outdated data). 
83 See e.g. Brief for Petitioner, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 65-66. 
84 See Brief for Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 63. 
85 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Housing Equality Center of Pennsylvania in Support of Respondent, 
Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) (reviewing examples of litigation where facially 
neutral policies disproportionately effect families based on race and family size, and the importance of 
disparate impact in combating those policies); Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus 
Curiae In Support of Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 11-12 (noting the 
Equal Protection clause explicitly rejected language that would outlaw the consideration of race), Brief of 
Students from the New York University School of Law Seminar on Critical Narratives in Civil Rights as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent , Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) (discussing 
racial disparities and discrimination in other facially neutral practices like felony status, jury selection, and 
welfare); Brief for John R. Dunne, J. Stanley Pottinger, Victoria Schultz, James P. Turner, Brian K. 
Landsberg, and Joan A. Magagna as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 
U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) (former Department of Justice officials noting that individual racial classifications 
trigger strict scrutiny and usually violate equal protection, while “mere” race consciousness does not) 
 164 
In contrast, race consciousness is given a negative connotation by those opposed 
to the consideration of race.  Compare the uses of “race-conscious” by petitioners, 
respondents, and their respective amici, demonstrated by word trees in figures 7 and 8.  
 
Figure 6: Word tree of "race-conscious" in briefs supporting the petitioner 
Arguments for the petitioner in figure 7 are certain of the unconstitutionality of race-
consciousness, with many arguing that disparate impact will compel governments and 
private actors to consider race “in order to avoid” liability.86  Figure 7 demonstrates how 
Texas and its amici frequently link race-consciousness to unconstitutional decision-
making, making it seem as if even thinking of race is what causes their actions to have 
discriminatory effects.  Notably, arguments for petitioner do not deny that their actions 
                                                 
86 See e.g. Brief for Petitioner, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 65-66; Brief of 
Amicus Curiae American Civil Rights Union in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. 
___ (No. 13-1371); Brief for the American Financial Services Association, the Consumer Mortgage 
Coalition, the Independent Community Bankers of America, and the Mortgage Bankers Association as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, Inc., in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive 
Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. And Allied 
Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, CATO institute, Individual Rights Foundation, Reason Foundation, Project 21, and Atlantic Legal 
Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371). 
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have discriminatory effect, but that providing disparate impact will force them to 
consider race.  In other words, if they are forced to think about race they could be found 
liable for racist actions, and this, to petitioner and their amici, is bad.  This 
oversimplification demonstrates the problematic association with racism and intent.  If 
racism is reduced only to intent, or something that exists in the minds of someone who 
acts (consciously or unconsciously), then it becomes an unthinkable tautology—so long 
as a person, government, or institution is not thinking about race, their actions cannot be 
considered racist.  Thus race-consciousness paradoxically becomes the culprit for racism, 
rather than parties, like petitioner and their amici, who enable racism and white 
supremacy by harshly enforcing the status quo. 
 
Figure 7: Word tree of "race-conscious" in briefs supporting the respondent 
Respondent and their amici in figure 8, above, demonstrate a broader discussion 
surrounding race-conscious actions, but mostly centered on efforts, decisions, and 
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measures that are meant to remedy racial discrimination.87  In this view, race-
consciousness is a necessary part of the measurement process.  There is no asserted 
causal relationship between the consideration of race and racist action, but that the 
consideration of race permits measures to address, ensure, or otherwise remedy issues of 
racism and racial discrimination. 
Disparate impact litigation necessitates some form of race consciousness because 
the analysis involves consideration of race as a factor.  For Justice Kennedy, who has 
almost always sided with the colorblind wing of the Court,88 considering race in disparate 
impact does not undermine his belief in race-neutral remedies, seen below in figure 9.  
 
Figure 8: Justice Kennedy "race-neutral" word tree. 
                                                 
87 Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae In Support of Respondent, Inclusive 
Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief for John R. Dunne, J. Stanley Pottinger, Victoria Schultz, 
James P. Turner, Brian K. Landsberg, and Joan A. Magagna as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Inclusive Communities, 576 
U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Community Land Trust Network in Support of 
Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief of Sutdents from the New York 
University School of Law Seminar on Critical Narratives in Civil Rights as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Breif for Citites of San Francisco; 
Atlanta; Baltimore; Boston; Birmingham, Alabama; Carrboro; Chapel Hill; Columbia, South Carolina; 
Dubuque; Durham; Flint; Los Angeles; Memphis; Miami; Miami Gardens; New Haven; New York; 
Oakland; Philadelphia; Seattle; and Toledo and King County Washington as Amici Curiae in Suppot of 
Respondent the Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371). 
88 Erwin Chemerinsky, The 2016 Election, the Supreme Court, and Racial Justice, 83 U.CHI. L.REV. Online 
49, 52 (2016) (“since coming on the Court in 1988, Kennedy had never voted to uphold an affirmative 
action plan—not in education, not in contracting, not in employment—until Fisher v University of Texas at 
Austin13 was decided on June 23, 2016). 
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Instead, Justice Kennedy frames disparate impact as a race-neutral tool.  Disparate impact 
is used to identify policies that create disparities, but liability is not “so expansive as to 
inject racial considerations into every housing decision.”89  Though he never mentions 
race-conscious policy, for better or worse, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion centralizes 
the importance of diversity and combating “racial isolation” using disparate impact with 
racial considerations.90  Remedying histories of racial discrimination necessarily require 
taking some account of race, but for Justice Kennedy “mere awareness of race in 
attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at the 
outset.”91  For a Justice that regularly subscribed to colorblindness, “mere awareness” of 
race is a large departure from a totalizing race-neutral view.  Justice Kennedy has opened 
his mind to the consideration of race—even if it is a mere awareness—opening doors for 
scientific evidence to inform, educate, or just demonstrate the ongoing significance of 
race in society.  Mere awareness is not enough to start remedying the long history of 
racist, white supremacist policies and practices that created problems in housing 
discrimination and segregation in the first place, but it does signal more open standards 
for the types of evidence considered at the Supreme Court. 
For any kind of statistical analysis on race to take place, race must be 
operationalized—racial meaning must be given some form to identify disparities in their 
historical origin or meaning.  Advancing the colorblind, race-neutral view of Justices 
                                                 
89 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 21. 
90 Id. at 23. 
91 Id. 
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Thomas and Alito’s dissents would remove consideration of racialized effects of housing 
policies and practices from a statute designed to consider and combat the racialized 
effects of housing policies and practices—unless there is a stated intent to discriminate.92  
Reducing racism to individual acts of meanness, particularly in Fair Housing Legislation 
which is explicitly aimed at remedying systematic racism, is a conceptual mismatch.   
Justice Kennedy’s re-framing of disparate impact as a race-neutral tool is an 
acknowledgment of disparate impact as social scientific method—a means of analyzing a 
social issue or problem.  Affirming a disparate impact analysis does not proscribe a set 
disparity or scenario that would statistically indicate discrimination.  Instead, Inclusive 
Communities affirms statistics as a legally significant and sufficient approach to 
considering racial discrimination in housing.  This means taking a holistic view of racism 
in housing, considering both the racist realtor and the policy that disproportionately 
directs funding and resources to some communities rather than others.  To approach 
disparate impact without an understanding of race and racism as systemic and 
institutional, particularly in housing, is to miss the forest for the trees—narrowly focusing 
on specific acts without understanding their connections.  Incorporating disparate impact 
expands the Court’s frame of racism in housing, accepting that there are circumstances 
when people are effected by racism without an individualized act and intent.  The Court’s 
                                                 
92 See e.g. Inclusive Communities, slip op. at 8 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (arguing that “the fact that a practice 
has a disparate impact is not conclusive evidence. . . that a practice is discriminatory,” while noting the 
Court’s “role in the development” of housing discrimination.); and Inclusive Communities, slip op. at 5 
(Alito, J. dissenting) (“Congress accordingly outlawed the covered actions only when they are motivated by 
race or one of the other protected characteristics”). 
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conceptualization of race thus necessarily colors it’s understanding of data, particularly in 
framing intent, effects, neutrality, or consciousness.   
4.2.3 Significant Statistics and Statistical Significance 
The Court’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act and its ontological 
assumptions about race set boundaries for statistical evidence of disparate impact.  Even 
data, terms, or theories well accepted within social sciences may be disregarded if they do 
not match the Court’s understanding of the problem.  In law, the Supreme Court is the 
ultimate authority; no matter how rigorous, valid, or thorough the research.   
Ultimately, this was the lesson of McCleskey v. Kemp, when the Court refused to 
“infer a discriminatory purpose” in Georgia’s death penalty sentencing practices, despite 
the Baldus study’s statistically significant findings that Black defendants with white 
victims were 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death than Black defendants with 
Black victims after controlling for other potential intervening factors.93  Although the 
Court acknowledged the findings, methods, and evidence, because the Baldus study did 
not “prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions” there was no 
“constitutionally significant risk of racial bias.”94  The statistically significant increase in 
death sentences by race, dramatically increasing the number of Black men killed by the 
death penalty in Georgia, was not deemed constitutionally significant because it did not 
fit within the Court’s framing of race and the constitution. 
                                                 
93 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) 
94 Id. at 308, 313. 
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Here, there is not a specific study indicating a systematic disparity, but an 
argument over whether studies can be proof of discrimination in housing in the first 
place.  Inclusive Communities centers on a HUD regulation implementing a burden 
shifting framework for disparate impact, but the actual statistics become a key point of 
contention in determining whether disparate impact is a workable standard.  As always, 
the litany of numbers, statistics, and quantitative data presented are meaningless without 
context and analysis.  Data not only refers to the statistical analyses presented before the 
court, but also the authorities used by the Court.   
As discussed in Chapter 3, Decisions of the Court are grounded in evidence from 
a variety of sources.  While the Court may not hear original research or testimony, it is 
nevertheless inundated with arguments, data, and analysis in any given case.  In Inclusive 
Communities, the Court received 36 amicus briefs, 19 in support of the respondent, 16 in 
support of the petitioner, and one in support of affirmance.  These are in addition to the 
merits briefs from each side, and any independent research from a Justice or clerk. 
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Figure 9: Hierarchy Chart of authorities in Inclusive Communities opinions. 
As Figure 9 illustrates, the opinions in Inclusive Communities draw the most from 
case law, heavily emphasizing Supreme Court precedent and cases from Courts of 
Appeals.  Surprisingly, there is a sizable amount of authority coming from external or 
empirical analyses,95 particularly in the dissenting opinions by Justices Alito and 
Thomas.  I assumed that these conservative Justices would rely more strictly on tradition, 
the opinions of the Court and constitutional or statutory texts, rather than drawing on 
                                                 
95 For complete definitions see supra Intermission: Nvivo Codes and Cases and infra Appendices A, B. 
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external data to make their point.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, Figure 10, 
occasionally steps into external data, but focuses mostly on case law, statutory authority, 
and the congressional record.  Compare this with Justices Thomas’ and Alito’s dissenting 
opinions, Figures 11 and 12, which supplement case law with extensive external analysis. 
 
Figure 10: Hierarchy Chart of Sources of Authority used by Justice Kennedy 
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Figure 11: Hierarchy Chart of Sources of Authority used by Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas, an extremely-conservative originalist, has become known for 
prioritizing his own interpretation of the constitution over that of previous decisions of 
the Court.96  After dismissing Griggs as wrongly decided, Justice Thomas’ dissent rejects 
                                                 
96 See e.g. Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas has his Own Constitution, THE NEW YORKER (June 30, 2016) 
(available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/clarence-thomas-has-his-own-constitution); 
and Lincoln Caplan, Clarence Thomas’s Brand of Judicial Logic, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Oct. 22, 2011) 
(available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/opinion/sunday/clarence-thomass-brand-of-judicial-
logic.html). 
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disparate impact again because it “defies not only the statutory text, but reality itself.”97 
Justice Thomas’ dissent is a reification of racial disparities, arguing that such imbalances 
are not only natural, but argues that racial minorities are not always disfavored around the 
world98—drawing on, if not outright paraphrasing and citing the same sources as, the 
writings of Black conservative  economist Thomas Sowell.99.  In Justice Thomas’ view, 
statistical disparities indicated by disparate impact analyses are meaningless before a 
court without some showing of discriminatory intent.100   
                                                 
97 Inclusive Communities, Slip Op. at 8 (Thomas, J. Dissenting). 
98 Id. at 8-9. 
99 Compare Id. with Thomas Sowell, THE THOMAS SOWELL READER 291 (2011). 
100 Inclusive Communities, slip op. at 8. 
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Figure 12: Hierarchy Chart of Sources of Authority used by Justice Alito 
In an odd twist, precedent, case law, and statutory reasoning saved disparate 
impact, with dubious social science research playing a key role in the case against 
disparate impact.  Not only does this undermine my own assumptions about scientific 
evidence at the Court, but it overlooks the immense weight of scientific evidence in favor 
of disparate impact and the dearth of scientific evidence against disparate impact 
presented in amici briefs.  Unlike the Brandies brief, which used scientific evidence to 
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push the law to change with society,101 the conservative Justices’ paradoxically use 
scientific evidence to argue against using scientific evidence.  In Inclusive Communities, 
scientific evidence is more often used to entrench existing racial disparities than support a 
rule that would undermine the long history of racialized housing segregation in Texas.  
Yet at the end of the case, the disparate impact standard for scientific evidence remains, 
despite the scientific evidence presented against it.  
4.2.3.1 Sporting Percentages 
Statistical analyses, especially those presented in disparate impact claims, are 
more than simple comparisons of percentages.  Disparate impact usually involves 
advanced statistical techniques like multiple regression.   Multiple regression analyses in 
the Supreme Court appear in cases involving discrimination in some form (race, sex, age, 
etc.), because multiple regression analyses have the power to indicate the potential effects 
of social classifications like race, sex, or age, on outcomes like income.102  Disparate 
impact cases typically use multivariate regression, because the technique estimates the 
statistical significance of different variables like race, income, geography, age, or any 
                                                 
101 See Angelo Ancheta, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 29 (2006); David L. 
Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 
38 EMORY L. J. 1005, 1008 (1989); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 359, 365 (2008)(also noting Brandies’ predominantly female research team which 
crafted the scientific argument presented before the Court); Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and 
the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 59, 88 (2013). 
102 Daniel L. Rubinfield, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 211 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 2011); PAUL D. ALLISON, MULTIPLE REGRESSION: A 
PRIMER 16 (1997); Brief of Ian Ayres as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 
576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) (describing rigorous statistical techniques, including regression, used to make 
disparate impact analyses). See also County of Washington v. Gunther, 421 U.S. 161 (1981) (finding that 
claims of “discriminatory undercompensation” are valid, respondents used multiple regression analysis in 
expressing the effect of sex on pay, though the court did not factor this in to its final determination). 
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quantifiable variable in the analysis.103  Statistical significance does not mean that it is the 
most or least important issue in the analysis, but that you can reject the “null hypothesis” 
that a variable has no effect.104  Statistical analysis of race in this context therefore 
affirms the need for race conscious policies, since rejecting the null hypothesis simply 
means that, statistically, there is evidence that race effects the studied outcome. 
Despite the litany of statistical tests available, the Court and many of the amici in 
Inclusive Communities, rely on directly comparing percentages, which does little more 
than indicate the possibility of an idea.  Amici on both sides argued over the statistical 
tests best suited for disparate impact, most notably Ian Ayer’s amicus brief responding to 
the amicus brief of James P. Scanlan.  Though the brief of James P. Scanlan goes at 
length about statistics being insufficient to measure disparate impact,105 he fails to discuss 
regression or statistical significance, both of which are well accepted scientific measures 
of disparate impact.106  Using only basic statistical comparisons can indicate a potential 
disparity, but techniques like multivariate regression can indicate statistically significant 
                                                 
103 Importantly the p-values in a multiple regression indicate the level of statistical significance, generally 
accepted in most social sciences at a .05 level.  So long as the p-value is less than .05, the variable is 
deemed statistically significant, though some studies and fields require higher threshold for significance at 
.005 or .001. See also ALLISON, MULTIPLE REGRESSION AT 16; Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple 
Regression, at 321. 
104 Rubenfeld, supra note 95, at 321; Terance D. Miethe and Jane Florence Gauthier, SIMPLE STATISTICS 
APPLICATIONS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 156-57 (2008). 
105 Brief for James P. Scanlan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. 
___ (No. 13-1371). 
106 Brief for Ian Ayers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ 
(No. 13-1371). 
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variables, allowing parties and courts to measure to what extent race, income, familial 
status, or other variables effect housing options. 
However, the dissenting opinions in Inclusive Communities present statistical 
disparities of their own to counter disparate impact.  Justice Thomas notes that “for 
roughly a quarter-century now, over 70 percent of the National Basketball Association 
players have been black.”107  Justice Alito also goes for the sports comparison, “of the 32 
college players selected by the National Football League (NFL) teams in the first round 
of the 2015 draft, it appears that the overwhelming majority were members of racial 
minorities.”108  Justice Thomas and Alito’s un-scientific analyses of the prevalence of 
Black and Brown athletes in professional sports leagues is used to refute disparate impact 
in housing—pitting professions where there is a prominence of people of color against 
policies that disproportionately exclude people of color from housing opportunities.  
Small areas of success are used against prevailing social inequalities, feeding into myths 
of exceptionalism.  Because there are relatively more Black professional athletes in two 
sports, significant housing disparities are normalized and legitimized.  
Justice Alito and Thomas’ hypotheticals are supposed to show how disparities are 
not necessarily “because of” race but race can be a statistically significant factor in 
professional sports, especially when intersecting with other statuses like class or family 
status.109  Here the use of statistics is not to facilitate changes in law or policy for the 
                                                 
107 Inclusive Communities, slip op. at 9 (Thomas, J. Dissenting). 
108 Inclusive Communities, slip op. At 9 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
109 Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow and Jimi Adams. Hoop inequalities: Race, class and family structure 
background and the odds of playing in the National Basketball Association. 47 International Review for the 
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benefit of those disadvantaged, but to remove beneficial standards under the illusion of 
colorblindness.  Both Justices, in this case and others, advocate for an exclusively intent-
based analysis of discrimination.  Their percentages in representation in the NFL and 
NBA are not indicative of any kind of discrimination, but bare statistics to imply that 
racial disparities may simply be the result of meritocratic processes since “teams chose 
the players they think are most likely to help them win games.”110  Implying meritocracy, 
even within professional sports, is an attempt to cover the fact that statistical disparities 
can indicate larger social problems when properly analyzed. 
4.2.3.2 Avoiding Pretext 
Disparate impact and statistical analyses can be designed to reveal how facially 
neutral tests, measures, and policy have disproportionate effect on racialized, gendered, 
or otherwise marginalized peoples.  The illusions of meritocracy like in Justice Thomas 
and Alito’s hypotheticals gloss over the fact that statistical disparities in particular 
contexts can be indicative of larger issues.  In Inclusive Communities, the statistical 
disparity is rooted in the distribution of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs), 
which disproportionately favor concentrating people of color in communities separate 
from whites.111  Here the disparate impact analysis was triggered by the Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) point-system and 
                                                 
Sociology of Sport 43 (2012) (finding that the stereotype of Basketball players coming from poverty is 
flawed, and statistically untrue).  
110 Inclusive Communities, slip op. at 9 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
111 See Joint Appendix, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371). 
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discretionary policies in distribution of LIHTCs which disproportionately concentrated in 
low-income communities of color.112  The TDHCA’s proffered explanation that the 
concentration of LIHTC’s was to promote revitalization efforts serving low-income 
tenants, but the district court found this reason was “pretextual to require trial.”113  Thus 
the disparate impact test worked to identify potential substitutes for race that are used to 
reify housing segregation. 
Amici for the respondent were very concerned about potentially being found 
liable for factors that correlate to race under the same pretextual standard.  Amici like the 
American Financial Services Association wants to shun the disparate impact rule, 
because “risk-based underwriting criteria results in differential outcomes which merely 
reflect the heterogeneity of our society,” a fancy way of saying it’s just the way things are 
and we need to accept it.114  In fact, the majority of Amici for the Petitioner in the 
housing industry’s primary concern was increasing litigation costs115—a concern that 
                                                 
112 See Joint Appendix, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 110-114 (Summary judment 
opinion of the lower court finding that ICP had met its burden in the disparate impact analysis). 
113 Id. at 115. 
114 Brief for the American Financial Services Association, The Consumer Mortgage coalition, the 
Independent Community Bankers of America, and the Mortgage Bankers Association as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 27. 
115 See Brief for the American Financial Services Association, The Consumer Mortgage coalition, the 
Independent Community Bankers of America, and the Mortgage Bankers Association as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371) at 27; Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Texas Apartment Association in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-
1371); Brief for the American Insurance Association, the national Association of Mutual Insurance 
Companies, and the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America as Amici  Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ (No. 13-1371); Brief of the Consumer Data Industr 
Association; National Consumer Reporting Assocation; and the National Association of Professional 
Background Screeners as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Inclusive Communities, 576 U.S. ___ 
(No. 13-1371). 
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their existing practices which disproportionately benefit whites, like credit scores or 
criminal background checks could open them up to disparate impact claims.116  However, 
the low success rate of disparate impact claims,117 and the unanimous recognition for 
disparate impact claims in lower courts shows these Associations are more concerned 
with the potential publicity problems than an outbreak of litigation after Inclusive 
Communities.  
 
4.3 Rebuilding Fair Housing 
Fair Housing is dedicated to the grand purpose of increasing opportunities for 
residential living, both in creating diverse heterogenous communities while ensuring that 
people of color are not confined to low-income areas due to racial biases.  Racist 
sentiments creating divisions in housing still exist, as evidenced by the pool party 
incident in McKinney that opened this chapter.  The disparaging calls for Black youth to 
leave the neighborhood and the Officer’s use of force against Black youth are acts of 
interpersonal hostility which fit the Supreme Court’s usually narrow view of racism as 
individualized.  The systemic housing disparities that entrench racial segregation, and 
attempts to dismantle housing discrimination that instigate white supremacist anxieties 
over Black teens playing in a pool in a predominantly white community, are harder to pin 
down in a court of law.  Systemic issues of discrimination in housing inform 
individualized racisms.  Calls for Black youth to return to “section 8” housing in 
                                                 
116 See e.g. Oyama, supra note 38; Turner, supra note 36. 
117 See Selmi, supra note 67, at 738-39 and Seicshnaydre, supra note 40, at 400-403. 
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McKinney speak to the historic and ongoing issues of racial segregation in Texas, since 
reducing Blackness to low income housing is not just a white supremacist tactic of 
associating Blackness with poverty or welfare, but also identifying the ways in which 
housing is divided by race in Texas.  Notions of belonging in Texas suburban 
communities are driven by histories of discrimination; slavery reduced Black people to 
property, the Freedmen’s Bureau and post-emancipation plans for Black economic 
advancement were eliminated.118  Segregation, by law or social pressure, limits home 
ownership, employment, education, and other forms that would accumulate wealth in a 
capitalist society.  Black people showing up in white suburbia, even as residents hosting a 
pool party like in McKinney, become an apparent outsider that, in a white supremacist 
frame must be ostracized—leading to incidents like McKinney in 2015. 
At the center of this analysis is understanding the role of scientific evidence in 
antidiscrimination law like the FHA.  Disparate impact necessarily invokes some type of 
social scientific evidence, but the reliability or scientificity of this evidence is still 
questionable.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion reaffirms a commitment to disparate 
impact analysis in revealing discriminatory effects, as a race-neutral tool that can force 
housing authorities to be more mindful of the effects of policy on race.  The question that 
drives disparate impact—does this policy have a disparate effect based on race and is it 
related to discrimination—remains a legally valid, scientifically answerable question, 
imbued with the authority of the Supreme Court.  Inclusive Communities does not 
                                                 
118 See W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: 1860-1880 (1935, 1998). 
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validate any set pattern of housing.  Instead it legitimizes the interrogation of housing 
disparities based on statistical, social scientific, analyses. 
However, what evidence is sufficient for the Supreme Court is still in doubt.  
Justice Thomas and Alito use extensive empirical data to support their opinions, but these 
are largely to project hypotheticals that simply compare percentages.  Their dependence 
on the predominance of Black athletes in professional sports is curious, equating an 
occupation that is hyper-selective with a housing policy under the FHA that is meant to 
maximize housing opportunities.  Moreover, the dissents do not deny the statistical tests 
that can be used in these cases; there is no statistical baseline for disparate impact, only a 
question of whether a statistical disparity is acceptable.  Disparate impact is more than an 
arbitrary comparison of percentages. 
In Inclusive Communities, the Court accepts the importance of scientific evidence 
in looking at racial disparities in housing, but its significance is still hazy.  The burden 
shifting framework provided by HUD provides many opportunities to present evidence at 
the district court.  Unfortunately, when Inclusive Communities returned to the district 
court, the case was dismissed for failing to make a prima facie case of discrimination 
since it identifies a network of discretionary practices as the source of a discriminatory 
effect, rather than “affirmatively identify a specific policy that produced a disparate 
impact.”119  Disparate impact claims were recognized in principle, but in this particular 
case, there was no relief for the distribution of low income housing credits that arguably 
                                                 
119 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, et al., No. 
3:08-CV-0546-D (N.D. Tex.) Mem. Op. at 13. 
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perpetuate housing segregation in Texas.  Here, the principles and analysis rooted in 
legislation were affirmed at the Supreme Court, but the practical implementation did not 
meet the standards established by the Court.  In the next chapter looking at affirmative 
action the court accepts the principles as a given, but focuses almost entirely on Texas’ 
implementation. 
At the Supreme Court, the congressional record and legislative history made the 
purpose of the Fair Housing Act clear; the record well illustrates the terms of analysis and 
concepts.  What is less clear is how the Court’s allergy to quotas but its fascination with 
statistical comparison will play out when the purpose of federal legislation is hazier, or 
the Court is analyzing general principles of racial equity.  For these answers, I turn to 
Affirmative Action in the next chapter and trying to discern how strategies for achieving 
social goals of inclusion can survive colorblind rhetoric. 
 185 
5 Measurement Mismatch: Affirmative Action in Fisher II 
“Sound so smart like you graduated college,  
like you went to Yale but you probably went to Howard, knowing you." 
- Drake (f. Nicki Minaj) – Make Me Proud 
 
Higher education has been a cornerstone of civil rights strategy at the Supreme 
Court.  Victories in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,1 Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma,2 Sweatt v. Painter,3 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma4 declared 
segregation unconstitutional in law schools and graduate education, setting the stage for 
Brown v. Board of Education to declare racial segregation in public education 
unconstitutional.5  However, as seen in Chapter 4, segregation, desegregation, and 
integration are very different concepts, in theory and practice.6  Segregation in higher 
education was found unconstitutional in Sweatt and McLaurin in 1950.  With the passage 
of the Civil Rights Act in the in1964, federal policies shifted toward policies of inclusion 
like affirmative action.7  Colleges and universities developed their own race-conscious 
                                                 
1 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (finding that Missouri must either provide a separate law school for Black students 
or allow Black students to take classes at the white Law School). 
2 332 U.S. 361 (1948) (finding that the University of Oklahoma must provide equal instruction, and admit 
qualified Black applicants like Ms. Sipuel). 
3 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding the Black law school provided by Texas was quantitatively and qualitatively 
inferior to the all-white University of Texas law school). 
4 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (decided the same day as Sweatt for similar reasons, as applied to graduate schools). 
5 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (citing Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, and 
McLaurin)  
6 For an extensive discussion of the problematic, at best, transition from unconstitutional segregation, 
desegregation, and integration see Lino A. Graglia, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
ON RACE AND SCHOOLS (1976). 
7 See Tara J. Yosso, Laurence Parker, and Daniel G. Solórzano, and Marvin Lynn, From Jim Crow to 
Affirmative Action and Back Again: A Critical Race Discussion of Racialized Rationales and Access to 
Higher Education, 28 REV. OF RESEARCH IN ED. 1, 9 (2004) (discussing the development of affirmative 
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affirmative action policies, but just 28 years after Sweatt and McLaurin ended segregated 
school policy, affirmative action was challenged and curbed by the Supreme Court in 
University of California Regents v. Bakke.8  Affirmative action survived, in principle, 
since Universities have a “substantial interest that legitimately may be served by . . . 
consideration of race and ethnic origin,”9 but the University of California’s reserved seat 
program, a quota system, was struck down.  Twenty-five years later the Court would 
again affirm racially integrated and diverse institutions as a constitutionally protected 
goal in Grutter v. Bollinger,10 though Justice O’Connor hypothesized that affirmative 
action would no longer be necessary in another twenty-five years.11  More than sixty 
years after segregation in higher education was found unconstitutional, the Court seems 
                                                 
action and ensuing litigation) and Ira Katznelson, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD 
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2006). 
8 Bakke sued as an individual white male student because he was waitlisted and denied admission at the 
University of  California Davis medical school in 1973 and 1974, while the University used a special 
admissions program to admit racialized minorities to 16 out of the total available 100 placements in the 
program.  Bakke sought a writ of mandamus, a special order from the Court mandating his admission to the 
medical school.  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).) 
9 Id. 438 U.S. at 320. 
10 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (affirming affirmative action, finding diversity is a compelling 
state interest, and University of Michigan Law School’s use of race as a plus factor was narrowly tailored 
to meet that end); but see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding the University of Michigan’s use 
of a points system which included race did not pass strict scrutiny, and resembled a quota).  
11 Justice O’Connor mused that in the 25 years since Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, “the 
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased.  We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved 
today.” 539 U.S. at 343 (internal citations omitted) (citing to oral argument transcripts for the increasing 
“high grades and test scores” among students of color).  At oral argument in Fisher I, Chief Justice Roberts 
questioned whether there was a “deadline” on affirmative action, and whether University of Texas will 
achieve its goal of diversity by 2028.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 49-50, Fisher v. University of Texas, 
570 U.S. ___ (2015) (No. 14-981). 
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to accept that racially integrated and diverse institutions are an important, and 
constitutionally sanctioned, goal for universities.12 
Problems remain in deciphering how and in what ways the Court believes racial 
diversity should be achieved. For some Justices, it also means deciphering how long that 
goal is protected.  The ends are agreeable, but the means have become the controversy.  
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2013) (Fisher I), the Court agreed with the 
University’s goal of a racially diverse campus, but remanded for the Fifth Circuit to 
decide whether the University’s use of race met the standards established by previous 
opinions of the Supreme Court.13  Like a bad penny or a boomerang, Fisher returned to 
the Supreme Court in 2015.14  This time the question did not turn on principles or lofty 
goals, but on matters of practicality; did the University of Texas properly calibrate its 
admission policy to use race in a justifiable, but limited way?  Fisher II is not a purely 
legal question, but is heavily, if not entirely, reliant on facts and policy.  In other words, 
the Court is no longer weighing affirmative action in principle, but its practice. 
If the disparate impact standard is about identifying a standard of proof, the 
question in affirmative action is one of measurement.  In social sciences or law, standards 
of proof set a baseline for what is acceptable to reach a goal, while questions of 
                                                 
12 The Court is one of the last to the party, as discussed infra the amicus briefs from the Military, major 
corporations, most elite universities, a wealth of state schools, and a plethora of social scientists describing 
the crucial importance of racial diversity in education, the workplace, and in society. 
13 Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013)(Fisher I) (finding diversity to 
be a compelling interest, but remanding to the Fifth Circuit for a determination of whether the University’s 
admissions program is narrowly tailored to achieve that end).. 
14 Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016) (Fisher II). 
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measurement look for efficient, productive, or scientifically valid means of reaching it.  
Fisher II’s interrogation of affirmative action policy under the standards of the Court is 
really a question of measurement and methodology.  What methods are permissible for 
achieving a racially diverse learning environment?  How should Universities 
conceptualize or operationalize race in its strategies to increase the population of students 
of color, without engaging in unconstitutional quotas or racial balancing?  The Court has 
left the practical implementation of policy to Universities and legislatures, reserving 
judgement on the constitutionality of University policy.  In this chapter, I analyze what 
standards and measures the Court applied to the University of Texas’ consideration of 
race in its holistic admissions policy, and how the Court evaluated the University’s 
justification for its policy and Fisher’s counterarguments. 
None of the Justices of the Court are educators or have expertise in educational 
policy, but they have help.  In Fisher I, over 100 amicus curiae briefs were submitted, 
and most briefs for the University used social science to show the importance of race 
conscious policies.15  In Fisher II, there were 84 amicus briefs:  thirteen in favor of the 
petitioner, Abigail Fisher, 68 in favor of the respondent, the University of Texas, and 
three in favor of neither party.  This time only four briefs did not cite to some form of 
empirical data, grounding this debate in the implementation of educational policy.   
Here the nexus of race, social science, and law is not in the burdens of proof for 
trial courts, like in Chapter 4’s discussion of Inclusive Communities, but the 
                                                 
15 Suzanne E. Eckes, David Nguyen, & Jessica Ulm, Fisher v. University of Texas: The Potential for Social 
Science Research in Race-Conscious Admissions, 288 ED. LAW REP. 1, 9-10 (2013). 
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implementation of social policies set forth through the opinions of the Supreme Court.  
Social sciences are used to explain how and in what ways the University’s 
implementation of race-conscious reaches the ends prescribed by the Court.  Theories of 
social sciences and policy recommendations become central to the Court’s understanding 
of whether the University’s use of race in admissions is “narrowly tailored” to achieving 
the agreed-upon goal of a racially diverse university.  Many of the briefs focus on the 
goal itself, whether racial diversity is actually beneficial to a University, but for the most 
part this point has already been litigated and decided by Fisher I.16  The following 
sections provide a brief background on the origins of Texas’ hybrid percent/holistic 
review plan, followed by a summary of the strict scrutiny standard the Court uses to 
evaluate affirmative action claims based on Bakke and Grutter.  From there I go to a 
substantive analysis of Fisher II, looking at what authorities are used in Kennedy’s 
majority and Alito’s dissent, and to what ends.  Then I evaluate how race in higher 
education is conceptualized and operationalized in the social science data and the Court.  
Finally, I analyze the “mismatch theory” that Justice Scalia brought up in Fisher II at oral 
argument, which suggests that students of color attend less competitive, lower tier 
universities to increase their performance.  Ultimately, my goal is to examine how the 
Supreme Court uses social science to operationalize its affirmative action policy, and 
uncover the ways in which ideologies of racism underlie race-neutral alternatives. 
5.1 The Texas Plan: Residential Segregation and the path to Fisher II 
                                                 
16 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
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Fisher and Inclusive Communities are rooted in the same underlying facts of 
segregation.  Chapter 4 discusses the extensive housing segregation that continues to 
plague Texas, and the far-reaching effects of the resultant housing disparities, including 
education.  Just as in housing, Texas high school districts continue to be intensely racially 
segregated.17  In 1996, seven years before Grutter, the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. State 
of Texas found the University of Texas’s affirmative action program was an 
“unconstitutional admissions system” because it considered race as a factor.18   
In response, the Texas legislature passed a “Top 10%” law the next year as a race-
neutral alternative to affirmative action; guaranteeing admission to all state universities 
for any Texas applicant in the top ten percent of their high school graduating class.19  In 
the 1994-1995 school year, 31.9% of Black students and 43% of Latino students in Texas 
attended intensely segregated schools, or schools where 90-100% of the student 
population is not white.20  Over the next seven years, the top ten percent plan ensured 
admission of Black and Latina/o students, but enrollments failed to reach pre-Hopwood 
numbers.21  All gains from the top 10% plan directly result from intense residential 
                                                 
17 See also Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and Educational 
Inequality, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (January 2005); Marta Tienda and Sunny Xinchun Niu, 
Capitalizing on Segregation, Pretending Neutrality: College Admissions and hte Texas Top 10% Law, 8.2 
AM. L. AND ECON. REV. 312 (2006). 
18 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996). 
19 Tex. Educ. Code § 51.803 (2015). See also Tienda and Niu, supra note 16, at 314 (discussing the 
legislative background to passing the top ten percent plan). 
20 Gary Orfield, Mark D. Bachmeier, David R. James, and Tamela Eitle, Deepening Segregation in Public 
Schools: A Special Report from the Harvard Project on School Desegregation, Equity & Excellence in 
Education 30.2, 5, 14 (1997). 
21 Tienda and Nu, supra note 17, at 340. 
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segregation throughout Texas.22   At top tier institutions, like the University of Texas at 
Austin, the gains are even smaller since the expense of a high prestige school deters top 
10% students, who choose less selective Texas universities even though they are 
otherwise guaranteed admission.23  The race-neutral educational policy depends on the 
ongoing legacy of racial segregation and white supremacy in Texas, but still fails to meet 
the levels of enrollment achieved under affirmative action. 
In deciding Grutter in 2003, the Supreme Court implicitly overturned Hopwood 
and provided the University of Texas (UT) and the Texas legislature an opportunity to 
use race-conscious admissions once again.  Soon after Grutter, UT began a yearlong 
“Diversity Study” which found that Students of Color were severely underrepresented in 
small classes and on campus: 90% had one or no Black students, 46% had one or no 
Asian American students, and 43% had one or no Latina/o students.24  The University 
therefore instituted a new policy in 2004 to generate the Grutter approved “critical 
mass”25 of students it severely lacked, without abandoning the Top 10% Plan.  UT 
admissions now caps top 10% admissions as 75% of the places in the freshman class, 
                                                 
22 Id. at 342. 
23 Id. 
24 The study defined small classes as 5-24 students.  See Joint Appendix at 445-446, Fisher I 133. S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (No.14-981) (quoting University of Texas at Austin, Diversity Levels of Undergraduate 
Classes at the University of Texas at Austin, 1996-2002 (2003)).  See also Uma M. Jayakumar and Annie 
S. Adamian, with Mitchell James Chang, Reflections on the Diversity (Rationale) Literature: Examining 
the Potential and Need for Critical Diversity Praxis, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL EQUITY: 
CONSIDERING THE FISHER CASE TO FORGE THE PATH AHEAD 186, (Uma M. Jayakumar and Liliana M. 
Garces eds., 2015). 
25 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (“We are satisfied that the Law School adequately considered race-neutral 
alternatives currently capable of producing a critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the 
academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational mission”). 
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reserving 25% for holistic review.  The holistic review process utilizes an Academic 
Index score (SAT and High School GPA) supplemented with a “Personal Achievement 
Index” which scores two essays with a review of the student’s application file with six 
other factors, including “special circumstances.”  A version of holistic review was in 
effect after Hopwood, but after 2004, the University amended the “special circumstances” 
factor to include a seventh sub-factor: race.26   
Abigail Fisher was not in the Top 10% of her graduating class and was denied 
admission to the University of Texas at Austin in 2008.  Ms. Fisher alleged it was the 
inclusion of race as the seventh sub factor to the special circumstances factor in the PAI 
was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause.  Ms. Fisher sued the 
University of Texas in 2008 to recover her $100 application fee, since she alleged the 
University’s use of race violated the equal protection clause.  Both the Texas District 
Court and Fifth Circuit found in favor of the University; noting the tendency of 
percentage plans to rely on residential segregation, but finding the use of race through the 
ten percent plan and holistic admissions were narrowly tailored to generate a critical mass 
and meet the compelling interest of diversity.27   
When the Supreme Court ruled in Fisher I (2013), only Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
noted the ten percent plan’s dependence on segregation.  “It is race consciousness, not 
blindness to race, that drives [Texas’ top ten percent plan.]  If universities cannot 
                                                 
26 Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638-639 (5th Cir. 2015).  See also Joint Appendix 
at 447-448, Fisher I 133. S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.14-981); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Kimberly West-
Faulcon in Support of Respondents at 11, Fisher I 133. S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.14-981).  
27 See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 631 F. 3d 213, 241-247 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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explicitly include race as a factor, many may resort to camouflage to maintain their 
minority enrollment.”28  Instead the seven-Justice majority treated the University’s 
interest in racially diverse educational setting as a given: “an academic judgment to 
which some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper.”29  Fisher I was not about the 
constitutionality of affirmative action in principle, despite Justices Scalia and Thomas’ 
desire to overturn Grutter.30  The Court never addressed the constitutionality of the top 
ten percent plan, remanding the case for the Fifth Circuit to determine “whether the 
University has offered sufficient evidence that would prove its admissions program is 
narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”31   
The Court focused on racial segregation in Texas in Inclusive Communities in 
2015, but Texas’ segregation was also a point of emphasis two years earlier in Fisher I.  
Neither Fisher nor Inclusive Communities disturbs the systemic racism manifested in 
housing segregation, but Fisher I and II’s support of the top 10% plan makes it an 
element of racial diversity in admissions.  The denial of a single white applicant, who 
would not have been eligible for admission even if race was not part of the admissions 
process, triggered a constitutional inquiry into the University of Texas’ holistic 
admissions process.  Here the Court interrogates institutional behavior and nearly upends 
                                                 
28 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gratz, 539 
U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
29 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
30 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J. Dissenting) and Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J. 
Dissenting). 
31 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
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affirmative action not because Ms. Fisher was denied a necessity like housing or an 
education, but because of Ms. Fisher’s “unjustly committed” application fee.32  But 
treatment of diversity and educational opportunities for students of color in the opinions 
and arguments in Fisher I and II reveal the real injury is the potential threat to white 
entitlements that affirmative action supposedly presents.33 
5.2 Scrutinizing Fisher I 
In the closing words of his majority opinion in Fisher I, Justice Kennedy 
reminded the Fifth Circuit to apply the strict scrutiny standard without deferring to 
assurances of “good intention.”34  Justice Kennedy quoted the saying that strict scrutiny 
“must not be strict in theory, but fatal in fact” and then put his own spin on the saying: 
“strict scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact.”35  Justice Kennedy parallels 
fatal and feeble to remind the lower courts, and observers, strict scrutiny mandates 
thorough review, not a preemptive decision.  As discussed in Chapter 2, strict scrutiny is 
a legal doctrine of judicial review that requires “more searching judicial inquiry” in cases 
which touch on a fundamental right or involve “prejudice against discrete and insular 
                                                 
32 Here the injury the Court was supposed to remedy comes down to the application fee.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 12-13, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
33 This “rhetoric of white innocence” at the Supreme Court fashions an injury around the whiteness of the 
complaining party, rather than a denial of opportunity since, even in quota cases like Bakke, immense 
opportunity exists for white students and there is no history of oppression.  See Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color 
of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional Rhetoric of White Innocence, 11 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 477 (2005); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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minorities.” 36  From a footnote in United States v. Carolene Products, the doctrine has 
evolved into a two-pronged analysis as to whether a law or policy is (a) narrowly tailored 
to (b) further a compelling government interest.  In other words, if the goal is sufficiently 
compelling and constitutional, then the means of achieving it must do no more (and no 
less) than necessary to meet that goal.  
By the 1970s, strict scrutiny had been applied in a variety of different cases, 
usually invalidating restrictive state laws,37 with glaring exceptions like affirming 
Japanese internment in Korematsu v. United States.38  Strict scrutiny is not designed to 
eliminate all legislation, but to proscribe a means of analyzing legislation to meet 
exacting judicial standards.  In Grutter, the Court scrutinized and approved of race-
conscious admission policies at the University of Michigan.  The “educational benefits 
that flow from student body diversity” are a compelling interest with “real” benefits, 
drawing heavily on evidence from amicus curiae.39  Nearly a third of the Grutter opinion 
is dedicated to the narrow tailoring requirement, ultimately finding that the University’s 
diversity interest was not achievable through race-neutral alternatives, and taking solace 
in the notion that Michigan’s race-conscious admissions “have a termination point,” 
                                                 
36 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (overturning Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905) and ending the Courts’ strict judicial restrictions on progressive economic legislation from 
Congress).  See also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59:3 VAND. L. REV. 793, 799 (2006). 
37 See Winkler, Fatal in Theory, at 805. 
38 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
39 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-334 (finding “these benefits are not theoretical, but real”). 
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beginning the implied deadline described earlier.40  However, Justice Kennedy’s dissent 
called the Court’s narrow tailoring analysis “nothing short of perfunctory,”41 giving 
undue deference when the University failed to “produce a convincing explanation or 
show it has taken adequate steps to ensure individual assessment.”42   
It makes sense that it would be Justice Kennedy writing for the majority a decade 
later in Fisher I, ordering a remand for further analysis as to whether the University of 
Texas “offered sufficient evidence that would prove that its admissions program is 
narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”43  Again, six of the 
other Justices of the Court joined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion,44 with Justice Ginsburg 
dissenting on the grounds that the case should simply be decided in favor of the 
University without having to remand.  Even Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in the 
opinion in full, not in part, accepting the Court’s remand only on narrow tailoring—even 
though Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote separately to note they would revisit and 
overrule Grutter given the opportunity.45  But even with this open invitation, Fisher I 
settled the University of Texas’ compelling interest in diversity and a critical mass by 
                                                 
40 Id. 539 U.S. at 342. 
41 Id. 539 U.S. at 389. 
42 Id. 539 U.S. at 391. 
43 Fisher I., 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
44 Justice Kagan did not take part in the consideration or decision of either Fisher decision, most likely 
because she participated in the case previously when she was Solicitor General, who argued in favor of the 
University of Texas as amici during and after her tenure. 
45 Id., 133 S. Ct. 2422 (Scalia J. concurring) and Id. (Thomas, J. concurring).  Justice Thomas’s lengthy 
dissent is also notable in the many rhetorical strategies used to equivocate affirmative action to segregation, 
including the mismatch theory discussed infra § 5.4. 
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precedent and by the majority of the Justices of the Court.  Surprisingly it was Justice 
Kennedy who would write for the majority in Fisher II to find the University’s had met 
the narrow tailoring requirement.46  Justice Kennedy’s swing from dissent in Grutter to 
majority in Fisher II shocked many,47 and left even Justice Alito to remark that 
“something strange” had happened since Fisher I.48 
5.3 Stranger Things: Educational Authorities in Fisher II  
On remanding, after some additional briefing, the Fifth Circuit came to the same 
conclusion it made three years earlier: the University’s use of race-conscious admissions 
was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest in the educational benefits that flow 
from diversity.49  Both the majority and Judge Garza’s dissenting opinion engage in 
extensive analysis of the factual record, effectively following Justice Kennedy’s 
instructions to scrutinize the factual record presented by both parties.  Neither the Fifth 
Circuit nor the Supreme Court question the underlying quantitative or qualitative data in 
their opinions.  Instead the controversy entirely boils down to contextualizing and 
applying that data to policy; determining the correct methodological framework for 
                                                 
46 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214-15. 
47 See e.g. Steve Vladeck, Symposium: So what happened between Fisher I and Fisher II, 
SCOTUSBLOG.COM, (June 23, 2016) (It’s hard to view today’s ruling in the second Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin . . . as anything other than a stunning surprise); Kimberly West-Faulcon, Symposium: 
Surprisingly, facts rule the day in Fisher II, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 24, 2016) (“Unwilling to sound the 
death knell on racial affirmative action in higher education, Kennedy ventured down a path he had never 
taken before. He upheld the race-conscious component of the University of Texas at Austin’s admissions 
policy as satisfying the stringent strict-scrutiny standard of review”); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Upholds Affirmative Action Program at University of Texas, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 23, 2016) (“the 
decision, by a 4-to-3 vote was unexpected). 
48 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215. 
49 Fisher II, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (2014). 
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analysis.  The Fifth Circuit utilized extensive background data, both from the factual 
record and external sources, including two appendices graphing the admission data in the 
factual record.  At the Supreme Court, the controversy is less over the quantitative 
admissions data, but the extent to which that quantitative data presents a reliable 
interpretation of the University’s application of race-conscious admissions. 
Looking to the different authorities used in the opinions lends insight on how the 
Court evaluates the importance of information provided by the parties and the Fifth 
Circuit, as well as what weight is given to these authorities in the opinion.  Below, in 
Table 1, I have listed the sources referenced in the three opinions in Fisher II, by 
authority.  The N represents the number of sources cited to—not the number of citations 
in total, but the number of different sources used in each area of authority.  The percent 
column represents the percent of the total for that opinion.   
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Table 1: Authorities referenced in Fisher II Opinions 
Authority50 
Majority (Kennedy) Dissent (Alito) Dissent (Thomas) 
N %  N % N % 
Amicus Brief 1 4% 12 13% 0 0% 
Brief of Petitioner 1 4% 1 1% 0 0% 
Brief of Respondent 0 0% 2 2% 0 0% 
District Court 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Appellate Court 2 7% 3 3% 0 0% 
Supreme Court 10 37% 17 19% 2 100% 
U.S. Constitution 1 4% 0 0% 0 0% 
Book or Treatise 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
Census 0 0% 2 2% 0 0% 
Academic Journal 
(Peer-Review or Law) 
0 0% 2 2% 0 0% 
Magazine or 
Newspaper 
0 0% 9 10% 0 0% 
Other 0 0% 1 1% 0 0% 
University of Texas 
Admissions Office 
0 0% 2 2% 0 0% 
Website 0 0% 13 15% 0 0% 
Factual Record 10 37% 17 19% 0 0% 
Government or 
Professional 
Association Report 
0 0% 4 4% 0 0% 
Oral Argument 1 4% 1 1% 0 0% 
State Law 1 4% 1 1% 0 0% 
Total 27 100% 89 100% 2 100% 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, both Kennedy and Alito lean heavily on the Supreme Court 
precedent and the factual record to reach their conclusion, with Justice Kennedy almost 
entirely relying on the analysis of the Fifth Circuit, the factual record, and the standards 
provided by previous opinions.  As in Inclusive Communities in Chapter 4, it is surprising 
                                                 
50 The method for coding and conceptualization for the authorities is described in the intermission before 
Chapter 4, see supra Intermission.   
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to see conservative, textualist Justices lean so heavily on external authorities in their 
dissenting opinions.  Justice Alito’s extensive use of amicus curiae and external sources 
expands the information presented beyond a narrower view of the text of the constitution 
or opinions of the Court.  Drawing support from this variety of sources indicates that 
precedent, on its own, is insufficient to rebut the majority’s interpretation.  Even in terms 
of the facts and data on educational policy, the opinion of the Court appears to grant 
substantial deference to the University, while Justice Alito’s dissent finds the 
University’s position in opposition to established case law, particularly the opinions of 
Justice Kennedy, offering alternative sources for race-neutral remedies.  This contrast in 
sources, explored in the next two sections, highlights how the Court’s institutional power 
is sufficient authority when in the majority, but dissenting opinions must prove that the 
Court is taking the wrong direction using alternative authorities. 
5.3.1 Narrow Tailoring: Justice Kennedy’s Majority  
Justice Kennedy’s historical opposition to affirmative action and deference to 
University policy suddenly fades in Fisher II, leaving a very context-specific evaluation 
of the University of Texas’ “sui generis” approach.51  Most of the Court’s opinion is 
spent reciting the factual record and establishing the three controlling principles 
established by previous opinions of the Court: (1) a university’s consideration of race 
triggers strict scrutiny, (2) the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity 
is a compelling interest, and the Court will defer to a University’s “reasoned, principled 
                                                 
51 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208. 
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explanation,” and (3) no deference is owed to the University in the narrow tailoring 
inquiry. 52  Up to this point the Court relies almost entirely on its own precedent, but once 
the analysis turns to apply these principles to the University of Texas, the analysis almost 
entirely relies on different parts of the factual record, shown below in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Hierarchy Chart of Authorities used in the Majority Opinion 
The Court’s interpretation of the factual record relies heavily on the University’s 
ongoing assessment of diversity in admissions, the student body and campus climate.  
The 2004 Diversity Study, along with related depositions and materials in the record, 
                                                 
52 Id., 
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provides the backbone for much of the Court’s analysis.  This study provides a 
quantitative and qualitative assessment of the failure of the top ten percent plan to 
generate sufficient student body diversity.  Because the petitioner never challenged “the 
University’s good faith in conducting its studies,” the Court accepts them as the central 
ingredients in justifying the use of race in holistic admissions.53  Rather than defer to the 
University’s broad policy aims, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion defers to the 
University’s methods of data collection and interpretations of that data.  Quantitatively 
registrar data shows demographic shifts that have failed to provide adequate diversity in 
the classroom, and qualitative “anecdotal evidence . . . that minority students admitted 
under the Hopwood regime experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation.”54  In the 
opinion of the Court, these data indicate a sufficient need for diversity which caused the 
University to narrowly tailor the race-conscious holistic admissions program.   
Importantly, Justice Kennedy emphasizes time spent evaluating and reevaluating 
admissions.  The University spent seven years attempting to achieve diversity through the 
ten percent plan and holistic review without considering race, but “none of these efforts 
succeeded.”55  The University’s ensuing study, and commitment to repeating the diversity 
study every five years to calibrate the holistic admissions process, become crucial to 
Justice Kennedy’s evaluation of the use of race in admissions by placing time-sensitive 
limits on race-conscious action.  If the University is calibrating its admissions process 
                                                 
53 Id., 136 S.Ct. at 2211. 
54 Id., 136 S.Ct at 2212. 
55 Id. 
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every five years, then if it determines that race is no longer helpful in achieving student 
body diversity, it can do away with it.  Next, Justice Kennedy reasons that existing data 
on admissions must be accepted because the race-conscious admission program was only 
in effect for three years before Fisher filed suit, and remanding for more data would be 
“limited to a narrow 3-year sample, review of which might yield little insight.”56  In other 
words, Justice Kennedy gives significant deference to the University’s self-assessment of 
the use of race, emphasizing available data and sample size in making practical 
determinations from an educational perspective, rather than imposing a constitutional 
ceiling.  Measuring and evaluating race-consciousness in higher education thus becomes 
more about educational policy and implementation at a university level, not a 
constitutional argument.   
For the majority, there is enough data to show that race-neutral policies are 
insufficient to meet the constitutionally valid goal of racial diversity.  But rather than 
weigh in on exactly how Texas is achieving that goal, Justice Kennedy’s majority makes 
reflexivity the central standard of measuring the validity of race-conscious admissions.  
In other words, the constitutional measure of race-conscious admissions is based on the 
University’s, not the Court’s, recurring evaluation of whether its admissions policies are 
achieving its goals.  Recognizing Texas’ top ten percent plan as insufficient reaffirms 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissents that emphasized percentage plan’s reliance on segregation,57 
                                                 
56 Id., 136 S.Ct at 2209. 
57 Id., 136 S.Ct at 2213. 
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but interestingly never citing to the Inclusive Communities opinion which also 
documented residential segregation in Texas.   
Accepting the University’s findings that race-neutral policy failed to achieve 
student body diversity in qualitative or quantitative ways is very important since it leaves 
the University’s use of race-conscious admissions intact; providing doctrinal justification 
for affirmative action and practical educational benefits to students of color by providing 
increased opportunities for admissions.  However, this continues the obfuscation of 
systemic issues of racial discrimination, and how institutional racisms are intertwined.  
The fact that percentage plans in admissions create some racial diversity, even though 
insufficient, is entirely reliant on racial discrimination and segregation in housing, which 
influences primary and secondary education.  Percentage plans are frequently offered as 
the race-neutral alternative, but acknowledging their reliance on segregation could 
expose, at least in part, how race-neutral policies are reliant on other systematic, racially 
discriminatory practices. 
5.3.2 Surprised Strawmen: Justice Alito’s Dissent 
Justice Kennedy’s liberal turn in favor of affirmative action shocked outside 
observers, but it also appears to have affected his colleagues as well.  Justice Alito’s 
dismay is tangible in his dissenting opinion.  Like Justice Kennedy, he cites extensively 
to the factual record and to previous opinions of the court.  However, almost half (8 out 
of 17) of the opinions that Justice Alito quotes or cites to in his dissent is either a 
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majority, concurrence, or dissent written by Justice Kennedy.58  This subtle level of 
citation not only demonstrates the extent to which Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
differs from his previous opinions on involving race or affirmative action, but also Justice 
Alito’s measurable surprise that Justice Kennedy has joined the side of affirmative action.  
Justice Alito’s use of case law, and the opinions of Justice Kennedy, mostly follow the 
post-racial tropes documented by Sumi Cho, equivocating historical discrimination and 
racism against racialized minorities with programs designed to remedy those histories of 
oppression.59  For Justice Alito, and his many citations to Justice Kennedy’s former 
opinions, this means equivocating the use of race as a sub-factor in holistic review to 
increase the number of students of color as “systematic racial discrimination.”60   
In this view, race-conscious remedies to racial discrimination are a form of racial 
discrimination; equivocating affirmative action to systematic, historical restrictions on 
opportunities for higher education for people of color.  Ms. Fisher was denied admission 
because she was not in the top ten percent of her class and her combined SAT, GPA, 
                                                 
58 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2215 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013)); Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2221 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Richmond v. Ja.A. Croson Co., 4388 U.S. 469 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgement)); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2221 (Alito, J. 
dissenting) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (Justice Kennedy writing for the majority)); 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2221 (Alito, J. dissenting) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J. dissenting)); 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2221 (Alito, J. dissenting) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete co., 500 U.S. 614, 
619 (1991) (Justice Kennedy writing for the majority)); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2224 (Alito, J. dissenting) 
(quoting Parents Involved v. Seattle Unified School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Kennedy, J. concurring in 
part and concurring in judgement)); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2215 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (Justice Kennedy writing for the majority)); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2228 
(Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (Kennedy, J. 
dissenting)). 
59 Sumi Cho, Postracialism, 94 IOWA L. REV 1589, 1594 (2008). 
60 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2242 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
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essays, and extracurricular activities were not more outstanding than other admitted 
students.  Nearly seventy years before Ms. Fisher, Mr. Herman Sweatt was denied 
admission to the University of Texas Law School because he is Black and the Texas 
constitution at that time barred Black students from the University of Texas.61  Justice 
Alito’s moral equivocation places these two in the same category of racial discrimination, 
even though Mr. Sweatt’s denial was rooted in overt, covert, and historical discrimination 
and Ms. Fisher’s was based on an implied entitlement to admission based on her 
whiteness, with no showing of historical, statistical, or other discriminatory treatment, 
intent, or effect against whites.  Justice Alito would still accept Ms. Fisher’s assertions, 
because of the implication, and therefore offers extensive authorities beyond the opinions 
of the Court to support his argument. 
                                                 
61 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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Figure 14: Hierarchy Chart of Justice Alito’s Dissent in Fisher II 
Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito also leans on the factual record established by 
the lower court.  Where he differs is in incorporating different elements of empirical data 
to make his case.  As shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 14, Justice Alito makes generous use 
of Amici and Empirical information, though as noted earlier the empirical data presented 
here is mostly websites of the admissions offices of different Universities.  Justice Alito 
incorporates amicus briefs, the factual record, and other empirical data to discuss Asian 
American students, multiracial students, intraracial diversity, and standardized testing.  
These four examples are cornerstones of Justice Alito’s attempt to muddle measures of 
campus diversity and offer race-neutral alternatives to create racially diverse campus. 
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5.3.2.1 Asian American Representation 
First, in section II.C.2 of his dissent, Justice Alito attacks the University’s 
classroom diversity justification (the dramatic underrepresentation of students of color in 
classes where there is one or less of Black, Latino or Asian American student in a class) 
for narrow tailoring, because he believes Asian Americans are not properly represented in 
the process.  Quoting the Amicus Asian American Legal Foundation (AALF), a 
conservative legal group devoted to colorblind admissions policies, Justice Alito argues 
that UT Austin’s emphasis on classroom diversity prioritizes Latinos over Asian 
Americans because Latinos “outnumber” Asian Americans demographically, remarking 
that “apparently ‘Asian Americans are not worth as much as Hispanics.’”62  Here Justice 
Alito’s dissent tries to undermine diversity and statistical analyses of the University of 
Texas by asserting that Asian Americans are undervalued in the admissions process, 
since increasing the number of Black and Latina/o students “inevitably harms students 
who do not receive the same boost” because of the limited number of admissions.63  Not 
mentioned are two other Asian American organizations provide amicus briefs for the 
Respondent, countering AALF’s assertions with statistical analyses on the rapid rise in 
representation of Asian Americans both in the State and at the collegiate level.64   
                                                 
62 Fisher II. 136 S. Ct. at 2227 (Alito, J. Dissenting) (quoting Brief for Asian American Legal Foundation 
et. al. as Amici Curiae at 11 (Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981)). 
63 Id. at 2227 n. 4. 
64 See Brief of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, et. al. in Support of Respondents, at 
12-23 (Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice et al., in Support of Respondents at 28-40 (Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-
981). 
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Justice Alito’s argument highlights a central component of the case against 
affirmative action: the idea that creating programs to benefit Blacks and Latina/os must 
automatically discriminate against or harm everyone else, namely whites and 
occasionally Asian Americans, and to think otherwise “defies the laws of mathematics.”65  
This straw man argument creates the specter of discrimination against populations who 
are already admitted in significant numbers to the institution, reasoning that the finite 
number of admissions means any benefits to one group harms all others.  This fallacious 
line of reasoning underestimates the myriad of advantages and disadvantages that go into 
collegiate admissions, like racialized biases in standardized testing, preparation courses, 
advanced placement classes, or even familial and professional ties.  These unearned 
benefits not considered as such, and are left alone.  Moreover, there is a presumption of 
entitlement to the pre-existing finite seats for those who are supposedly harmed by 
affirmative action.  Finally, it does not contemplate expansion—if the problem is the 
limited number of seats, then simply increase the number of seats to include well 
qualified individuals being left out and leave affirmative action untouched.  This would 
include a racialized remedy for discrimination and the claimed harm of non-benefit for 
whiteness.  Instead, Justice Alito uses Asian American students and their experiences 
based on the limited and hyperbolic understanding of one brief, without consideration of 
the other briefs and studies presented before the Court noting how Asian Americans 
benefit from affirmative action generally, and at the University of Texas specifically. 
5.3.2.2 Self-Identification and Multiraciality 
                                                 
65 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2227 n.4 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
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However, Justice Alito’s concern for Asian American students in admissions does 
not stop there.  The UT admissions policy does not define or verify an applicant’s racial 
identification, inviting them to self-identify with a provided category.  Justice Alito 
expresses concern for “individuals with ancestors from different groups” citing to two 
recent reports from the Pew Research Center finding that 28% of Asian Americans and 
“26% of Hispanics” marry a spouse of a different race or ethnicity.66  Similarly he cites 
the census bureau, reporting that “individuals describing themselves as members of 
multiple races grew by 32% from 2000 to 2010.”67  Justice Alito’s interest in growing 
multiracial community is less sympathy than suspicion, suggesting that UT’s policy of 
self-identification by race is an “invitation for applicants to game the system.”68  In 
essence, Justice Alito’s line of argument seems to advocate for overall racial purity, while 
his comment on gaming the system misunderstands both multiraciality and admissions.   
Multiracial people, however they identify, still bring a different, diverse 
perspective to the university setting.  Similarly, Justice Alito sets up this argument by 
saying that more students will have ancestors of different races “as racial and ethnic 
prejudice recedes,”69 yet this would simply mean that more students are eligible for the 
                                                 
66 Id., at 2229 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing United States Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows Multiple-
Race Population Grew Faster Than Single-Race Population (Sept. 27, 2012), online at 
https://www.census.gov/ newsroom/releases/archives/race/cb12-182. Html). 
67 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2229 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing W. Wang, Pew Research Center, Interracial 
Marriage: Who Is "Marrying Out"? (June 12, 2015), online at http://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-
tank/2015/06/12/interracial-marriage-who-is-marrying-out/; W. Wang, Pew Research Center, The Rise of 
Intermarriage (Feb. 16, 2012), online at http://www.pew socialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-
ofintermarriage/). 
68 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2230. 
69 Id. 
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benefit of affirmative action, in direct contrast to his earlier argument of mathematical 
impossibility.  Somehow affirmative action is keeping students out based on limited seats 
while letting too many students in thanks to interracial marriage—assuming all the 
married couples in Justice Alito’s quoted studies are having children.  
Moreover, the admissions at the University of Texas consider race based on self-
identification which arises in the holistic review consideration of essays the student has 
written.  Justice Alito’s line of argumentation is reductionist, assuming simply checking a 
box next to a race will guarantee admission, when a full file review would reveal students 
who may identify as multiracial but whose experiences are qualitatively identical to white 
students applying to the University.  Even then, all this would do is eliminate one of the 
many factors considered in holistic review.  Practically, this concern has little effect on 
admissions.  In principle, it is an argument for racial purity and white supremacy. 
5.3.2.3 Intraracial Diversity 
Next, in section II.C.3 of his opinion, Justice Alito attacks the University’s 
intraracial diversity rationale for narrow tailoring.  Intraracial diversity in this sense refers 
to UT’s use of holistic review to ensure that the applicant pool and admitted students 
represent both many different racial minorities and different experiences as racialized 
peoples.  However for the Petitioner, its Amicus, and Justice Alito, this translates to 
“seeking affluent minorities . . . rely[ing] on the baseless assumption that there is 
something wrong with African-American and Hispanic students admitted through the 
Top Ten Percent Plan.”70  Justice Alito draws on census data to argue that the Top Ten 
                                                 
70 Id. at 2231 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
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percent plan still draws in minorities “wealthier than the average Texas family,” which he 
defines as children raised in households with a household income above the Texas 
median, $49,453.71  Again, Justice Alito twists the University’s attempt to include a 
variety of racialized perspectives into a deficit approach, arguing that because the 
University would beneficially consider the race of students of color from any 
socioeconomic status, affirmative action has inverted to ensure admissions for affluent 
students and demean low income students.  
First, this falsely equivocates race and class, being Black, American Indian, or 
Latina/o does not always indicate lower socioeconomic status.  Even though there may be 
intersections and correlations between race and class thanks to the rampant function of 
white supremacy and capitalism in the United States, there is no one-to-one relationship.  
Second, it underestimates the fact that racial diversity considers that there is a benefit to 
considering race and including more people of color that is unquantifiable by any other 
factor—there is something about being a person of color in the United States that, 
regardless of other intersecting identities, creating qualitatively different experiences that 
add to the learning environment for all.  Racism is inherently discriminatory, but does not 
discriminate based on class.  While affluent students of color may not have experienced 
poverty, they likely have experienced racism or discrimination, which creates a different 
perspective on society.  Using intraracial diversity as a justification for holistic review 
ensures that racialized experiences are not essentialized in the University, meaning that 
                                                 
71 Id. 136 S. Ct. at 2233 (Alito, J. Dissenting) (citing United States Census Bureau, A. Noss, Household 
Income for States: 2008 and 2009, p. 4 (2010), online at https://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/ acsbr09-
2.pdf.) 
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admissions attempt to ensure that no one student is made to be a spokesperson for their 
race, and that no one set of experiences is representative of all people of a particular race.  
5.3.2.4 Standardized Testing 
Furthermore, Justice Alito argues the intraracial diversity justification is defeated 
by the University’s use of SAT scores, “which has often been accused of reflecting racial 
and cultural bias, as a reason for dissatisfaction with poor and disadvantaged African-
American and Hispanic students.”72  Though he admits he is “ill equipped to express a 
view” on the racial bias in the SAT, he notes that “SAT scores clearly correlate with 
wealth.”73  On this point Justice Alito cites extensively to the briefs for the respondent, 
particularly Top Tier Universities whose briefs extensively support the University’s use 
of race in holistic admissions, but do not use SAT testing in their own admissions 
policies.74  Justice Alito also supplements this with his own research on admissions, 
citing the websites of multiple universities who do not require the SAT.75  But the 
Universities amicus briefs are not cited for their use of race-conscious admissions, but 
their lack of SAT scores due to racial and class bias, that he conveniently overlooks due 
to his professed lack of expertise. 
5.3.2.5 Have a Little Fire Scarecrow: Deconstructing Alito’s Strawmen 
                                                 
72 Id. 136 S. Ct. at 2234 (Alito, J. Dissenting). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at n.13 (extensive discussion of Universities who do not require the SAT). 
75 Id. 
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In the context of classroom diversity or intraracial diversity, Justice Alito’s idea 
of narrow tailoring is an immeasurable, unwinnable game.  Rather than an intersectional, 
holistic approach to match the holistic review the University is supposed to give students, 
Justice Alito attempts to pin the University either as unconcerned with Asian 
Americans—who are still admitted in large numbers under holistic review considering 
race—or a rising threat of multiracial students who will somehow damage the University 
by self-identifying with a broad racial category.  Justice Alito’s comments on “gaming 
the system” strike an oddly defensive tone in his statistically informed rhetorical assault 
on the University’s admissions policy.  This accusation of cheating draws on meritocratic 
tropes of white supremacy—perceiving affirmative action only as a beneficial advantage 
rather than a remedy to the litany of social and cultural oppressions that have historically 
created persistent and continuous, systematic disadvantage for racialized minorities, all 
while failing to recognize these disadvantages may exist.  Even the qualitative findings 
that students experience loneliness, isolation, and a racially hostile campus climate, are 
heavily scrutinized; Justice Alito asks for quantification, “we are not told how many,” 
before quickly noting that any quantification seeking demographic parity is 
impermissible racial balancing, and illogical to link to demographics.76  Like much of his 
dissent, Justice Alito attacks the University’s position as vague, then uses census and 
other demographic statistics to build a strawman argument, which he quickly tears down 
as impermissible racial discrimination.  Social scientific evidence is thus 
decontextualized, parted out, or isolated to create the illusion of deficit.  Shifting the 
                                                 
76 Id. 136 S. Ct. at 2235 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
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measures and studies used to evaluate what types of diversity are good, achievable, or 
important for a University creates a moving target, rendering sound affirmative action 
policy unenforceable. 
Whether using Asian Americans, SAT’s or Multiracial students, Justice Alito 
constructs an illusory series of injured parties who are not at issue in the case, and then 
dismisses them as impermissible beneficiaries of the University’s holistic review process.  
The narrow tailoring requirement, under Justice Kennedy’s view, is a call for 
methodological transparency and periodic retooling of the plan.  In Justice Alito’s 
estimation, there can be no narrowly tailored program since any estimation based on race 
would invoke unsavory racial preferences that could be better accomplished by race-
neutral means.  Again, the compelling interest in achieving a racially diverse campus is 
never disturbed in Justice Alito’s opinion, he does not try to revisit Fisher I or Grutter as 
Justice Thomas did in his Fisher I concurrence.  Rather, Justice Alito would eliminate the 
University’s use of race in holistic review in favor of the race-blind holistic review 
system, which the University showed in its Diversity study was not achieving the agreed 
upon objective of a racially diverse campus.   
The use of social science and empirical data in Justice Alito’s dissent is, at best, 
an oversimplification of the factors that go in to considering racialized diversity, a 
statistical game of smoke and mirrors.  At worst, it is white supremacist dogma.  
Concluding his analysis of the narrow tailoring argument in section II.D, Justice Alito 
hypothesizes that  
In 2004 when race was not a factor, 3.6% of non-Top Ten Percent Texas 
enrollees were African-American and 11.6% were Hispanic.  It would stand 
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to reason that at least the same percentages of African-American and 
Hispanic students would have been admitted through holistic review in 
2008 even if race was not a factor.77 
 
There are many sound, reliable, verifiable, predictive statistical measures that could 
answers Justice Alito’s questions on patterns in enrollment—many of them are within the 
Amicus Curiae briefs, like the briefs Justice Alito cited for his data on the SAT’s.78  He 
instead ponders his own hypotheticals based on a single data point to upend a holistic 
admissions program.  Scientific evidence in Justice Alito’s dissent is not considered 
rigorously, or systematically, but selectively; only accounting for data that support his 
assumptions, dismissing contrary evidence by imposing deficit-oriented assumptions.  
The hypothetical Justice Alito poses, whether race-neutral holistic review was 
sufficiently increasing racially diverse admissions, was at the center of the University’s 
Diversity Study, which lead to the race-conscious holistic review at the center of this 
case.  Instead, Justice Alito is content to reason that hypothetical race neutral policies, 
like socio-economic status or simply race-blind review, will sufficiently increase racial 
diversity.  Again, Justice Alito’s dissent does not question the goal of a racially diverse 
campus, only how it is achieved.  One Justice’s statistical speculation on the benefits of 
race-neutral admissions is thus superimposed over the immense weight of social 
scientific authorities advocating for race-conscious policy.  The questions, hypotheticals, 
and problems presented in Justice Alito’s dissent have all been directly or indirectly 
                                                 
77 Id. 136 S. Ct. at 2237 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
78 Id. 136 S. Ct. at 2234 n.11 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Brief for Amherst University et al. as Amici 
Curiae 15-16; Brief for Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae 7; Brief for Six Educational Nonprofit 
Organizations as Amici Curiae 21). 
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addressed by social science research documenting the importance of racial diversity and 
race-conscious admissions, briefed by one or more of the many amicus social scientists,79 
nonprofits,80 corporations,81 or college basketball coaches.82 
5.4 Critical Masses: Social Scientists and Race Neutral Alternatives 
Unfortunately, Justice Alito is not alone in his estimations on racial diversity and 
the proper means of achieving that end.  Though he extensively references amici curiae in 
favor of the respondent, beneath the surface of the opinions is a battle of empirical 
analysis in predicting the effects different policies have on collegiate admissions.  In 
Fisher II there are three groups of amici offering scientific evidence for the Court:  the 
petitioner’s race-blind advocates, amici for neither party advocating for the elimination of 
race-based affirmative action and incorporation of class-based affirmative action, and 
                                                 
79 Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amicus Curiae the 
American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-
981); Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of 823 Social Scientists Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
80 See e.g. Brief of Six Educational Nonprofit Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education 
Association, et al., in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
81 Brief of Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of DuPont, IBM, Intel, and the National 
Action Council for Minorities in Engineering in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(No. 14-981). 
82 Brief of National Association of Basketball Coaches, Women’s Basketball Coaches Association, the 
National Association for Coaching Equity and Development, Geno Auriemma, Jim Boeheim, John Chaney, 
Jody Conradt, Tom Izzo, Mike Krzyzewski, Joanne P. McCallie, George Raveling, Nolan Richardson, Sue 
Semrau, Orlando ‘Tubby’ Smith, John R. Thompson, Jr., Tara Vanderveer, Dick Vitale, Coquese 
Washington, and Gary Williams as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016) (No. 14-981). 
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amici for the respondent arguing for the preservation and expansion of race-conscious 
admissions.  Or, as I call them, the contentious colorblind, the class critics, and the race-
conscious cheerleaders, respectively.   
Amici for the respondent and neither party both argue that using race to achieve 
racial diversity is fatally flawed since any means of achieving diversity considers race 
and is in their eyes unconstitutional.  These two groups diverge on proposed alternatives.  
The contentious colorblind would simply eliminate any consideration of race and let life 
find a way.  The class critics follow the liberal wing of post-racialism,83 acknowledging 
the struggles of people, of color but rooting their oppressions and systemic disadvantage 
in problems of class inequality.  Class critics oppose race-conscious affirmative action in 
favor of alternatives that emphasize socioeconomic status; like the infamous Richard 
Sander whose mismatch theory is cited extensively by the amici for the petitioner and 
noted by Justice Scalia at oral argument.  Sander argues that ending racial affirmative 
action and endorsing only socioeconomic affirmative action will achieve the same end.  
Amici for the respondent, the race-conscious cheerleaders, advocate for the use of race as 
a crucial factor in admissions for achieving the important goal of diversity and directly 
refute the other two groups of amici.  All 68 of the amici for Respondent argue for 
affirmative action and the importance of racial diversity in higher education, with most of 
                                                 
83 Cho, supra note 59, at 1602 (explaining that for liberal post-racialists  
the fundamental concern is that race talk obscures “the truly disadvantaged”; they prefer 
an inchoate analysis that draws upon the class critique, although in a much more inert, but 
palatable, manner.30 Practical post-racialists decry race-based remedies because they pose 
a “zero-sum” game that injures whites in order to benefit people of color. In order to 
achieve racial equality, these post-racialists fear that “playing the race card” will ultimately 
destroy the willingness of whites to pursue racial justice due to false accusations of racism.) 
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these race-conscious cheerleaders arguing for expansion of existing affirmative action 
programs. 
Most of the argument between social scientific standards happens in the amicus 
phase of the Case, with little making it in to the final opinions of the Court.  Certain 
elements carry through, like the critique of SAT testing or the principles of 
Socioeconomic status, but few of the arguments made by amici make it to the final 
opinions of the justices.  While this may make amici seem redundant, the fact that some 
of the sources and data make it into elements of the final opinion, even if the briefs are 
not cited, shows these opinions are at least considered.  Table 2 shows the discrete 
differences in sources used and the number of amicus in favor of respondent 
outnumbering the number in favor of petitioner by nearly five to one.  The many amici 
for respondent shows strong, diverse support for race-based affirmative action, but could 
also lead to reader fatigue in creating a larger workload for the justices, or more likely 
their clerks.  Expressed as percentages of the authorities used in each area in Table 2, the 
respondent and the three briefs in support of neither party draw largely from academic 
articles, either law journals or peer-reviewed journals to support their arguments.  
Petitioner on the other hand relies most on the constitutional standard, though 
interestingly use periodicals slightly more than academic articles, in supporting its 
analyses.  Each of the following sections takes a brief substantive look at the primary 
authorities in each camp, and with special note to how these arguments intersect and are 
taken up by the Court, if at all. 
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Table 2: Authorities Referenced in Fisher II Amicus Briefs 
Source 
Petitioner Amici 
(n = 13) 
Respondent 
Amici 
(n = 68) 
Neither Party 
(n = 3) 
N % N % N % 
Administrative Regulations 0 0% 7 0% 0 0% 
Amicus Curiae 5 1% 49 1% 1 1% 
Petitioner: Merits Brief 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Respondent: Merits Brief 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Federal Appellate Courts 25 6% 70 2% 2 2% 
Federal District Courts 18 4% 36 1% 1 1% 
State Appellate Courts 3 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
State Supreme Court 5 1% 14 0% 0 0% 
Supreme Court 160 36% 745 22% 10 8% 
Congressional Record 1 0% 46 1% 0 0% 
Congressional Report 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
U.S. Constitution 7 2% 26 1% 0 0% 
Datasets 0 0% 9 0% 0 0% 
Books or Treatises 29 7% 291 9% 46 37% 
Census 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
The College Board 0 0% 19 1% 0 0% 
Academic Article (Law 
Journal or Peer Reviewed) 
54 12% 888 27% 34 27% 
Periodical (Magazine or 
Newspaper) 
57 13% 169 5% 15 12% 
Report 0 0% 212 6% 0 0% 
Other 6 1% 47 1% 10 8% 
UT Admissions Office 1 0%  0%  0% 
Website 32 7% 418 13% 5 4% 
Factual Record 2 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Government or Professional 
Association 
18 4% 142 4% 1 1% 
Oral Argument 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
State Law 13 3% 51 2% 0 0% 
Federal Statute 5 1% 52 2% 0 0% 
U.N. and International 
Jurisdictions 
0 0% 27 1% 0 0% 
Totals 443 100% 3318 100% 125 100% 
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5.4.1 Colorblindness as Neutrality 
From the Petitioner’s brief and their Amicus, the line of argument follows 
traditional patterns of race-blind discourse that we saw in Alito’s dissent and the different 
strategies of colorblindness discussed in Chapter 2.  Petitioners and their amici make a 
moral equivocation between race-conscious remedies and racism or “racialism” of the 
past.84  Affirmative action is treated the same as Jim Crow segregation, making any 
consideration of race hostile to principles of equal protection under the constitution.  
Petitioner’s briefs for certiorari85 and merits brief argue that the use of race “comes at 
extraordinarily high cost [because] . . . . it ‘demeans the dignity and worth of a 
person.’”86  Therefore by eliminating the consideration of race-conscious admissions, all 
of this indignity could be avoided, because this indignity “is far too high a price to pay 
for any marginal benefit the use of racial preferences may confer on underrepresented 
minority students.”87  Some of the amici argue that the race-conscious admissions go 
                                                 
84 Id. at 1603. 
85  
86 Brief for Petitioner at 47, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (quoting Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. at 746 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000))). 
87 Id.  
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even further by conferring an “undue preference” for Black students in the admissions 
process,88 and the University holds secret negative quotas against Asian Americans.89   
Statistical analyses included to support these bold claims are not sound and do not 
withstand scrutiny—which may explain why they are not used in the final opinions.  For 
example, the work of Althea K. Nagai gets cited in multiple briefs,90 but is, at best, 
willfully obtuse, and, at worst, racist.  Her calculations and logistic models claim to 
estimate odds of admission for whites and Asian Americans based on the median scores 
of “Black admittees.”  Nagai’s methods are incredibly vague in how she conceptualizes 
her measures and probabilities, saying she controls for “other factors” without describing 
what factors are eliminated or what confounding variables might exist.91  This is 
methodologically crucial since describing the way data is presented, narrowed, and 
evaluated defines the measured effects and identifies whether the correlation is measuring 
what Nagai proposes to measure, or simply a series of false positives known in statistics 
as Type I error.  Similarly, Nagai does not include a coefficient of determination, “r2” for 
                                                 
88 Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et. al in Support of Petitioner at 27, Fisher II, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief for the CATO institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
27, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
89 Brief Amicus Curiae of Jonathan Zell in Support of Petitioner at 25-27, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(No. 14-981); Brief of Amici Curiae the Asian American Legal Foundation and the Asian American 
Coalition for Education (Representing 117 Affiliated Asian American Organizations) in Support of 
Petitioner at 9-23, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
90 Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et. al in Support of Petitioner at 27, Fisher II, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief for the CATO institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
27, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
91 See e.g. Althea K. Nagai, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in Undergraduate Admissions at the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, Center for Equal Opportunity (September 13, 2011) (online at 
http://www.ceousa.org/attachments/article/546/U.Wisc.undergrad.pdf) 
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any of her regression models, or any other measures for goodness-of-fit.  R2 describes 
how well a regression model describes the variation in a dependent variable based on the 
included data, allowing researchers to see whether there could be additional variables that 
would explain changes in the dependent variable.92  In other words, for all the sweeping 
statistical assumptions Nagai makes about the relationship between race and admissions, 
there is nothing in her data that would indicate it is a direct relationship, and not effected 
by the presence of other confounding, intervening variables.  The statistical significance 
she describes only means that it is unlikely the differences in the data are due to chance. 
Furthermore, Nagai’s predictions are statistically biased against Black students.  
Nagai uses the median standardized test score and GPA of admitted Black male students 
as her control, eliminating all data in her sample that does not match this variable.  Every 
applicant she studies must a GPA and test score equal to the median score for Black 
males.  Nagai does not state what this changes the sample size to, or how this drastic 
narrowing of the sample effects the demographics of her data.  Instead, Nagai reports in 
multiple studies that Black students have a near 100% probability of admission, using this 
as evidence of bias against white and Asian students.93  In essence, Nagai’s probability 
model simply shows that nearly 100% of Black students with a specified test score and 
                                                 
92 Terance D. Miethe and Jane Florence Gauthier, SIMPLE STATISTICS APPLICATIONS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 
248 (2008); Anna Leon-Guerrero and Chava Frankfort-Nachmias. ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL STATISTICS FOR 
A DIVERSE SOCIETY 274-248 (2011); David Faigman, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders, & Edward K. 
Cheng, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY: STATISTICS AND 
RESEARCH METHODS 384 (2010). 
93 Compare Nagai, supra note 91, with Althea K. Nagai, Racial and Ethnic Admission Preferences at 
Arizona State University College of Law, Center for Equal Opportunity (September 13, 2011) (online at 
http://www.ceousa.org/attachments/article/541/ASU_LAw.pdf) 
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GPA have the same test score and GPA as a Black male student.  In other words, all 
Black students admitted to the University with these scores and GPA were admitted to 
the University with these scores and GPA.  All blue skies are blue.   
Nagai’s research is circular logic masquerading as quantitative analysis with the 
sole purpose of obscuring and confusing issues of race through statistics.  Her statistical 
reports do not meet basic standards for statistical analysis and presentation of data, failing 
to describe the demographics of the cases in the sample, the meaning of variables, or 
even which variables are used as independent or dependent in the analysis.  Nagai is not 
actually measuring or describing anything quantitatively or quantitatively significant to 
admissions, but only summarizing the percentages of students that fit into narrow 
arbitrarily defined categories.  She refers to this data as a “chance” or “probability” of 
admission, but nothing indicates the weight a university gives to race in admissions.  
Nagai is not looking at rate of admission, but only how students fit to an arbitrarily 
defined median.  None of her reports or data are from peer reviewed journals, but private 
reports posted online.  Nagai’s dubious, problematic, and racist, methodology and 
complete lack of explanation for data collection or control factors or other statistically 
sound techniques invalidate her approach, likely explaining why her studies are cited to 
but never fully addressed or interrogated.   
Qualitatively, some in the contentious colorblind crowd argue that race is too 
confusing a topic, offering Elizabeth Warren, the Senator from Massachusetts with 
professed Cherokee heritage, and Rachel Dolezal, a white woman who claimed to be 
Black for many years, as examples of how self-identification in race conscious 
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admissions can go wrong.  The greatest harm presented here is that self-identification by 
race is imprecise and arbitrary.94  This fear of racial imposters presents very little in the 
way of substantively saying why race-conscious admissions do or do not work, but only 
that the consideration of race is sillier for having to deal with people like Ms. Dolezal.  
What these briefs leave out is the University’s holistic review process, which considers a 
plethora of other factors in the application; the mere mention of self-identified race would 
not considerably effect Ms. Dolezal’s application.  Yet these spurious examples in the 
Judicial Watch brief filter in principle into Justice Alito’s dissent, as noted earlier with 
his perplexed estimation of multiracial people.  In all cases, the core principle goes to the 
idea that race is somehow an overriding plus factor that will guarantee admission, but 
much like Nagai’s data or Justice Alito’s examples, these tangents are more misdirection 
than application of race or substantive questions of policy. 
5.4.2 Replacing Race with Class 
Although submitted in support of neither party, the Briefs of David Orentlicher, 
Richard Kahlenberg, and Richard Sander all argue against the use of race in admissions, 
offering race-neutral alternatives that focus on socioeconomic status.  All three of these 
White men are concerned that Universities are spending so much time focused on race 
that less attention is focused on socioeconomic status.  Richard Sander, the most cited of 
the three across the many briefs on all sides, argues that racial diversity has actually 
harmed students of color at elite colleges and universities, because they are 
                                                 
94 Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 
19, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
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“mismatched” in multiple ways.  Either they are mismatched in learning, and supposedly 
perform worse on standardized tests like the bar exam, mismatched in competition, since 
low grades lead to discouragement and dropout, and social mismatch, based on social 
isolation at a university.95  Rather than contemplate the litany of intervening factors that 
contribute to the treatment of students of color at elite institutions and law schools, 
Richard Sander blames the institution for using affirmative action to accept students of 
color to elite institutions, where, in his mind, they do not belong.   
Richard Sander’s data and analysis are largely gathered from his own studies, and 
none of his studies on mismatch have appeared in peer-reviewed journals.96  While law 
journals are important and valid publications for quantitative research, the fact that 
Sander’s statistical analysis of his mismatch theory has never been published in 
quantitative or peer-reviewed journal means it has not received the same methodological 
scrutiny in publication as other social scientific studies affirming the importance of race 
and affirmative action.  Instead it is evaluated for logical argumentation and legal 
validity, with less editorial supervision and revision of statistical measures than Sander’s 
research would receive in peer-reviewed quantitative journals.  Still, Sander’s research is 
very popular among conservatives opposed to affirmative action, like Justice Thomas in 
                                                 
95 Brief of Richard Sander in Favor of Neither Party at 17-19, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-
981). 
96 Richard Sander has published in peer-reviewed journals, see Richard Sander and Jane Bambauer, The 
Secret of My Success: How Status, Eliteness, and School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. Empirical 
Legal Studies 893 (2012).  This publication is not about his mismatch theory, but arguing that “there is 
little empirical basis for the overwhelming importance students assign to ‘eliteness’ in choosing a law 
school.”  Id. 
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Fisher I,97 multiple amicus for the petitioner,98 and Justice Scalia at oral argument.99  
Mismatch theory provides the seemingly neutral, empirical ammunition that 
conservative, race-blind constitutional scholars are looking for.  Statistics add an 
additional guise of neutrality, instead of embracing and acknowledging existing biases. 
Sander’s research is also popular among briefs for the respondent, but there the 
arguments are centered on disproving his underlying hypothesis, exposing his 
methodologies as flawed, and even pointing to underlying flaws in the data that in his 
work.100  Amicus briefs from Richard Lempert, Empirical Scholars, and Kimberly West-
Faulcon all explicitly state that they submitted their briefs in order to expose Richard 
Sander’s mismatch theory and Richard Kahlenberg’s research on socioeconomic status as 
scientifically unsound. 
                                                 
97 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2431-2432 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing to Brief for Richard Sander as Amicus 
Curiae, Fisher I, 133 S. ct. 2414 (2013) (No. 11-345)). 
98 Brief of Gail Heriot and Peter Kirsanow as Amicus Curiae at 29, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 
14-981); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et. al in Support of Petitioner at 17-18, Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief for the CATO institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 22, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
99 Transcript of Oral Argument at 67-68, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
100 Brief of Teach for America, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 
2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor W. Burlette Carter in Support of Respondents 
at 8, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education 
Association, et al. in Support of Respondents at 35-36, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae of Kimberly West-Faulcon in Support of Respondents, 16 – 28, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 
(2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support in Respondents at 12-23, 
Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of American Law 
Schools in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 
14-981); Brief of the American Educational Research Association et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Lempert in 
Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
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While the arguments in favor of replacing racial affirmative action with 
socioeconomic status survived to Justice Alito’s dissent, Richard Sander’s mismatch 
theory was left at oral argument.  When Justice Alito pressed counsel for the Respondent 
on the fact that selective institutions should recruit less students of color and have them 
admitted to “lesser schools” to increase performance, Mr. Garre quickly dismissed Justice 
Scalia’s phrasing of mismatch theory, noting that holistic admits to the University of 
Texas fare better at school.  He commented “I don’t think the solution to the problems 
with student body diversity can be to set up a system in which not only are minorities 
going to separate schools, they’re going to inferior schools.”101  Mr. Garre inverts 
postracial strategy, identifying the mismatch theory for what it is, a racist policy designed 
to redirect students of color from elite universities into lower tier schools.  While lower 
tier schools provide excellent educations to all students, the central point is that denying 
access to elite institutions removes social, cultural, and economic benefits that come with 
it; benefits that even Sander acknowledges in his peer-reviewed empirical studies.102 
5.4.3 Centralizing Race to Achieve Diversity 
Finally, the amici for respondent present a variety of perspectives advocating for 
the use of race-conscious admissions.  Ten of the briefs are from businesses, bar 
associations, doctors, college basketball coaches and military members, all arguing in 
favor of race-conscious admissions to recruit more students of color, to produce 
                                                 
101 Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
102 Sander & Bambauer, supra note 96. 
 229 
graduates of color and white graduates who understand how to work in diverse 
environments.103  Social scientists take up a large portion of the amicus curiae in favor of 
the University, not only arguing against mismatch theory but providing established social 
scientific evidence on intervening variables that explain racial isolation.  The Brief for 
Experimental Psychologists for instance, lists fourteen professors of psychology and 
other social scientists at schools across the nation to provide an excellent metasynthesis 
of stereotype threat literature.104  Simply put, they argue that when students are placed in 
learning environments where they are made to feel unwelcome, unable, or isolated 
because of racial stereotypes, academic performance suffers.  This research provides 
scientifically sound, alternative explanations and intervening variables for correlations 
between race, isolation, and high performing universities that Sander’s research ignores 
or fails to understand.  The mismatch Sander describes is not on the student, but 
stereotype threat identifies that it may be due to institutional failure to include or provide 
for students of color.  The experimental psychologists brief’s synthesis of research 
concludes that the essential task of University admissions is to “remedy the experience of 
racial isolation and tokenism that renews and amplifies stereotype threat.”105  However, 
                                                 
103 Brief of Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of DuPont, IBM, Intel, and the National 
Action Council for Minorities in Engineering in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(No. 14-981); Brief of National Association of Basketball Coaches, Women’s Basketball Coaches 
Association, the National Association for Coaching Equity and Development, Geno Auriemma, Jim 
Boeheim, John Chaney, Jody Conradt, Tom Izzo, Mike Krzyzewski, Joanne P. McCallie, George Raveling, 
Nolan Richardson, Sue Semrau, Orlando ‘Tubby’ Smith, John R. Thompson, Jr., Tara Vanderveer, Dick 
Vitale, Coquese Washington, and Gary Williams as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981);  
104 Brief Amicus Curiae for Experimental Psychologists, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
105 Id. at 32. 
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this lengthy analysis does not make it into the final opinion of the court.  Justice 
Kennedy’s majority does identify underlying issues of campus climate; racial isolation 
and loneliness receive a brief mention in the majority’s emphasis on the importance of 
classroom diversity.  Still, the majority’s discussion of the harms caused by a hostile 
campus climate only makes a rhetorical link to race-conscious admissions, without 
drawing from scientific evidence for support even in footnotes. 
 Fisher II is largely about the narrow tailoring in the University’s implementation 
of policy—showing that the race-neutral policies suggested by petitioner and amici are 
ineffectual, and necessitated a use of race-conscious admissions.  The University’s 
diversity study presents an internal empirical justification, bolstered by the many amicus 
briefs from other colleges and universities who have found that race-neutral admissions 
simply do not work to achieve a racially diverse student body.  Amici include other top-
tier state schools like the University of Michigan or the University of California school 
system, as well multiple briefs from other private and public universities.106  All of these 
                                                 
106 Brief for the University of Michigan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Leading Public Research Universities The University of Delaware, 
Indiana University, The University of Kansas, The University of Minnesota, The University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, The Pennsylvania State University, Purdue University, and Rutgers, The State University Of New 
Jersey, as Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief 
for Amicus Curiae Harvard University in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 
14-981); Brief of California Institute of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University, Case Western Reserve 
University, Emory University, George Washington University, Northwestern University, Rice University, 
Tulane University, University of Rochester and Washington University in St. Louis as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Brown University, 
University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, 
Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton 
University, Stanford University, Vanderbilt University, and Yale University in Support of Respondents, 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of American Law 
Schools, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amherst, Allegheny, Barnard, Bates, 
Bowdoin, Bryn Mawr, Carleton, Colby, Connecticut, Davidson, Dickinson, Franklin & Marshall, Grinnell, 
Hamilton, Hampshire, Haverford, Lafayette, Macalester, Middlebury, Mount Holyoke, Oberlin, Pomona, 
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universities urge the Court to strengthen its support of affirmative action, providing 
substantive examples of how bans on affirmative action in California and Michigan have 
harmed the admissions of students of color at top tier public universities in those states.   
 Despite the quantitative and qualitative data presented by the many amici scholars 
and schools, the Court does not draw on their briefs as authorities in its analysis.  The 
only amicus brief cited by the Court comes from the Asian American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, bolstering the Court’s argument that students of all races benefit from 
race-conscious admissions, and “the contention that the University discriminates against 
Asian-Americans is ‘entirely unsupported by evidence in the record or empirical 
data.’”107  This secondary citation to empirical data is about as close as the Court gets to 
citing to a scientific source other than the University’s diversity study, despite the wealth 
of options provided by amicus briefing.  Oddly, Justice Alito’s citations to universities 
for the notion that SAT scores correlate to race and class is the most extensive use of the 
race-conscious cheerleader amici, but quoted and used entirely out of context.  For the 
majority, the Court’s institutional authority on affirmative action is sufficient for the 
written opinion even though the amici and scientific evidence are overwhelmingly in 
support of race-based affirmative action.  Justice Alito’s a-contextual strawmen 
                                                 
Reed, Sarah Lawrence, Simmons, Smith, St. Olaf, Swarthmore, Trinity, Union, Vassar, Wellesley, And 
Williams Colleges, and Bucknell, Colgate, Tufts, Washington & Lee, And Wesleyan Universities, Amici 
Curiae, Supporting Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of the President and Chancellors of the University of California as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
107 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2207 (2016) (quoting Brief for Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
et al. as Amici Curiae at 12). 
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arguments highlights the ways in which scientific evidence is merely another tool at the 
Court’s disposal, and it does not have to be used for its intended purpose.  In the end, the 
bounty of social scientific evidence presented to the Court is not crucial to the legal 
argument, either in citation or analogy, but the ideas seep in to the opinions of the Court.  
Social science amici inform the Court and the dissent’s framings of race in education, but 
the arguments and analysis of social scientists get lost in translation as the majority 
declines to use most of the social science evidence and the dissent reframes and misuses 
evidence. 
5.5  Conclusion: Conceptualizing Race and Policy 
Justice Kennedy’s sudden swing for the liberal wing of the Court to author his 
first ever majority opinion in favor of affirmative action placed him at the center of a 
methodological dispute over the use of race-conscious policies in higher education.  
Although the Court remanded Fisher I only on the question of narrow tailoring, the 
conceptualization of race was fore fronted by all parties in the litigation.   The necessity 
of housing segregation to achieve some degree of admissions for people of color at the 
University of Texas was mentioned, but was never substantively or systematically 
addressed.  Although the Court now approves of the top ten percent in hybrid form with 
the race-conscious holistic admissions policy, the necessity of the race-conscious 
admissions may only increase over time if anything is done about housing segregation in 
Texas—but this is unfortunately incredibly unlikely.  Even though Inclusive Communities 
preserved disparate impact as a claim, the specificity that the district court interpreted the 
Court’s opinion to require imposes a lofty standard.  Housing discrimination and 
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educational segregation are networked in an interlocking, overlapping series of 
oppressions based on racial discrimination and white supremacy.  Taken together Fisher 
II and Inclusive Communities theoretically are an indictment of Texas’ history of racial 
discrimination, identifying how even remedial policies like fair housing or affirmative 
action have failed to stem the tide of white supremacy.   
Instead we are left with a question of goodness of fit for the factor-of-a-factor use 
of race.  Those opposed to race-conscious admissions, like the dissenting Justices and 
parties supporting the petitioner, want to establish the most stringent restrictions and 
narrowest of margins for the consideration of race.  In this view, race cannot be 
quantified without becoming inappropriate racial balancing or seeking parity with state 
demographics.  Chief Justice Roberts dismissed qualitative measures of race by balking 
at the idea of surveys to establish campus climate calling the questions “sophomoric” and 
inadequate.108  These survey measures in the record were mean to gauge campus climate, 
and measure the diversity as experienced by students of color in the learning environment 
on campus.  Still, Justice Alito, both at oral argument and in his dissenting opinion is 
focused on establishing limiting principles, that do not provide much room for operation 
or error, but only limitations.  Taken together with the series of strawmen and 
cherrypicked statistics that accuse the University of using holistic admissions to admit 
legacies and affluent minorities, the dissenters’ objection is not to any particular measure, 
but the concept of race-consciousness in and of itself.   
                                                 
108 Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
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Justice Breyer considered as much at oral argument, pushing the petitioner to 
answer when, if ever, race could be used to accomplish racial diversity, which the Court 
had previously established as constitutional.  All the race neutral alternatives provided by 
the Petitioner focused on other factors like socioeconomic status or the top ten percent 
plan, but as Justice Breyer pushed at oral argument: “That’s not to use race.  I’m saying r-
a-c-e, race.  I want to know which are the things they could do that, in your view, would 
be okay.  Because I’m really trying to find out.  Not fatal in fact, we’ve said.”109  But the 
petitioner provided no answer other than Justice Powell’s suggestion of racial tiebreakers 
in Bakke.110  In order for race-conscious polices to be properly measured by the Supreme 
Court, it seems there needs to be some agreement on the operationalization of race in 
university policy:  how can the University use race to meet the goals that the court has 
deemed acceptable? 
Justice Kennedy’s majority provides some answers by deferring to the 
University’s contextual conceptualization of race and race-conscious policy, making the 
key measure of narrow tailoring transparency.  While Justice Alito’s dissent takes issue 
with the University’s interpretation of the facts and its use of them, Justice Kennedy is 
quite taken with the University’s continued, periodic assessment of its use of race-
conscious policies.  The constitutional measurement and significance in Justice 
Kennedy’s estimation has already been established by precedent, it’s just a matter of 
whether the University is properly interrogating its own practices.  Measurement then is 
                                                 
109 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Fisher II, 136 s. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
110 Id. at 33. 
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left to those who are closest to the subject matter, and most understanding of its practice.  
Inclusive Communities failed to make an impact after it was dismissed at the district 
court,111 but Fisher II looks to have a broader reach as Justice Kennedy’s opinion closes 
by giving “considerable deference” to a University’s pursuit of diversity within 
constitutional boundaries.  Rather than proscribe a method of affirmative action, Justice 
Kennedy compares public universities to states under federalism, to serve as “laboratories 
for experimentation” in their use of data to craft approaches to diversity, with “constant 
deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies.”112  Justice Alito 
used more social science in his dissenting opinion to rebut established evidence, but 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion provides a research mandate for public universities.  Scientific 
evidence may not have been cited by the majority, but the opinion of the Court 
necessitates rigorous, consistent study of race in higher education.
                                                 
111 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, et al., No. 
3:08-CV-0546-D (N.D. Tex.) Mem. Op. 
112 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J. 
concurring)). 
 236 
6 Conclusion 
It’s important, therefore, to know who the real enemy is, and to know the 
function, the very serious function of racism, is distraction. It keeps you 
from doing your work. It keeps you explaining, over and over again, your 
reason for being. Somebody says you have no language, so you spend 
twenty years proving that you do. Somebody says your head isn’t shaped 
properly, so you have scientists working on the fact that it is. Somebody 
says you have no art, so you dredge that up. Somebody says you have no 
kingdoms, so you dredge that up.  
None of that is necessary.  
There will always be one more thing. 
 
– Toni Morrison, “Black Studies Center public dialogue,” Portland State 
University, May 30, 1975 
 
 Precedent is the central paradigm of law in the United States.  Prior 
decisions of the Court create a complex codification of tradition that is not easily 
overturned and guides the course of legal developments for future generations.  The 
United States began as a country built on laws, but also ideologies and institutions.  
White supremacy, the enslavement of people as property, genocide of Indigenous 
peoples, and the expansion and privatization of land are part of the traditions of law in the 
United States.  At one point, these were perfectly legal and accepted.  Today they are less 
commonly accepted, but still embedded in the law in some part—they are still part of 
legal precedent.  The law may bend, adapt, change directions, but it remains tied to its 
legacy of past decisions. 
Sometimes policies change for the better, with the Supreme Court altering course 
on a legacy of oppression.  Brown v. Board of Education remains the shining example in 
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a shift in the Court’s interpretation of race, but this turn was anything but abrupt.1  A 
series of previous opinions desegregated higher education,2 providing precedent to make 
such a sweeping pronouncement against segregation in public education in Brown.  
However, the Court’s incorporation of “modern authority,” social science research on the 
harms of racial segregation, as grounds for rejecting Plessy’s precedent made Brown 
special.3  Modern authority, as discussed in Chapter 3, signaled the Court’s openness to 
alternative interpretations on race, and that scientific studies exposing oppression and 
racism are valid at the Court. 
The problem with “modern authority” is that the ideologies, the institution, the 
epistemology of the Court remains untouched.  It is the facts, the amicus, the 
circumstances that changed.  Modern authority may offer fresh evidence on a social 
issue, but still validates the social, institutional, and ideological power of the Court.  The 
machine is working, it simply had the wrong input.  As Toni Morrison explains, racism 
“keeps you explaining, over and over again, your reason for being.”4  Brown’s authorities 
did not make a new or groundbreaking finding, the detrimental effects of racism and 
white supremacy were well known and studied, especially to social scientists, even at the 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (mandating a state law school for Black students 
or integration of the existing white law school); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma,332 U.S. 361 (1948) (mandating that the University of Oklahoma provide equal instruction and 
admit qualified Black applicants); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (desegregating Texas’ law 
school); McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (desegregating graduate schools). 
3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
4 Toni Morrison, “A Humanist View” (presentation, Black Studies Center Public Dialogue, Portland State 
University, Portland, Oregon, May 30, 1975). 
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time of Plessy v. Ferguson.5  Just three years after the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 
W.E.B. Du Bois published his groundbreaking mixed-method sociological study  the 
Philadelphia Negro, which, in spite of its “Victorian moralizing,” 6 used qualitative 
surveys and quantitative statistical analyses to show oppressive conditions of crime and 
poverty in the Black Community were rooted in racial inequality—refuting the 
pseudoscientific racist assumptions of Black immorality or criminality.7  Du Bois’ work 
pioneered the field of sociology, both methodologically and substantively.8  The social 
scientific authority was nearly contemporary with Plessy, long predated Brown, and 
provided ample verifiable evidence of the oppressive nature of racism.   
But this Du Bois critical social science would not receive legal consideration until 
Brown, thanks to the legal strategizing of Charles Hamilton Houston.  Brown solidified 
consideration of scientific evidence in equal protection law,9 but provided no standards 
for evaluating or incorporating social scientific evidence.  Since Brown, the Court has 
sent mixed messages in what scientific evidence is acceptable.  At times the Court 
encourages and protects statistical analysis, like affirming disparate impact under the 
                                                 
5 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6 Khalil Gibran Muhammad, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF 
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8 Aldon Morris, THE SCHOLAR DENIED: W.E.B. DU BOIS AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY (2015). 
9 Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 
279, 294 (2005); Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the 
Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 828 (2002); Michael Selmi, Proving 
Intentional Discrimination and the Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L. J. 279, 300 (1997);  
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Civil Rights Act in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,10 but at others acknowledging the 
scientific validity while rejecting the legal relevance of multivariate regressions 
indicating a statistically significant increase in application of the death penalty for Black 
defendants in McCleskey v. Kemp.11  More than sixty years after Brown the Court is still 
searching for the proper methods and methodologies to consider race and scientific 
evidence at the Supreme Court, as evidenced in the recent opinions in Inclusive 
Communities v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs12 and Fisher v. 
University of Texas.13 
6.1 Scientific evidence in Fisher II and Inclusive Communities 
Inclusive Communities and Fisher II highlight the law’s murky relationship with 
social sciences as the Court is given findings from a variety of social scientific sources to 
guide the Court’s inquiry.  In Inclusive Communities, at the district and appellate court 
the respondent provided data on the distribution of Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
with sufficient statistical disparity to indicate a discriminatory effect.  The tax credit is 
disproportionately provided in majority minority communities, which perpetuates 
residential segregation by limiting federal and local funding for housing opportunities for 
people of color.  In Fisher II, the University of Texas used a top ten percent program to 
try and increase student body diversity after the Fifth Circuit eliminated race-based 
                                                 
10 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
11 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
12 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2504 (2015). 
13 (Fisher II), 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
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affirmative action in 1996.  After years without successfully remedying its lack of 
diversity, the University studied campus climate and decided to supplement the top ten 
percent program with race-conscious holistic file review in admissions to add the lacking 
racial diversity on campus.  In both cases, the Court considers problems faced by people 
of color arising from both the legacies of past policies of racial discrimination, the 
ongoing effects of racism in the lived experiences of people of color, and the purpose or 
efficacy of policies meant to remedy the harms of racial discrimination.  The Court 
considered the specifics of each case, with studies and analyses of the context 
surrounding Inclusive Communities and Abigail fishers claims, supplemented with a 
multitude of social scientific analyses, but very few, if any, of these analyses became part 
of the Court’s written decision. 
Because the Court lacks methodology for analyzing facts and social scientific 
evidence, either arising from the case or amicus curiae, analyses of these cases are left 
only with the different typologies of fact described in Chapter 3.  Whether David 
Faigman’s typology of constitutional facts14 or Angelo Ancheta’s five functions of 
scientific evidence,15 these after the fact categorizations of Supreme Court evidence and 
writings are informative as a retrospective but offer little for describing how to present 
evidence to the Court or understanding how the weight the Court may give these facts.  In 
Inclusive Communities, the argument is both a doctrinal debate as to whether the equal 
protection clause and Fair Housing Act contemplate claims of discriminatory effect, as 
                                                 
14 David Faigman, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008). 
15 Angelo Ancheta, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (2006) 
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well as synthesis of reviewable facts drawn from legislative history and text of the Fair 
Housing Act.  Similarly, in Fisher II, the Court considers whether the University of 
Texas’ case-specific use of race-conscious admissions fit within the Court’s doctrinal 
interpretation of the diversity under the equal protection.  The combination of doctrinal 
and case-specific inquiry means the decision preserves the University’s use of affirmative 
action, but because the Court’s opinion emphasizes the uniqueness and reflexivity of 
Texas’ consideration of race and admissions it potentially limits the future applicability 
of the opinion.  While Justice Kennedy emphasizes that states are “laboratories” for 
experimenting with educational policy,16 without a methodology described by the Court it 
makes the scientific method of testing and retesting all the more difficult.  Yet if the 
dissent had won the day in Fisher II, the decision would not be limited to the facts of 
Texas’ admissions program, but serve to seriously curb, if not eliminate, race-conscious 
admissions policy across the nation.  For those invested in working against racism, and 
historical and present disadvantages created by white supremacy, the stakes are high. 
The controversy and high-stakes nature of cases involving race and discrimination 
may explain, at least in part, the many authorities and facts presented in Inclusive 
Communities and Fisher II.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I coded for the cited authorities used in 
all briefs and opinions.  In both cases, this surprisingly revealed that Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinions in these cases, did not depend on scientific evidence and barely cited to 
data beyond the official record and previous opinions of the Court.  Though there was a 
good deal of scientific evidence presented to the Court, especially in the eighty-four 
                                                 
16 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
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amicus curiae briefs presented in Fisher II, the majority opinion focused on the factual 
record presented by the lower courts, and apply a constitutional interpretation to those 
pre-existing facts.   
Instead it was the dissenting opinions that used scientific evidence to try and 
undermine the doctrinal interpretation of the Court.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is 
important to understand the Court operates on three levels: ideology, institutional power, 
and individual rights.  In these cases, the Majority speaks with the full judicial authority 
of the Supreme Court, lending ideological and institutional weight to its consideration of 
individual rights.  Because the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the 
constitution, and the majority of the Court represents the official opinion and direction of 
constitutional law, there is less need for external support from social scientific evidence.   
In this sense, the Court only needs to rationalize its opinion within the four corners of the 
Constitution—squaring whatever the Court has decided against previous opinions, the 
Constitution, or statutes.  Even in Brown, the modern authorities were only noted to 
contradict the Plessy Court’s understanding of the harms of segregation.  A change in 
context could change doctrine, but the circumstances for this kind of change are unclear.   
Dissents on the other hand, particularly Justice Alito’s dissents in Inclusive 
Communities and Fisher II, are trying to show that the majority is incorrect, not only as a 
matter of law, but as a matter of fact.  Justice Alito’s dissents are not demosprudential, in 
the sense that Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres use it, since Justice Alito is not “focused 
on enhancing the democratic potential of the work of lawyers, judges, and other legal 
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elites.”17  Instead the dissents use scientific evidence to undermine the framing of the 
majority’s opinion, attempting to sever the majority’s connection from a grounded 
reality.  Justice Alito’s dissents are less a call to the public to invest in democratic 
potential for social change outside the Court, and more of a one-sided strategy session for 
identifying potential test-cases and scenarios that could undermine the Court’s ruling.  
There are exceptions to every rule, but Justice Alito in Fisher II and Inclusive 
Communities seeks the exceptions that could break, or overwhelm the ruling of the court.  
In Fisher II, for example, almost all the scientific evidence presented demonstrates the 
importance of race and diversity to higher education, but the Court does not cite any of 
the scientific studies and the dissent misuses the available data to meet its own ends.  The 
Court’s arguments are still deeply tied to the conclusions of scientific research, noting the 
qualitative feelings of loneliness and isolation and the importance of the University’s 
study of campus climate, but the scientific evidence itself is not used. 
Consistently, the Court resorts to implied science and armchair psychology in 
describing issues of race in society, with few studies or citations.  Despite modern 
authorities, the Court is still caught in the same intent based presumption that won the 
day in Plessy v. Ferguson: if there is any social inferiority associated with racism it is 
“solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”18  In other 
words, the harms of racism are in the mindset of people of color, avoiding any structural, 
social, or institutional conception of racism.  This is same the oversimplification of 
                                                 
17 Guinier, Lani, “Demosprudence through Dissent,” Harvard Law Review 122, no. 4 (2008): 16. 
18 163 U.S.at 551. 
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racism that focuses on intent and individual acts of meanness, rather than effect.  Even 
cases which seem to undermine social or structural oppression like segregation locate 
harms in the minds of people of color.  Brown’s “modern authorities” included Kenneth 
Clark’s doll test which identified the psychological harms of segregation on self-
perception among Black youth.19  This is the same basic argument advanced by Sander’s 
mismatch theory and Justice Alito’s view of race-conscious policy—people of color’s 
individual self-perception is the focus, with little regard for the myriad structural and 
ideological factors of racism in crafting mindset.  Amici responding to mismatch theory 
and psychological harms with studies of stereotype threat and other psychological 
evidence creates a rigorous study that implicates not only the intent, but effects of racism.   
However, the Court does not rely on these studies.  Instead the Court relies on the 
University’s qualitative finding of “feelings of loneliness and isolation” among students 
of color, supplemented with references to a quantitative study of enrollment.20  Chief 
Justice Roberts was less convinced of these studies, calling a survey to identify campus 
climate “sophomoric” at oral argument,21 while Justice Alito dismissed these findings of 
isolation as “illogical” and needing clarification.22  Racism is therefore framed as a 
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psychological issue in the minds of people of color, at worst reactions to individual acts 
of meanness or at best feelings of loneliness and isolation, in need of clarification and 
further study.  These studies already exist, many are presented to the Court,23 and Justice 
Alito still finds them insufficient, even though he cites to these amici in his dissent.24  As 
Toni Morrison said, “there will always be one more thing.”25   
So, what is left for defining the meaning of social science in the legal construction 
of race?  Above all, if the goal is to undermine the ongoing presence of racism and white 
supremacy in society, there needs to be an epistemological and ontological shift in the 
way the Court conceptualizes issues of race.  Psychological facts, showings of intent are 
important, and there is very important work being done in the fields of quantitative 
studies, social psychology, and critical race theory.  These Critical Race Realists like 
Gregory S. Parks are driving a very important conversation on integrating empirical 
psychological data into legal pedagogies to “(1) expose racism where it may be found, (2) 
identify its effects on individuals and institutions, and (3) put forth a concerted attack 
                                                 
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2235-36 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
23 Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of Amicus Curiae the 
American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-
981); Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981); Brief of 823 Social Scientists Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
24 Id. 136 S. Ct. at 2234 n.11 (Alito, J. dissenting) (citing Brief for Amherst University et al. as Amici 
Curiae 15-16; Brief for Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae 7; Brief for Six Educational Nonprofit 
Organizations as Amici Curiae 21). 
25 Morrison, supra note 1. 
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against it, in part, via public policy arguments.”26  Empirical social sciences in 
psychology play a crucial role in undermining perceptions of intent, race, and racism. 
Inclusive Communities and Fisher II involved argument over remedies to 
discriminatory effects, but became entrenched in a debate over intent.  Disparate impact 
was justified in Inclusive Communities as a tool for rooting out discriminatory intent: “It 
permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape 
easy classification as disparate treatment.”27  The effects of housing segregation, social 
and structural racism are overlooked for identifying discriminatory intent in housing.  
Similarly, in Fisher II, the Court twice mentions the top ten percent plan’s reliance on 
housing segregation, but still affirms this admissions policy as part of the larger scheme 
for meeting the institution’s educational goals.  The harms of segregated education or 
racism in education, particularly hostile campus climate, are drawn back to the way they 
impact individual rights—either Fisher’s or individual students of color.  However, these 
are not connected back to larger ideological forces of white supremacy and racism that 
influence both policy and individualized harms. 
Racism in housing and education are interwoven in ideologies, institutions, and 
conceptions of individual rights throughout society.  These I’s of the Court discussed in 
Chapter 2 highlight the layers of power in the Court’s opinions, yet the Court only seems 
to acknowledge a one-way effect from institution to individual—congress’ effect on an 
                                                 
26 Gregory S. Parks, “Toward a Critical Race Realism,” in Critical Race Realism: Intersections of 
Psychology, Race, and Law, eds. Gregory S. Parks, Shayne Jones, and W. Jonathan Cardi (New York, NY: 
The New Press, 2008) 7. 
27 Slip. Op. at 17. 
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individual realtor, higher education’s effects on individual students, or psychological 
effects on individual tenants or students.  However, what is missing is the connection 
back to ideology, even in Critical Race Realism.  Ideology is masked and left behind the 
scenes, addressed in writings of Critical Race Theory, but not taken up by the Critical 
Race Realists in the social psychological, empirical studies branch of CRT.  In the spirit 
of making “critical race theory more systematic,”28 I want to conclude with a proposal for 
a Critical Race Methodology, adding an empirical and sociological lens to legal analysis. 
6.2 Eyes on the Prize: Towards a Critical Race Methodology 
Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society  
can be understood without understanding both. 
-C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination 
 
From the its roots in the pioneering work of W.E.B. Du Bois, the field of 
sociology is built upon what C. Wright Mills terms “the sociological imagination.”29  
Mills situates the sociological imagination a lens of historical and sociocultural 
awareness that “enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of 
its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals.”30  A 
sociological imagination is a call to context, understanding individuals and society in 
tandem and dialectical tension; “a sociological imagination enables us to grasp history 
and biography and the relations between the two within society.  That is its task and its 
                                                 
28 Parks, supra note 8. 
29 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (1959, Oxford U.P. 2000) (Kindle edition). 
30 Id. 
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promise.”31  Wright’s sociological imagination tasks social scientists not only with a 
methodology that keeps society and the individual in view, but fosters an important 
responsibility between power and knowledge, “to reveal. . . the meaning of structural 
trends and the decisions for these milleux.”32  John Calmore offers a similar charge for 
attorneys engaged in “rebellious” or social justice oriented lawyering, understanding 
“how to work with the client community, not just on behalf of it.”33  Mill and Calmore 
represent those in sociology and law who believe in social justice that stress the 
importance and obligation of the attorney or the scholar to society.   
At the core of this commitment is a paradigmatic shift that simultaneously 
recognizes the parties, the case, and the context in which it arises.  Du Bois understood 
this not just as a sociologist, but that as a Black man in the United States the disconnect 
between his sense of self and the structural, social hostility towards his blackness created 
a “second-sight,” a “double consciousness” that searches for a unified vision of self both 
internally and externally.34  From the sociological imagination, rebellious lawyering, and 
double consciousness, I argue that Critical Race Methodologies must be grounded in that 
second sight, by looking both at the law in the context of legal doctrine, but also the 
broader social context in which the law was formed, exists, and will continue to exist. 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the 
Intersections of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 Fordham L. Rev.1936 
34 Du Bois, supra note  
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Connecting law’s ideological, institutional, and individual powers is nothing new, 
and in fact is a core tenant of critical race theory: trying to understand that “vexed 
bond”35 between race and the law identifies conditions of oppression and possibility.  I 
argue that CRT can transform legal studies through a critical race methodology—a way 
of knowing, understanding, and researching the law which grounds the researcher, the 
law (both ideologically and institutionally), and individuals in society.  Sociologist Mary 
Romero’s critique of psychology in LatCrit and OutCrit offers three principles from the 
sociological imagination to strengthen Critical Race research and analysis:  increased use 
of ethnographic research, establish connections between the personal and 
structural/historical, and ground analysis in institutional structure.36  In turning to a 
Critical Race Methodology, I want to draw off of these principles, but supplement them 
with insights from institutional ethnography and the broader work in Critical Race 
Theory to offer some methodological principles of research that combine social scientific 
and legal insights.  Critical Race Methodology can include analysis of psychology and 
intent, but must connect to sociohistorical context that recognizes the ideological, 
institutional, and individual function of racial power in law and everyday life. 
 Critical Race Methodology (CRM) therefore relies on the central tenants of 
critical race theory, but focuses on how these ideas are implemented in research.  CRM 
will grow and evolve through use, critique, and practice, but from the outset I want to 
offer four guideposts to CRM studies of law. 
                                                 
35 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). 
36 Mary Romero, Revisiting OutCrits with a Sociological Imagination, 50 Vill. L. Rev.925, 937-938 (2005). 
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6.2.1 The Centrality of Race 
First, racism is endemic to society, and the status quo of legal power necessarily 
depends on the socio-legal construction of race and perpetuation of white supremacy in 
the United States.  Just as Dorothy Smith and institutional ethnographers urge to keep the 
institution in view,37 in CRM this means keeping racism, both historical and present, in 
view.  Unlike the postracialism of the Roberts’ Court, which historicizes and condemns 
oppression as prior bad acts that are now expunged from the record,38 I want to repeat the 
wisdom of CRT in acknowledging race as a social construct with real and profound 
effects on the everyday lived experiences of people of color.  Racial power is at the root 
of the social, economic, and political development of the United States.  From slavery, 
land exchanges, and genocide that racial capitalism in the United States is built on, to the 
systems of mass incarceration, state violence, cultural appropriation, housing 
discrimination, and many other manifestations of white supremacy that exist today, the 
law makes this history and reality possible, legitimate, and insulated from systematic 
governmental critique.   
But while I want to underscore the centrality of race, this is not to the exclusion of 
other social and political identities.  Recognizing the centrality of race also means 
recognizing intersectionality, or how race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and other 
                                                 
37 Dorothy Smith, INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY: A SOCIOLOGY FOR PEOPLE 59 (2005); Marjorie L. 
DeVault & Liza McCoy, Institutional Ethnography:  Using Interviews to Investigate Ruling Relations, in 
INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY AS PRACTICE 17 (Dorothy Smith, ed., 2006). 
38 See infra Chapter 2; Sumi Cho, Postracialism, 94 IOWA L. REV 1589, 1594 (2008). 
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social identities are connected, and often regulated and defined by law.39  Life is not as 
simple as one experience, and recognizing the way varied social identities and roles are 
imbricated, overlap, and shift fosters understanding of the law itself.  In practice of 
research, this means applying a social lens to both empirical and legal data gathered.  
Law is an institution, but it is implemented by people as lawyers, judges, Justices, and 
clients.  Taking notice of the identities and roles of these individuals in their institutional 
context adds an important lens to the operation of law.  My goal is not a predictive 
model, which has eluded quantitative legal scholars,40 which forecasts and synthesizes 
general behaviors of the Court and the nine Justices.  Instead CRM centralizes the social 
and historic role that identity may play in any given legal case—from the parties 
involved, their attorneys, and judges.  Just as Institutional Ethnography urges researchers 
to reflexively engage in research moving between researcher, individuals, and their 
institutional roles,41 CRM keeps race, racism, white supremacy, and the lived, 
intersectional experiences of people in view as well. 
6.2.2 Triangulating the I’s of the Court 
                                                 
39 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989). 
40 Quantitative research has created great models for analysis of court behavior, but none of the models is 
able to forecast judicial behavior broadly.  See e.g. Theodore Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin, & 
Kevin M. Quinn. The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to 
Predicting Supreme Court Decision making, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2011); Daniel Martin Katz, 
Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-
Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L. J. 909 (2013); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. 
Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. 
Spaeth, & Sara C. Benesh, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2005); Harold J. 
Spaeth & Michael F. Altfield, Influence Relationships within the Supreme Court: A Comparison of the 
Warren and Burger Courts, 38 WESTERN POL. Q. 70 (1985) 
41 Smith, supra note 37, at 50. 
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 Second, to keep racism and white supremacy in view, CRM triangulates the 
function of racism in law through the ideological, institutional, and individual roles of the 
Court.  Returning to Chapter 2’s “I’s of the Court,” the law operates ideologically, 
through institutions, on individuals—both in the sense of a single person and as a 
representation of the shared lived experiences of groups.  I suggest that by 
epistemologically and methodologically triangulating the function of race and the law 
between these I’s, it creates a critical perspective to the social, legal, and historical 
context.  Much of Critical Race Theory and critical sociology already engages in this 
task, I only ask that they do so in collaboration and in connection.  In legal practice, the 
three I’s of ideology, institutional, and individual become P’s of precedent, procedure, 
and parties.  There is little substantive difference between these connections, but the P’s 
are simply legal translations of the underlying principles of the I’s that would apply to 
academic legal research.  The P’s of practice represent how judicial ideology is crafted 
and implemented through precedent, institutional discourse is honed through legal 
procedure and rules of evidence to implement ideologies and precedent, and concerns the 
substantive rights of parties, defined by the institutional procedures like standing, and 
guided by precedent.   
In legal research and writing, the I’s of CRM identify necessary tools for 
identifying the sociological function of race and the law, but leave out a fourth I: 
“Intent.”  The law’s obsession with intent in cases involving race and racism obfuscates 
the social consequences and lived experiences of people of color.  Attributing racism only 
to intent, conscious or unconscious, gives racists both too much and too little credit.  
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Individuals participating in systematic oppression are simultaneously a cause and result 
of racism; just because someone did not invent racism does not mean their participation 
in it, active or passive, is not harmful and should not be held accountable.  Focusing on 
intent obfuscates the ways in which institutions have developed to serve the needs of 
white supremacy by negatively effecting the lives of people of color and appearing as 
neutral, or natural for whites.  The average white person may rarely intend to benefit 
from white supremacy, but that doesn’t change the beneficial effects of that come from 
living in a white supremacist society.  By centralizing race and triangulating between the 
I’s of the Court avoids falling into the trap of intent by focusing legal analysis from a 
social perspective on race, racism and lived experiences. 
6.2.3 Systematic, Subjective Legal Analysis 
 Finally, CRM bridges the artificial gap between sociological/empirical reasoning 
and legal reasoning.  Though there are many movements, conferences, and scholars 
dedicated to the use of quantitative methods, empirical analysis of courts, or economic 
possibilities within the law, there still is no research method for the study of law itself.  
The most advanced quantitative studies of the Court present interesting longitudinal 
analyses of judicial behavior and ideology, but these general studies of judicial patterns 
are not common.42  These interesting analyses create excellent guides to overall patterns 
in the Court, but when it comes to reading and analyzing a case it falls into traditional 
legal scholarship.  Law students are taught how to “think like a lawyer,” but there is no 
real practice or method of analysis beyond case law and legal writing.  There are legal 
                                                 
42 Segal & Spaeth, supra note 40; Segal, Spaeth, & Benesh, supra 40; Spaeth & Altfield, supra 40. 
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procedures for identifying a cause of action, harms, and remedies, but adding a 
sociological perspective broadens questions of research, while making legal research and 
analysis more systematic.   
A systematic CRM analysis theoretically triangulates the importance of race in 
the legal issue, and locates the case in its social and historical context.  In the 
Intermission, I begin establishing the systematic analysis by making my methods of 
research and analysis transparent.  A large part of a CRM approach to legal analysis is 
incorporating the reflexivity necessary for methodological rigor, incorporating C. Wright 
Mill’s sociological imagination and Gail Leatherby’s theorized subjectivity43 by 
understanding the researcher, lawyer, or interested observer is substantively involved in 
the process of making, understanding, and implementing law.  This means evaluating 
controlling precedent and dicta on equal footing.  It means investigating the sources and 
epistemologies of authorities within the particulars of a case.  Not just from the judicial 
authorities, but from the evidence and briefs as well.   
This also means changing legal education to include classes on research methods 
and methodologies; not just as tools for legal research or how to maximize available 
research resources.  The research tools available to Lawyers in paid and free research 
databases are immense, making a rigorous, reflexive methodological approach necessary 
to ensure that these sources are analyzed thoroughly, consistently, and in theoretically 
informed ways.  Law already has a lot in common with social scientific practice.  
                                                 
43 Gayle Leatherby, John Scott, & Malcolm Williams, OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN SOCIAL 
RESEARCH 115 (2013). 
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Qualitative interviews, ethnography, and quantitative data gathering are very much a part 
of modern legal practice.  Courts generate, record, and archive so much data there is a 
wealth of knowledge waiting to be analyzed and operationalized.  Social scientific 
evidence is an important part of opinions, but the underlying social scientific principles 
are crucial to the evolution of the law in a data rich society.  Understanding and 
implementing research methods and methodologies will help to reveal the validity or 
meaning of social scientific data presented to the Court, since all parties, lawyers, judges, 
and justices would be better equipped to make methodological judgements of research 
and evidence presented before a Court.  Similarly adding methodological rigor to legal 
research and analysis would help make law and legal reasoning more transparent to other 
lawyers, social scientists, and ideally anyone interested in studying the law. 
6.2.4 Race Matters 
 Law and social sciences the guiding social narratives that define race and 
maintain racial power in the United States.  Law and science mutually reinforce white 
supremacy in defining racial categories as hierarchies of power; normalizing and 
legitimizing racism through a false neutrality.  By placing racism, law, and social 
scientific research in context, we can identify the myriad of ways in which racial power is 
used to enforce inequalities, how social science may support or hurt visions of racial 
justice, and how legal actors understand the society the law is designed to regulate.  To 
paraphrase Kimberlé Crenshaw, the key is not just to understand the vexed bond between 
race, law, and social science, but to change it.44  Contextualizing social science and legal 
                                                 
44 Crenshaw, supra note 35. 
 256 
proceeding through a racism-conscious framework centralizes the function of race in the 
institutional, ideological, and individual power of the Court, identifying strategies for 
success and collaboration between bodies of literature.  The Court has used social 
scientific evidence to make and unmake structures of racial power in the United States, 
but with no clear method or procedure for evaluating when social scientific evidence may 
be relevant, outcome determinative, or just another brief that a law clerk must go through.  
The Court’s use of scientific evidence is fluid; shifting with judicial ideology, the 
institutional powers at stake, and the parties involved in a case.  To add scientific rigor 
through CRM at a law school level and in legal practice will help to make social science 
matter in a legal sense, and make law more scientifically valid. 
Of course, this all must begin with an epistemological, and in many ways 
ontological, shift in the law.  The Court has become so concerned with being race-
neutral, that the salience of race has become buried in tactics meant to evade the role the 
Court has played in entrenching white supremacy and racial power in the United States.  
It all begins, as Justice Sotomayor so beautifully summarizes in her dissent in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, with an acknowledgement that Race matters: 
Race matters in part because of the long history of racial minorities' being 
denied access to the political process. . . . Race also matters because of 
persistent racial inequality in society — inequality that cannot be ignored 
and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities. . . .  
And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, that cannot be 
discussed any other way, and that cannot be wished away. Race matters to 
a young man's view of society when he spends his teenage years watching 
others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighborhood where he grew up. 
Race matters to a young woman's sense of self when she states her 
hometown, and then is pressed, "No, where are you really from?", 
regardless of how many generations her family has been in the country. 
Race matters to a young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign 
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language, which he does not understand because only English was spoken 
at home. Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent 
judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: "I do not belong 
here." 
In my colleagues' view, examining the racial impact of legislation only 
perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that 
race matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the 
Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial 
discrimination. As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to 
carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish 
away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society. It 
is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion that what 
makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does matter.45 
 
Race consciousness makes Justices of the Court uncomfortable.  The Court’s role in 
making racial power makes the law a cornerstone for unmaking racial power, sometimes 
through decisions of the Court, but also in suggesting alternatives to legal practice.  A 
race-conscious Supreme Court seems like a fantasy, but if we are dreaming I want to take 
it a step further.  The Court must not only be race-conscious, but racism-conscious, 
reflexive, and methodologically rigorous in its analysis.  This means understanding the 
social significance of race and interpersonal, institutional, and ideological racisms that 
effect the everyday lives of people of color.   
                                                 
45 Schuette v. Coatlition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014). 
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NAME DESCRIPTION 
Amici Interests Stated interest in joining case as amicus curiae. 
Anti-Discrimination 
Stated opposition to racial discrimination, 
including claims of discrimination against whites 
dedicated to advancing racial equality 
and challenging all forms of 
segregation. 
 
Telling narratives of race in the United 
States 
 
Think-tank  
Business Interests Financial or other property interest at stake. 
developers, owners, managers, 
investors, local housing officials, and 
other persons interested in multifamily 
housing and speak on behalf of housing 
providers, who have daily experience in 
dealing with rules prohibiting 
discrimination in housing. 
 
legitimate business practices  
to safeguard the constitutional and 
statutory rights and business interests 
of its members and those similarly 
situated 
 
Effectiveness of Disparate-Impact 
Interest in preserving disparate-impact because of 
its litigation purposes. 
Federalism 
Belief in federal state relations, usually argued in 
favor of states. 
Governmental body 
Governmental interest in litigation, because it 
touches on governmental powers. 
Cities  
enforces FHA  
Respond to arguments that federalism 
cuts against DI 
 
Litigants in related cases decided by district 
courts 
 
Litigation and public policy experience, 
colorblindness 
 
Minimizing lawsuits  
Officials who have enforced Disparate 
Impact under the FHA 
 
Opposition to government imposed racial 
preferences 
 
organizations that provide ~~representation, 
advocacy, and services on behalf of victims 
of housing discrimination, as well as victims 
of domestic and sexual violence. 
 
Protecting residents and communities against 
housing discrimination 
 
Provide history of governmental policies in 
creating segregated patterns 
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provide the Court with current social science 
research on implicit bias, associations 
between race and space, and stereotyping, 
and to explain the role of these phenomena in 
present-day discrimination in housing 
decisions. 
 
reforming the analysis of group differences 
in the law and the social and medical 
sciences 
 
Response to other Amici  
Rule of Law Legal authority of the courts. 
This case is of interest to the ACRU 
because we are concerned that America 
be governed under the rule of law. 
 
transparency, accountability and 
integrity in government and fidelity to 
the rule of law. Judicial Watch 
regularly files amicus curiae briefs as a 
means to advance its public interest 
mission and has appeared as an amicus 
curiae in this Court on a number o 
 
Sound Understanding of Pertinent Statistical 
Issues 
 
Statutory Background and Context  
Because of vs. otherwise make available language 
Debate over the operative clause of the Fair 
Housing Act at issue in this case. 
Contextualizing FHA 
Historical or other background analysis 
contextualizing the passage and implementation of 
the Fair Housing Act. 
Definition of Disparate Impact How the author defines disparate impact. 
Discriminatory Intent Definition or principle of discriminatory intent. 
Equal Protection 
Reference to the use and purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Estoppel 
Argument that petitioner should be legally barred 
from arguing against disparate impact since 
petitioner agreed to a disparate impact analysis in a 
lower court. 
FHA Purpose 
Purpose of the Fair Housing Act, stated in the act 
itself, legislative history, or other litigation. 
Housing Segregation in Dallas 
Present or historical housing discrimination in 
Dallas. 
HUD Notice and Comment 
Description of HUD Notice and Comment period, 
mandatory for all federal regulations and rules. 
Original Research 
Research conducted by a party or judge 
specifically for this case at the Supreme Court. 
Other Details Miscellaneous important details. 
Procedural Background 
Arguments, analysis, or evidence drawn from the 
record in this case. 
5th Circuit Opinion  
Administrative Regulations  
HUD Regulation  
District Court Opinion  
Remedial Order  
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Statistical Data  
Race, Race consciousness, racialization 
Related to racialization, race, “race neutral” or 
“race conscious” policies or terminology. 
Segregation and Harms 
Description of segregation and different related 
harms, including the creation of housing 
segregation. 
Federal public housing programs helped 
create segregated African American ghettos. 
 
Sources Sources Cited to within the Document 
Administrative Regs 
Regulations issued by federal administrative 
agencies, codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). 
Administrative Decisions 
Decisions by administrative courts interpreting the 
CFR. 
Briefs Briefs presented in this case or previous. 
Amici Briefs of amicus curiae. 
Cert petition 
Briefs from the process of petitioning for 
certiorari. 
Petitioner Briefs from the petitioners. 
Respondent Briefs from the respondent. 
Caselaw Previous decisions of a court. 
Courts of Appeals Decisions from federal appellate courts. 
District Court Decisions from federal district courts. 
State Court of Appeals Decisions from state appellate courts. 
State Supreme Court 
Decisions from state supreme courts, or highest 
court of appeal. 
State Trial Court Decisions from state trial courts. 
Supreme Court 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
Congressional Record 
Documents from the Congressional record and 
general legislative documents. 
Congressional Report Official report from a Congressional hearing or  
Constitution Constitution of the United States. 
Datasets 
Publicly or privately available dataset used in 
statistical analysis. 
Executive Action 
Executive Orders or Presidential Signing 
Statements 
External or Empirical Analysis 
Citation of authority that uses empirical data or 
secondary analysis. 
Books or Treatises Books or legal treatise. 
Census 
Census data, not to be confused with reports from 
the census bureau. 
Dictionary or Encyclopedia  
Law Journal or Peer Reviewed 
Academic 
This aggregates all law journals, law reviews, and 
any academic article cited. 
Magazine or Newspaper Any regular periodicals. 
Other  
Unpublished Dissertation  
Website Online resource 
Government or Professional Association 
Report or document from a governmental agency, 
professional organization, or other official source. 
ABA American Bar Association 
Section of Antitrust Law  
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American Planning Association  
Brookings Institute  
Casualty Actuarial Society  
Commission on Civil Rights  
Executive Agency  
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 
CDC Center for Disease Control 
Department of the Treasury  
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 
DOJ Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division  
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Reserve Board  
FHA Federal Housing Authority 
HUD Housing and Urban Development 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
Federal Housing Finance Agency  
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta  
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GAO Governmental Accountability Office 
Institute of Medicine Commission on 
Environmental Justice 
 
NAACP 
National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People 
National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders 
 
National Commission on Fair Housing 
and Equal Opportunity 
 
Pew Research Center  
United States Catholic Conference  
Urban Institute  
US Census Bureau  
US Conference of Mayors  
VA Veteran’s Affairs 
Rules of the Supreme Court  
State Law  
Atty. Gen. Opinion  
City Law  
Statute  
Statistical Analysis and Research Methods 
Comments or analysis related to statistical analysis 
or methodologies. 
Statistical Disparity 
Description, analysis, or definition of a statistical 
disparity. 
Wacky Hypos of Note 
Odd or relevant hypotheticals or metaphors 
presented in argument. 
When Disparate Impact Applies 
Hypothetical or statement describing a scenario 
when a disparate impact analysis is valid. 
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NAME DESCRIPTION 
Affirmative Action Description of affirmative action caselaw. 
Critical Mass Description or definition of “critical mass.” 
Demographics 
Analysis of demographics of Texas, the University 
of Texas, or other. 
Diversity 
Definition of diversity; on campus, in classroom, 
or other. 
Equal Protection 
Analysis of the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Measurement 
Describing, proscribing, or interrogating a way of 
measuring any of the concepts within the case. 
Mismatch Theory 
Advocacy for or critique of Richard Sander’s 
“Mismatch Theory,” which advocates for students 
of color to be placed in less selective colleges and 
universities. 
Race, Race consciousness, racialization 
Related to racialization, race, “race neutral” or 
“race conscious” policies or terminology. 
Race-neutral Alternative 
Description or policy agenda for a “race-neutral 
alternative” which the Court often searches for. 
Sources Sources Cited to within the Document 
Administrative Regs 
Regulations issued by federal administrative 
agencies, codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). 
Administrative Decisions 
Decisions by administrative courts interpreting the 
CFR. 
Briefs Briefs presented in this case or previous. 
Amici Briefs of amicus curiae. 
Brief for Amherst University et 
al. as Amici Curiae 
 
Brief for Asian American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund et 
al. as Amici Curiae 12 
 
Brief for Asian American Legal 
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
11 (representing 117 Asian 
American organizations). 
 
Brief for Black Students 
Association, et. al. as Amici 
Curiae 
 
Brief for Brown University et. al 
as Amici Curiae 
 
Brief for California Institute of 
Technology et al. as Amici 
~~Curiae 
 
Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus 
Curiae 12, and n. 4 (merits stage) 
 
Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus 
Curiae 8–12 (certiorari stage) 
 
Brief for Center for Individual 
Rights as Amicus Curiae 
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Brief for David Orentlicher as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin (No. 14-981) 
(2015) 
 
Brief for Experimental 
Psychologists as Amici Curiae 
 
Brief for Jonathan Zell as Amicus 
Curiae 
 
Brief for Judicial Education 
Project as Amicus Curiae 5– 17 
 
Brief for Judicial Watch, Inc., et 
al. as Amici Curiae 16. 
 
Brief for Military Leaders as 
Amicus Curiae 
 
Brief for NAACP as Amicus 
Curaie 
 
Brief for National Association of 
Basketball Coaches 
 
Brief for Richard D. Kahlenberg  
Brief for Richard Sander In 
Support Of Neither Party 
 
Brief for Six Educational 
Nonprofit Organizations as Amici 
Curiae 
 
Brief for Sweatt Family  
Brief for The Center for 
Individual Rights 
 
Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae 
 
Fisher I Amici 
Briefs of Amicus Curiae from Fisher v. University 
of Texas I. 
Brief Amici Curiae of 38 
Current Members of the 
Texas State Senate and 
House of Representatives in 
Support of Respondents, 
Fisher I (No. 11-345) (filed 
Aug. 13, 2012) 
 
Brief Amici Curiae of 
Empirical Scholars 
 
Brief Amici Curiae of Gail 
Heriot, Peter Kirsanow & 
Todd Gaziano, Members of 
the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights 
in Support of Petitioner, 
Fisher I (No. 11-345) (filed 
May 29, 2012) 
 
Brief Amici Curiae of the 
California Association of 
Scholars, et al. in Support of 
the Petitioner, Fisher I (No. 
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11-345) (filed Oct. 19, 
2011) 
Brief Amici Curiae of the 
California Association of 
Scholars, et al. in Support of 
the Petitioner, Fisher I (No. 
11-345) (filed Oct. 19, 
2011) (2) 
 
Brief Amicus Curiae of 
Richard Sander and Stuart 
Taylor 
 
Brief for Amici Curiae 
Fortune 100 and othe biz 
 
Brief for Amicus Curiae of 
the President and 
Chancellors of the 
University of California 
 
Brief for NAACP  
Brief for United States  
Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. 
Becton, Jr. et al., Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex., 133 S.Ct. 
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) 
 
Cert petition 
Briefs from the process of petitioning for 
certiorari. 
Petitioner Briefs from the petitioners. 
Respondent Briefs from the respondent. 
Caselaw Previous decisions of a court. 
Courts of Appeals Decisions from federal appellate courts. 
District Court Decisions from federal district courts. 
State Court of Appeals Decisions from state appellate courts. 
State Supreme Court 
Decisions from state supreme courts, or highest 
court of appeal. 
State Trial Court Decisions from state trial courts. 
Supreme Court 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
Congressional Record 
Documents from the Congressional record and 
general legislative documents. 
Congressional Report Official report from a Congressional hearing or  
Constitution Constitution of the United States. 
14th Amendment 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
Datasets 
Publicly or privately available dataset used in 
statistical analysis. 
Executive Action 
Executive Orders or Presidential Signing 
Statements 
External or Empirical Analysis 
Citation of authority that uses empirical data or 
secondary analysis. 
Books or Treatises Books or legal treatise. 
Census 
Census data, not to be confused with reports from 
the census bureau. 
College Board The College Board company. 
Dictionary or Encyclopedia  
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Law Journal or Peer Reviewed 
Academic 
This aggregates all law journals, law reviews, and 
any academic article cited. 
Magazine or Newspaper Any regular periodicals. 
Misc. Report 
Report from an organization not listed under 
“government or Professional Association”. 
Other  
Unpublished Dissertation  
UT Admissions Office University of Texas Admissions Office 
Website Online resource 
Factual Record 
Citation to the record presented either in the Joint 
Appendix, Supplemental Joint Appendix, or 
Petitioner’s appendix to cert petition. 
Government or Professional Association 
Report or document from a governmental agency, 
professional organization, or other official source. 
ABA American Bar Association 
Section of Antitrust Law  
AMA American Medical Association 
AAA American Anthropological Association 
American Planning Association  
AAMC Association of American Medical Colleges 
Brookings Institute  
Casualty Actuarial Society  
Center for Equal Opportunity  
Century Foundation  
Commission on Civil Rights  
CRO Congressional Research Office 
Executive Agency  
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics 
CDC Center for Disease Control 
Department of the Treasury  
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Education 
NCES National Center for Education Statistics 
DOJ Department of Justice 
BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Civil Rights Division  
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations 
FBOP Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Federal Reserve Board  
FHA Federal Housing Authority 
Homeland Security  
HUD Housing and Urban Development 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
Federal Housing Finance Agency  
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta  
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GAO Governmental Accountability Office 
Heritage Foundation  
House Research Organization  
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Institute of Medicine Commission on 
Environmental Justice 
 
LSAC 
LSAC inc., organization in charge of law school 
entrance exams. 
NAACP 
National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People 
National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders 
 
National Commission on Fair Housing 
and Equal Opportunity 
 
Pew Research Center  
United States Catholic Conference  
Urban Institute  
US Census Bureau  
US Conference of Mayors  
VA Veteran’s Affairs 
Oral argument  
State Law  
State Attorney General Opinion.  
City Law  
Statute  
Sweatt v. Painter Record Factual record from Sweatt v. Painter. 
United Nations (UN) & Other Jurisdictions 
Information from international organizations and 
laws of other nations. 
Statistical Analysis and Research Methods 
Comments or analysis related to statistical analysis 
or methodologies 
UT Admissions Policy 
Description of the admissions process for the 
University of Texas. 
Wacky Hypos of Note 
Odd or relevant hypotheticals or metaphors 
presented in argument. 
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Figure 16:  Figure 15: Institutional ethnographic map of Inclusive Communities 
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Figure 16: Photograph of Institutional Ethnographic Map of Fisher v. Texas 
 
